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The purpose of the efficacy of the Human Rights Violation Investigation 
Commission (Oputa Commission) in the Process of Transitional Justice (1966-
1999) is to explore the range of political and human rights problems that 
confronted Nigeria from colonial times, exacerbated by military incursion into 
governance in 1966. As the colonial period laid the foundation for ethnic and 
religious politics, the period of military rule brought moral, physical and 
institutional decay to Nigeria.  
The motivations of these military rulers were not driven by service to the 
country but personal gratification and accumulation of wealth. Corruption 
assumed pandemic proportions. Military leaders not only looted the coffers of the 
state but, like other dictators, their actions were above the law. They hounded, 
terrorised and jailed journalists, academics, human rights activists and all those 
who disagreed with them or their policies.  
Attempts to deal with these various problems of governance, which 
resulted in cases of gross violation of human rights, led to the Human Rights 
Violation Investigation Commission (the Oputa Commission) being established 
with a broad mandate to investigate past abuse and reconcile the peoples of 
Nigeria, so that harmony could be restored.  
The Oputa Commission, through its work, traversed the country and 
brought to light gory tales of past abuse in such a way that no one could deny they 
ever happened. The submissions received by the Commission revealed that all 
ethnic clusters or regional groups in Nigeria felt marginalised and cheated in 
federation. This general feeling of anger made the Commission’s work towards the 
restoration of harmony in the country even more urgent and important.  
The thesis will review Nigeria’s role to assess whether the country during 
the period under review complied with its international human rights obligations. 
The thesis finally discusses the lessons from the Oputa Commission as a 
transitional justice mechanism for Nigerians, and perhaps other nations emerging 
from war and/or human rights violations. This is important, considering the 




analysis of other countries with a history of authoritarianism and human rights 
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“Truth commissions have become routine; it has become a standard practice. You 
have a transition, and everybody immediately says we have to have a truth 
commission”. 1 
1.1 Background to the study 
In African societies, conflict resolution and peace building have long been 
a common phenomenon in antiquity2; perhaps what is new in contemporary 
debate is the efficacy of transitional justice in national development and classical 
democracy.3 This study therefore is an attempt to examine the nature of 
contention and contradictions of the Nigerian version of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, known as the Nigerian Human Rights Violation Investigation 
Commission (Oputa Commission).4 This mechanism also investigates political and 
human rights problems that have confronted Nigeria since the military political 
incursion in 1966.5 This study is important because political and human rights 
challenges in the country have long been on the periphery of constructive dialogue 
about nation building6 and ethnic diversity. Political activists affirm that the 
military regime brought with it moral, physical and institutional decay in Nigeria.7 
                                                          
1   BAXTER, V., 2002. Empirical Research Methodologies of Transitional Justice  
Mechanism. Stellenbosch, South Africa, 18-20. 
2   OLAOBA, O.A.  2005. Traditional Approaches To Conflict Resolution in the South-West  
  Zone of Nigeria. the Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal, 1(1), 22-40. Also See UMARU, K.O.  
  2005. Challenges of Conflict Management and Resolution in West Africa. the Nigerian  
  Army Quarterly Journal, 1(4), 391-404. 
3   JOSEPH, A.R. 1999. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: the Rise and Fall of the  
  Second Republic. Spectrum Books Ltd: Ibadan,4. Also See ESHIET, G. 2009. Transitional  
  Justice and Its Implications For Women in Nigeria. Women's World, 44, 17-35. 
4  ODURO, F., 2012. the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Lessons From  
  Comparable Experiences in Nigeria and Ghana. the Canadian Journal of Native  
  Studies, 32(2), 103-120. 
5  KIEH, G.K. AND AGBESE, P.O. eds., 2004. the Military and Politics in Africa: From  
  Engagement To Democratic and Constitutional Control. Ash Gate Publishing, Ltd. Also See  
  ACHEBE, C., 2012. There Was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra. Penguin. 
6  “Violations By the Police and Other Law Enforcement Agencies,” Annual Report 1997. Also  
  See: A Civil Liberties Organisation Report, 1999 On the State of Human Rights in Nigeria.  
  Civil Liberties Organisation: Lagos. 




Indeed, it has also been noted that the motivations of military rulers were not 
driven by service to the nation, but by personal gratification and accumulation of 
wealth.8 As a consequence, corruption became endemic in all regimes, leaving the 
country in a quagmire of human rights violations.9 In such situations therefore, the 
study affirms that there are a variety of transitional justice mechanisms that can 
help affected societies start afresh.10 In Nigeria, military leaders not only looted 
the treasures of the land,11 but like other dictators worldwide, they were unable 
to draw a distinction between themselves and the state.12 At the same time, their 
agents were seen to be above the law as they hounded, terrorised and jailed 
journalists, academics, human rights activists and all those who disagreed with 
their interests and policies.13 Like Kenya, the significance of institutional cleansing 
becomes inevitable, i.e., the transformation and improvement of these 
institutions through wide reaching reforms becomes one of the key cornerstones 
of an effective transitional justice process. As Grissen (1995) has written in his 
biography: “Military Intelligence held us in Apapa for two nights and then moved 
us to Security Service (SS) headquarters in Ikoyi, Lagos, for further questioning. At 
first our quarters were not crowded. But before our time was spent, 23 of us were 
sleeping in one room, on the floor on narrow mattresses”.14  Incidents like this one 
describe the nasty and brutal nature of Nigerian security apparatus. 
                                                          
  Democratic Development (1993-1999).Also See, FRANK, E.O., & UKPERE, W.I. 2012. the  
  Impact of Military Rule On Democracy in Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences, 33(3), 285- 
  292. 
8  TOYIN, O.S., 2015.the Impact of Military Coup D’etat On Political Development in Nigeria.  
  International Journal of Business and Social Science, 6(10), 194-202. 
9   BELLO, A. AND ODUSOTE, A., 2013. the Matrix of Bad Governance: Corruption and  
  Insecurity in Nigeria. in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Conference of the Nigerian  
  Association of Law Teachers Held Between the 22nd-26th April (606-643). 
10   KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. Transitional Justice in Kenya: A Toolkit For Training  
  and Engagement. 18. 
11   AGBESED. 2012. Ibrahim Babangida: the Military, Politics and Power in Nigeria.  
  Adonis and Abbey Publishers: Ikeja. 
12  BEST, S.G. AND VIVEKANANDA, F., 1999. the Nigerian Military, Militarism and the Crisis  
  of Democracy in Nigeria. Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives and Area  
  Studies, 18, 25-46. 
13  OLUKOTUN, A., 2004. Repressive State and Resurgent Media Under Nigeria's Military  
  Dictatorship, 1988-98 (Vol. 126). Nordic Africa Institute. 
14   GRISSEN, L.V., 1995. That We May Be One: the Autobiography of Nigerian Ambassador 




Various attempts to deal with the problems of military rule as well as cases 
of gross violation of human rights led to the setting up of the Oputa Commission.15 
The Commission had a broad mandate to investigate past rights violation, and 
reconcile the peoples of Nigeria with peace and progress.16 To achieve its 
mandate, the Commission traversed the country and brought home gory tales of 
past abuse that revealed that all ethnic clusters or regional groups in Nigeria felt 
marginalised and cheated in relation to the Nigerian federation project.17 The 
general feeling of anger made the Commission’s work in Nigeria more urgent than 
ever.  
The Oputa Commission received several reviews in journal articles. Some 
of these include Adeyemo (2013),18 Guaker (2009),19 Ikhariale (2008),20 Yusuf 
(2007),21 Akhihiero (2001/2002)22 and Kukah (2011)23 among others. This could be 
attributed to the indispensability of the findings and recommendations of the 
Commission, despite the ambush of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. Because of such 
intellectual productions, this research is the first doctoral study that focuses on 
the efficacy of the Nigerian Human Rights Violation Commission in the process of 
the transitional justice (1966–1999). No detailed study has been conducted on 
transitional justice in Nigeria. This research is also timely and the topic apt, 
                                                          
15   YUSUF, H.O., 2007. Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice For Victims of Impunity in  
  Nigeria. the International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1(2), 268-286. 
16   GUÅKER, E., 2009. A Study of the Nigerian Truth Commission and Why It Failed (Master's  
  Thesis, the University of Bergen). Also See, PERRY, J., & SAYNDEE, T.D. 2015. African Truth  
  Commissions and Transitional Justice. Lexington Books: Lanham. 
17  AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. Nigeria, Time For Justice and Accountability. London, UK:  
  International Secretariat, 2000.  Available  
http://www.Amnesty.Org/En/Library/Info/Afr44/014/2000 (Accessed June 12, 2008). 
18   ADEYEMO, D.D., 2013. Transitional Justice After the Military Regimes in Nigeria: A Failed  
  Attempt? Doctoral Dissertation, University of Western Cape. 
19   GUÅKER, E., 2009. A Study of the Nigerian Truth Commission and Why It Failed. Master's  
  Thesis, the University of Bergen. 1-51. 
20  IKHARIALE, M., 2004. the Oputa Reports: An Unfinished Job.  
  wttp://www.Nigerdeltacongress.Com/Oarticles/Oputa Reports. Htm. 1-4. 
21   YUSUF, H.O., 2007. Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice For Victims of Impunity in  
  Nigeria. the International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1(2), 268-286. 
22   AKHIHIERO P., 2001/2002. the Constitutionality and Powers of the Human Rights  
Violations Investigations Commission (Oputa Panel), Vol.7.No.1, University of Benin Law 
Journal, 116-135. 
23   KUKAH, M.H., 2011. Witness To Justice: An Insider's Account of Nigeria's Truth  




because of the knowledge it offers in conflict and peace building studies, as well 
as the transitional justice system.  
Additionally, this study discusses how other countries with a history of 
authoritarian and human rights violations have confronted their ugly past. Notably 
is South Africa with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which is 
arguably the continent’s best known example of restorative justice, when it 
choose to offer perpetrators amnesty in exchange for full disclosure about their 
past crimes.24 A comparative review of the transitional justice mechanism in other 
countries like the Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), will 
therefore help to inform the evaluation of the Oputa Commission’s work and 
mandate broadly. This is more compelling in countries undergoing a radical shift 
from repression to democracy, for the question of transitional justice presents, in 
a very conspicuous manner, the first real test for the establishment of real 
democracy and rule of law.25 
Casting a glance on Rwanda, there may be much that can be learnt from 
the Gacaca model, in what is an unquestionably difficult context in which to 
establish a new regime of rights and participation, the lessons it holds for 
grassroots approaches to transitional justice may not only be the result of its 
apparent positive potential, but of its problems too.26 It is trite to posit that 
democracy as a process cannot be built on a culture of impunity where real 
questions of recent past human rights violations have not been addressed in 
Nigeria.27 For a virile democracy to be established, past abuses must be addressed, 
and the ugly past exorcised.28 There is no “one-size-fits-all” model for addressing 
                                                          
24   KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. Transitional Justice in Kenya: A Toolkit For Training  
  and Engagement.44 
25  HAYNER, P.B., 2010. Unspeakable Truths 2e: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of  
  Truth Commissions. Routledge: New York.  
26   LUNDY, P. AND MCGOVERN, M., 2008. Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice  
  From the Bottom Up. Journal of Law and Society, 35(2), 265-292. 
27  FLETCHER, L.E., WEINSTEIN, H.M., & ROWEN, J. 2009. Context, Timing and thedynamics  
  of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective. Human Rights Quarterly, 31(1), 163-220. 
28   FARLEY, M.K. 2008. “Identity in Transition: Towards A Conceptualization of the Socio- 
  Political Dynamics of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, Doctoral  
  Dissertation, University of Cape Town; ROSENBERG, T. 1999. “Afterword: Confronting the  
  Painful Past”. in MEREDITH, M., 1999. Coming to terms: South Africa's search for  




past human rights violations.29 Each country’s unique history requires a tailor-
made transitional justice process.30 The method used by a particular country 
depends on its history and circumstance.  However, it is important that the model 
a country adopts should recognise the worth and dignity of those who suffered 
gross abuse in the past and uphold rule of law; in other words, the process must 
have, as its twin objective, the need for justice and reconciliation of the people 
who were previously divided. 31  
To achieve justice, judicial institutions that are transparent and impartial 
must be established to deal with those who committed gross violation of human 
rights.32 Though courts are important and dispense justice, they cannot, however, 
impose reconciliation. In a cautionary tale however, there is also an under-
examined feature that truth commissions have placed on the importance of 
commissioners and their appointment processes.33 Because there is so very little 
research on selection processes for commissions, Lanegran (2015) 34argues that 
the advice given to leaders establishing new commissions remains simplistic. 
Reconciliation as a process must be deliberate and willing and recognise 
the pain of victims and confession of guilt from the perpetrators.35 The wrongs of 
the past must be accepted in a process that thoroughly deals with the relationship 
between perpetrators and victims.36  
                                                          
29  ORENTLICHER, D.F. 2007. ‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms With  
  Local Agency. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1(1), 10-22. 
30   STACEY, S. 2004. A Lockean Approach To Transitional Justice. the Review of  
  Politics, 66(01), 55-82; DUGGARD, J. 1997. “Retrospective Justice: International Law and  
  the South Africa  Model”. in MCADAMS, A.J., 1997. Transitional Justice and the Rule of  
  Law in New Democracies. Univ of Notredame Press: Notredame. 
31   SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N., 2010. Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United  
  Nations   Approach To Transitional Justice.  
32   KIM, H., & SIKKINK, K. 2010. Explaining thedeterrence Effect of Human Rights  
  Prosecutions For Transitional Countries. International Studies Quarterly, 54(4), 939-963;  
  ROHT-ARRIAZA, N. ED. 1995. Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and  
  Practice.  Oxford University Press: New York. 
33   LANEGRAN, K., 2015. the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission: the  
Importance of Commissioners and Their Appointment Process. Transitional Justice  
Review, 1(3), 3.   
34   Ibid. 
35     HAYNER, P.B., 2010. Unspeakable Truths 2e: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of  
  Truth Commissions. Routledge: New York. 
36   GUILLERMO, O., SCHMITTER, P. & WHITEHEAD, L., 1986. Transitions From  




Nevertheless, such a process can be promoted by those who may not be 
directly involved in the conflict; but the process must be owned by those who are 
directly concerned with the issues (i.e. victims and perpetrators).37 Opinions are 
divided and not conclusive on whether a bottom-top approach to reconciliation is 
preferred to a top-down approach. Proponents of the former approach are of the 
view that improved interpersonal relations, which lead to local home grown 
reconciliation and grass roots initiatives are viewed as key to success.38 
Contrary to this view however is that for local dynamics to change, 
national intervention must first take place. This will filter down or create the 
conditions by which local actors can pursue the reconciliation process.39 No 
matter what approach is taken, what is clear is that to achieve reconciliation is 
difficult as the issues involved are personal, and sometimes sensitive.40 The 
authorities cannot impose trust and empathy by decree and they cannot also 
forgive in the name of the victims. The lessons of the amnesty legislations in Latin 
American countries in the 1980s did not discourage the families of those who 
disappeared from seeking justice and retribution.41 In South Africa, the powers of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) to grant amnesty 
for acts associated with a political objective including crimes that could constitute 
war crimes or crimes against humanity received disapproval of many human 
rights organizations.42 Further the victims of apartheid regimes were up in arms 
with the government and multinational companies demanding compensation for 
past crimes post the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) 
                                                          
37   SOOKA, Y., 2006. Dealing With the Past and Transitional Justice: Building Peace Through  
  Accountability. International Review of the Red Cross, 88(862), 311-325. 
38   ROHT-ARRIAZA, N. AND MARIEZCURRENA, J. eds., 2006. Transitional Justice in the  
Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice. Cambridge:Cambridge University      
Press. 
39  BLOOMFIELD, D., BARNES, T. AND HUYSE, L. eds., 2003. Reconciliation After Violent  
  Conflict: A Handbook. International Idea. 25. 
40    BHARGAVA, R., 2012. thedifficulty of Reconciliation. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 38(4- 
  5), 369-377. 
41   DAVIS, J., 2014. Seeking Human Rights Justice in Latin America: Truth, Extra-Territorial  
  Courts, and the Process of Justice. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
42   VARNEY, H, 2010. “Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice and Exceptionalism in South  
  Africa”, Contested Transitions: Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, in Colombia and  




process.43 Arguably, the criticism of the amnesty process in South Africa despite 
some level of accountability it provided may have informed the provision of a 
weaker amnesty mandate in the enabling legislation of the Kenya Truth Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission (KTJRC). The KTJRC only had powers to 
recommend amnesty for perpetrators unlike the SATRC, which had full powers to 
grant amnesty after full disclosure. The focus of this thesis is therefore on the 
concept of Truth Commissions (TCs), and their nature and impact on transitional 
societies, mainly in the African context. 
 
1.2 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions – an overview 
Faith in TRCs to achieve transitional justice has been in vogue in recent 
years, especially after the formation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (SATRC) in 1996. The popularity of the SATRC soared after it 
submitted its report in 1998.44 The SATRC also evoked much interest amongst 
transitional justice scholars, the media45 and human rights groups all desirous of 
peace in the world.46 It was hoped that the South African model could be exploited 
in various transitional societies as a reference point for holding accountable those 
individuals who in the past took part in various deplorable acts of human rights 
violations; while also assuring some sort of relief and justice for victims.47 It should 
be recalled that TRCs had earlier been carried out in Latin America (Argentina and 
Chile); however, the acclaimed success of the South Africa Truth and 
                                                          
43   Jubilee South Africa and Khulumani Support Group Instituted Claims Against Foreign  
  Banks and Companies That Supported the Apartheid Government. the Claims Were Filed  
  in the US Court On Behalf of Victims of Apartheid Crimes Atrocities. 
44   GIBSON, J.L., 2006. the Contributions of Truth To Reconciliation: Lessons From South  
  Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(3), 409-432. 
45   MOHAMMED, Y. 1987 (October 27). “Wanted: A National Ethic”. News Watch  
  Magazine. (Nigeria), 4. the Author Also Notes: ‘This Country Can’t Keep Postponing the  
  Acceptance of All the Ingredients That Promotedevelopment and Expect That It Will  
  Develop By Mere Wishful Thinking’, 4. 
46    GREADY, P., 2010. the Era of Transitional Justice: the Aftermath of the Truth and  
  Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond. Routledge: New York. 
47  It Should Be Noted That Previous Truth Commissions in Latin America (Chile and  
  Argentina) Had Already Started This Process, Which the South Africa Process Would  




Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) helped popularise TRCs as an effective 
transitional justice mechanism.48  
TRCs are further seen as a mechanism to capture the story of an 
authoritarian past and create memorabilia in remembrance of the past, replete 
with political repression and human rights violation.49 It has become the central 
point for a transitional justice stratagem. By 2003, TRCs had captured popular 
imagination with more than 25 TRCs formed worldwide.50 In the southern parts of 
the world, for instance, it was observed that this trend has especially become 
widespread, from Latin America to postcolonial South Africa,51 to the West African 
states of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ghana, and to the island of East Timor 
(Timor-Leste) situated in South East Asia, which gained its independence and 
became a sovereign state as late as 2002.52 In March 2009, the Truth Justice 
Reconciliation Act was enacted by the Parliament in Kenya launching the Kenya 
TJRC. 
All these nations have one thing in common, namely that they had Truth 
and Reconciliation Commissions (hereafter TRC or TRCs) at different times, to 
account for human rights violations during previous authoritarian or colonial rule 
in their domains. These TRCs were given a mandate to hold accountable those 
individuals who committed gross human rights violation under the previous 
regime and to make recommendations about relief for victims.53 
Prior to the sudden surge in popularity of TRCs in the late 1990s; TCs had 
emerged more than a decade earlier as an alternative to the process of criminal 
justice, via judiciary systems.54 Uganda was the first country to establish a truth 
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commission in 1974;55 followed by the Latin American countries of Bolivia (1982), 
Argentina (1983) and Chile (1990). These countries were the first to have adopted 
TRCs to take stock of various human rights violations that took place in their 
regions during violent civil wars in the second half of the twentieth century.56  
The Argentinian and Chilean TRCs produced remarkable results and it was 
the experience of both countries that scholars relied on before opting in favour of 
TRCs, and other similar processes that aimed at seeking justice for all past human-
rights violation worldwide.57 Both experiences with TRC worked to capture the 
attention of world scholars. The SATRC later became a role model for countries 
that did not wish to seek reprisals for all past human rights violation, as well as 
transitional nation-states.58 Perhaps this is because “the leaders of the new South 
Africa promised that never, never again should this country experience the 
oppression of one by another”.59 
The main reason for the popularity of TRCs are its various normative 
frameworks, such as being more focused on the victims and aiming to restore 
truth and justice, as well as helping victims overcome their trauma and lead them 
towards recovery.60 The process is based on the mechanism of systematic 
organisation of collective memory and oral evidence in order to reconstruct actual 
events and arrive at the global or macro truth, that is, the systemic cause of the 
human rights violation.61 It also facilitates reconciliation for victims to address 
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their past sufferings and begin a process of healing. It is for these reasons that 
TRCs have become a useful tool for countries emerging from autocratic rule and 
civil conflict. Available evidence shows that TRCs tend to portray certain 
limitations and are sometimes fraught with ineffectuality that renders their 
functioning difficult and their normative values, which promise to offer justice to 
victims, in most cases fail to deliver. In fact, most experts working in this field of 
human rights violation, speak of a lack of empirical evidence to support the various 
attainment the TRCs or any other processes aiming for transitional justice, claim 
to achieve.62 
However, TRCs have received widespread support amongst member states 
of the United Nations63 claiming that this approach is a definitive step towards 
bringing about positive outcomes in the process of reconciliation with a violent 
past.  However, the actual process is very different from various purported claims. 
The different international human rights organisations advocate TRCs over 
transitional nations,64 mainly developing nations, which have recently emerged 
from a brutal past, such as Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.65  
Other countries in this category include Ghana, Rwanda and the Central 
African Republic.66 TRCs are said to present to these nations a model to achieve 
peace and political stability after past violent conflicts and human rights 
violation.67 However, international organisations fail to comprehend the basic 
underlying political nature of these African developing countries. The unstable and 
turbulent nature of their social structure with fledgling democratic orders, exhibits 
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a certain type of competitiveness in their political system and electoral policies 
that often result in unintended negative outcomes for TRCs. 68 
Consequently, problems arise when these TRCs, suitable for stable states, 
are recommended for fragile and unstable African democracies like Nigeria. 
Besides these basic problems, the major challenges faced by the Nigerian TRC (that 
later came to light) were that the Commission’s proceedings were not supported 
by strong laws, spelling out its mandate clearly.69 Owing to these flaws some of 
the respondents, who were financially strong and powerful,70 exploited the legal 
system to stall the proceedings of the Oputa Commission. The Supreme Court of 
Nigeria, on the other hand, declared that the Commission was illegal, and 
therefore void.71 
 
1.3   Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the efficacy of the Human Rights 
Violation Investigation Commission (Oputa Commission) in the process of Nigeria’s 
transitional justice. It brings to the fore the involvement of the military in Nigerian 
politics72 and attendant human rights violation since 1966.73 As a neglected theme 
in national discourse, this research differs extensively from the broader issues of 
criminal justice and the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC), subject to 
intensive research and studies by different scholars.74  
                                                          
68   MCGOWAN, P.J., 2006. Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part Ii, Empirical  
  Findings. Armed Forces & Society, 32(2), 234-253. 
69   SMITH, D.J., 2010. Response To Eric Uslaner's Review of A Culture of Corruption: Everyday  
  Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria. Perspectives On Politics, 8(4), 1176-1177. 
70   MOMOH, A. AND ADEJUMOBI, S., 1999. the Nigerian Military and the Crisis of  
  Democratic Transition: A Study in the Monopoly of Power. Civil Liberties Organisation: 
Lagos. 
71  FAWEHINMI GANI AND OTHERS V. GENERAL IBRAHIM BABANGIDA AND OTHERS (Sc.  
  360/2001). 
72  MEREDITH, M., 2011. the State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence.  
  Simon and Schuster: New York. 
73   DADA, D.J.A. 2013. Human Rights Protection in Nigeria: the Past, the Present and Goals  
  For Role Actors For the Future. Human Rights, 14. 
74  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: Selected Full-Text Books and Articles Can Be Found  
  On.Https://Www.Questia.Com/Library/Criminal-Justice/Trials/International-Criminal- 




Therefore, the primary purpose of this work is to analyse the nature and 
dynamics of political transition in Nigeria, and how the military regimes deployed 
power and authority in the abuse of human rights.75 Indeed, the study reveals the 
way government manipulates commissions of inquiry to divert public attention 
from socio-political problems.76 This research will be beneficial to scholars and 
researchers in various fields of knowledge. It will also be useful to nations yearning 
for transitional justice and reconciliation, and by extension nations emerging from 
violent past and gross human rights violations.  
Emphatically, this is imperative if there is the disintegration of certain 
states, the reconstitution of national identities, the emergence of transnational 
non-state actors such as the ‘Islamic State’ or Boko Haram and the intervention of 
the international criminal justice system in numerous conflicts that have called on 
us to challenge the immutability of the nation state as a primary means of 
reflecting on and organizing transitional justice approaches.77 
 
1.4 Aim and objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to determine the effectiveness of the Oputa 
Commission in the process of Nigeria’s transitional justice. Myriad forms of 
human rights violation by law enforcement agencies during the military 
regimes are also investigated.78 Since the emergence of the military in Nigerian 
politics,79 human rights violations had been underplayed in major discourse on 
the experiences of victims and witnesses,80 despite the inclusion of 
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fundamental human rights in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria in 1989.81 
Similarly, reports of the Civil Liberty Organisation82 and international 
non-governmental organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, have also remained on the periphery of the government’s 
agenda. This scenario clearly underscores the importance of this study. Four 
specific objectives in this study are: 1) examine the dynamics of political 
transition since colonial Nigeria,83 2) discuss the nature and impact of human 
rights violation in Nigeria, 3) analyse the role and contribution of the Human 
Rights Violation Investigation Commission (the Oputa Commission),84 and 4) 
underline the lessons that other countries could learn from the Nigeria 
transitional justice process. 
 
1.5 Problem statement 
 
Over the years, the problems of human rights violation by law 
enforcement agencies and other organs of government85 have been 
minimised in major discourse on nation building in Nigeria.86 This was of real 
concern in the last decade of the twentieth century when police brutality 
reached its peak.87 Apart from the complaints of victims and witnesses, the 
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government of the day did not see anything wrong with the atrocities and 
extrajudicial killing.88 Besides, the reports of human rights activists also 
corroborated the account of victims and observers, which the authorities 
considered as sabotage to national unity. 89  
Amidst the overwhelming evidence of human rights violation, the Nigerian 
government vehemently denied its existence.90 At the same time, government 
representatives and senior officers in the military debunked the idea as fictional 
and a campaign of calumny to tarnish the image of the country.91 The undaunted 
efforts of human rights activists and non-governmental organisations that 
reported victims of human rights violations to the media92 ultimately gave 
credence to the rumour that forced government to accept responsibility. The 
capitulation of the authorities was not for nothing, as some scholars posit, but due 
to the imminent breakdown of law and order, which the government wanted to 
forestall. This is corroborated by Grissen (1995) “One man’s lust for power has 
denied human rights to the majority of Nigeria’s millions. Such mockery of people 
cannot long withstand silent rebellion that smoulders just beneath the surface of 
the nation’s people”. 93 Thus, there was a cry for reconciliation and peace building 
in the form of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to reduce the increasing 
agitation.94 
It is therefore obvious previous that the diversity of Nigerian society, as 
well as its composition which centred on ethnicity and class95 has made human 
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rights violation possible since the civil war. The question therefore is how did 
Nigeria get to this point in its history?96 Has the country acknowledged the various 
abuses and extrajudicial killing in Nigeria? And further, to what extent did the 
Oputa Commission achieve its mandate?97 These among other questions have 
compelled this study to evaluate the Human Rights Violation Investigation 
Commission (HRVIC), hereafter the Oputa Commission, and the process of 
Nigerian transitional justice.  
1.6 Research questions 
 
Research questions are meant to guide researchers in their interpretation and 
analysis.98 Therefore this study is essentially guided by the following questions:  
What were the dynamics of political transition since colonial Nigeria?99 
What was the nature and impact of human rights violation in Nigeria? 
What was the role and contribution of the Oputa Commission and to what extent 
did it achieve its mandate?100 
What were the lessons of the Oputa Commission for Nigerian peoples and the 
wider world, especially countries in transition from a brutal or authoritarian past?  
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The success of the Oputa Commission was diminished because there was 
no official publication of its report,101 because the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
declared the Commission illegal and redundant.102 An important outcome of the 
TRC in Nigeria is that, if TRCs are to be established, the Commission should be so 
created to suit the national context.103 There must be well-defined legislation, with 
clearly spells out its jurisdictions so that conflicts with other existing mechanisms 
would not occur. All these measures are necessary to make a TRC function 
effectively within a fledgling democracy, emerging from a brutal past of gross 
human rights violation. 
Could the Oputa Commission be regarded as a success, even though its 
report was not published officially?104 The answer is affirmative because there 
were other benefits. The Oputa Commission was an attempt at reconciliation and 
it covered a lot of grounds despite the absence of strong legal instruments to back 
it up and the pronouncement of the Supreme Court. It is a plus to ordinary people 
who never thought their cases would one day be heard in the public domain and 
create shame on those who thought they were above the law.105 
 
1.8   Operational definition of terms 
It is important to provide a working definition of some of the terms used 
in this study to promote wider understanding. Civil war means a violent conflict 
within a country fought by organised groups that aim to take power at the centre 
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or in a region or to change government policies.106 War refers to a matter of doing 
evil in the hope that good may come out of it. Out of war comes peace; out of loss 
gain. War denotes “armed conflict not of an international character"107 and must 
show two criteria:  
(1) The revolting faction must show some reasonable degree of organization.  
(2) The armed confrontation between the parties must reach some degree of 
intensity. If all the above characteristics are present, then the legal government is 
“obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents 
organized as military".108 
Human rights imply that “all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.109 Transitional justice means a 
response to systematic or widespread violation of human rights. It seeks 
recognition for the victims, and promotes possibilities for peace, reconciliation, 
and democracy in the country.110 Transitional justice is not a special form of justice 
but adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive 
human rights violations. In some cases, this transformation happens suddenly; in 
others, it may take place over many decades”.111 Truth commissions refer to 
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commissions of inquiry with the primary purpose(s) of investigating and reporting 
on key periods of recent past abuse. They are often official state bodies that make 
recommendations to remedy such abuse and to prevent its recurrence.112 
1.9 Significance of the study 
This study contributes to Nigerian legal studies, history, conflict and peace 
building. It is one of the few detailed studies linking the democratic development 
of Nigeria with human rights violation by the state, and the quest to address those 
violations through a transitional justice mechanism known as the Oputa 
Commission. Specifically, the significance of the study includes:  
• Discussion on the dynamics of political transition since colonial Nigeria.113 
• Examination of the nature and impact of human rights violation in 
Nigeria.114 
• An analysis of the role and contribution of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, known as the Oputa Commission. 
• Underlying lessons of the Oputa Commission for Nigerian peoples and the 
wider world.   
• Assistance of the government in repositioning the Nigerian legal system 
and security services to meet the challenges of the modern era.115 
• Benefit to scholars, researchers and the public interested in issues of 
politics,116 transitional justice and human rights. 
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1.10 Methodology and justification of the study  
The study of truth and reconciliation is an emerging sub-discipline within 
the larger discipline of law, conflict and peace building. Thus, the methodology for 
studying this aspect of knowledge will continue to grow as more doctoral theses 
are devoted to this study area. In redressing this gap, therefore the study adopts 
an inter-disciplinary approach; it employs the historical method of data collection, 
analysis and interpretation from primary and secondary sources.117 
Primary sources include archival materials obtained from the national 
archives in Kaduna (NAK), Ibadan (NAI) and Enugu (NAE) respectively. Materials 
obtained from these places were analysed and interpreted with a view to clarifying 
and complementing information from oral interviews and documentary evidence. 
The study also gained from the personal experience of the researcher who was a 
coordinator and technical advisor to the Oputa Commission. The researcher also 
obtained oral evidence collected through structured interviews from respondents 
including (a) victims and witnesses of human rights violations in Lagos, Abuja and 
Enugu, (b) law enforcement agents who lived and worked in Lagos and Abuja, (c) 
participants and observers of the Oputa Commission, and (d) human rights 
activists. Reliance on oral evidence arose from the dearth of documentary 
evidence of principal witnesses, victims and a panel of judges (known as the Oputa 
Panel).  Above all, it provides valuable clues that complement other sources and 
enrich the work.  
Also employed in the study is information from newspapers118, 
magazines,119 bulletins and other related documents, especially reports of Truth 
and Reconciliation Commissions in Liberia, South Africa and Mexico, to mention a 
few. These documents were accessed for the purposes of verifying existing data. 
Most of the information was obtained from the University of Lagos and 
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Christopher University Mowe, Lagos. Others were online publications on the TRC 
in Ghana120 and Latin America.  
The researcher equally exploited films and documentaries121 on TRCs in 
other countries. The documentary films are useful because they help reconcile 
grey areas in the activities of the Oputa Commission. Secondary sources were also 
utilised in this study, consisting mainly of books, journal articles, theses, 
dissertations, monographs and other unpublished works. Most were obtained 
from the University of Lagos, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Ahmadu Bello 
University, Zaria and Christopher University Mowe, Lagos.   
In analysis and interpretation of the data, the study incorporated concepts 
from cognate disciplines122 such as law, history, political science and peace and 
conflict studies.123 The fieldwork was conducted in Lagos, Abuja and Enugu.124 This 
also assisted the researcher in clarifying information obtained from other sources. 
This is the first focused study on Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
Nigeria, as to the best of our knowledge, no intellectual production on the Oputa 
Commission has been carried out. The study is apt and timely because it draws on 
parallels between intellectual evidence, politics and policy making.125 On the one 
hand, this research will serve as a reminder to the authorities that there was a 
Nigeria project that is yet to be concluded for lack of legal instruments.126 
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The study, on the other hand, is capable of convincing victims of human 
rights violations in Nigeria that they have been vindicated, even though the 
findings were not implemented. It will also inform the government that human 
rights violation in Nigeria needs be tackled with the urgency it demands127 just like 
that of Ghana,128 Liberia and the SATRC. Additionally, this study will be beneficial 
to human rights activists and non-governmental organisations, researchers and 
the public in need of raw material for further research and evaluation of nations 
in transition. 
1.11 Limitations of the study 
The concept of transitional justice and human rights violation is beyond 
the scope of this research; it was therefore important to consider the interplay of 
politics and social justice in Nigerian polity. Therefore, the limitations of this study 
are the time set for submission, financial constraints, and victims’ and witnesses’129 
reluctance to grant interviews on their experience of law enforcement agents, as 
well as paucity of archival materials. 
1.12 Literature review 
The study adopts a thematic approach in the review of relevant literature 
and these are categorised as follows. The first category discusses the history of 
Nigeria and development of ethnic politics since the colonial period. The second 
explores the involvement of the Nigerian military in politics and transition to 
democracy. Whereas the third category comprises generalised works on human 
rights violation for the period 1966–1999, and the Oputa Commission. 
History of Nigeria and development of ethnic politics 
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The literature in the first category include: Ikime (ed.) (2012), Groundwork 
of Nigerian History,130 Falola et al. (1989), History of Nigeria, vol. 1,131 Crowder, 
(1966), The Story of Nigeria132 and Falola et al. (1991), History of Nigeria, vol.3,133 
Akpofure and Crowder (1966), Nigeria, A Modern History for Schools,134 Perham 
(1960), Lugard, The Years of Authority 1898–1945,135 and Lugard (1922), The Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa.136 
These works are certainly useful to this study because they explore the 
history of Nigeria from pre- to post-colonial periods. Obaro Ikime’s edited work is 
a collection of essays, which covers the entire spectrum of the history of Africa’s 
largest black state. Part 4 of the book, which covers Nigeria in the twentieth 
century, is most valuable to this study, particularly, Tamuno’s “British Colonial 
Administration in Nigeria in the Twentieth Century”, and “The Nationalist Struggle 
for Independence”.137  
Falola et al. (1991)138discusses, among other subjects, the land and peoples 
of Nigeria, tradition of origins, intergroup relations, as well as Nigeria and the 
outside world. In discussing the birth of Nigeria, and the events leading to 
independence, Crowder (1966)139 affirms that Nigeria’s journey towards self-
determination was complex and eventful.  
The chapters on the rise of Nigerian nationalism, the three constitutions 
and independence achieved, are raw material for the understanding of this 
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study.140 Writing on colonialism, Falola and colleagues support Crowder’s thinking 
on the political impact of colonial rule. The chapters on military administration, 
1966–1979 and the second republic, 1979–1983 provide a rich study on activities 
of the military junta and attendant human rights violation in the country, the focus 
of this study.141  
Akpofure and Crowder’s work corroborates the views of Falola et al. but 
emphasises that the history of Nigeria today stretches back more than two 
thousand years. At present, much of this history lies in the myths and legends of 
oral tradition. The chapters on consular rule loss of sovereignty and the origin of 
regionalism inform this study.142 
Perham’s work investigates the early years of indirect rule in Nigeria and 
the various contradictions of nationhood. The chapters on the creation of 
Nigeria143, indirect rule,144 and the Lagos opposition,145 are critical to this work. 
Also meaningful in understanding British Empire is Lugard’s exciting handbook on 
governance used by Lugard in his crusade for colonial enterprise. Lugard’s work is 
a veritable guide on colonialism and machinery of government, and deals with the 
history of African peoples in their early and formative years., Perham therefore 
underscores the contribution of Frederick Lugard to the making of Nigeria. 
Other works in the first category include those of Joseph (1999), 
Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second 
Republic,146 Coleman (1958), Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,147 Nnoli (1978) 
Ethnic Politics in Nigeria,148 Akinyele, ed (2003), Race Ethnicity and Nation Building 
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in Africa: Studies in Inter-Group Relations,149 and Osuntokun and Olukoju, eds. 
(1997), Nigerian Peoples and Culture.150  
These publications have sharpened our understanding of Nigeria’s 
democracy, nationalism and ethnic politics. Joseph, Coleman and Nnoli’s works 
appear distinct, in the sense that while Joseph establishes the crisis of Nigerian 
democracy, military rule and prebendal politics, Coleman’s work provides a rich 
study of the debate on Nigerian nationalism. According to the former, many 
factors underlie the dawn of party politics, class interests and competitive ethnic 
politics.  
Continually though Nnoli’s work also qualifies Coleman’s arguments, 
particularly with reference to the politicisation of ethnicity and the colonial 
ideology of divide and rule. Two chapters in the book are fundamental to this 
study. These are, Ndukaeze Nwabueze’s “Towards a Wider Understanding of Inter-
group Relations), and Mark Chabad’s “South Africa: The Challenge of Building a 
Rainbow Nation”. The interesting aspect of these accounts is the argument that 
Nigeria’s crises had its roots in ethnic politics. Despite the interesting discourse, 
these works did not provide a focus on peace building, or the TRC, which is the 
focus of this study. On the other hand, Osuntokun and Olukoju, eds. (1997)151 deal 
with thematic issues in Nigerian history and politics. They bring to the fore the 
dynamics of cultural nationalism and ethnic politics, which laid the foundation for 
corruption and tribal sentiments, thereby corroborating the respective arguments 
of Nnoli152 and Coleman.153  
Select literature on the involvement of the Nigerian military in politics and the 
transition to democracy 
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Literature in the second category is an interesting review because of its rich 
insights on the involvement of the Nigerian military in politics and transition to 
democracy. They include: Miners (1971), The Nigerian Army 1956–1966,154 
Elaigwu (1985), Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman,155 and History of 
the Nigerian Army 1863–1992 (1992),156 Uwechue (1971), Reflections on the 
Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future,157 and Ojiako (1979), 13 Years of Military 
Rule 1966–1979.158 
Miner underscores the historical development and military transformation 
leading to Nigeria’s independence. The author also discusses the factors that 
contributed to the Nigerian Civil War and the entry of the military into politics.159 
This idea is taken further by Eliagwu, who provides an authoritative account of the 
life and times of Gowon and his journey to military rule. Apart from exploring the 
life of Gowon and his political engineering, the work also highlights the democracy 
agenda, which was truncated by the Dimka’s coup of 1976.160   
The History of the Nigerian Army 1863–1992 discusses its origins and 
development until 1992. It also explores the role of the military in governance and 
internal security operations (ISOs). The chapter on the “Nigeria-Army in 
Government”161 is relevant to this study, because it sharpens our understanding 
of events leading to military political incursion as well as corroborating the 
accounts of Miners and other scholars. Uwechue’s detailed study dwells on the 
situation before and after the civil war, which did not differ much from that of 
Miners and Eliagwu. Rather it focuses on one man’s account and participant 
observation of the war, and this raises much argument on Uwechue’s involvement 
(on the side of Federal troops at the beginning) and his change of position as an 
ambassador to the Biafran government, which is highly informative.                                                                          
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Other books in the second category include that of Haywood and Clarke 
(1964), The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force,162 Ukpabi (1966) “The 
Origins of the West African Frontier Force,”163 Kirk-Greene (1964) A Preliminary 
Note on New Sources for Nigerian Military History164 Madiebo (1980), The 
Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War,165 and Gutteridge (1969), The Military in 
African Politics.166 These works provide a deeper understanding of the evolution 
of the Nigerian military in colonial Nigeria. 
Haywood and Clark trace the history of the Royal West African Frontier 
Force (RWAFF), and attendant social progress over time. They discuss the nature 
and composition of the colonial army and life in the barracks. While Ukpabi 
explores in detail the origins of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). He claims 
that this could be written in terms of the history of Northern Nigeria from 1897–
1906 because they were the martial force. Kirk-Greene’s work provides a rich 
study on the early colonial barracks located in strategic areas in the country, which 
he notes was composed along ethnic lines with the Hausa in the majority.  
Apart from Madiebo’s detailed study on the civil war, Gutteridge also 
discusses the origins and nature of African armies,167 the tragedy of Nigeria,168 and 
the political role and motivation of the military in Africa.169  
Gutteridge reiterates the political struggle and ethnic dimension 
surrounding the site and location of the Nigerian Air Force in Kaduna, which he 
regrettably called the “tragedy of Nigeria”.170 The value of the book is the 
interpretation of geo-politics, and political manipulations by nationalists and their 
European collaborators seeking relevance in developing nations. Nevertheless, as 
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informative as these works appear, they do not provide insight into human rights 
violation during the period as well as truth and reconciliation in Nigeria, the focus 
of this research. 
The informative work of Meredith (2011), The State of Africa: A History of 
a Continent is relevant to this study.171  It is a towering history of modern Africa 
and provides a holistic view of contemporary issues facing African states. Chapters 
relevant to this thesis include “Winds of change”,172 “The coming of tyrants”173 
and “No condition is permanent”174 among others. 
Generalised works on human rights violation and the Oputa Commission 
The third category of works include: Annual Report (1997), A CLO Report 
on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria,175 Annual Report (1998), A CLO Report on 
the State of Human Rights in Nigeria,176 and de St. Jorre (1972), and The Nigerian 
Civil War.177 The Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission Report (May 
2002),178 and Shriver (1995), An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics179 are 
significant because they examine cogent but related themes, particularly on 
human rights violation and the Oputa Commission. John de St. Jorre provides a 
detailed analysis of the Nigerian Civil War, which began after British colonial rule. 
The author offers background to the military regime in Nigeria, which he 
elaborates on, citing its human rights violations and widespread brutalities.  
Also discussing ethics for enemies and forgiveness in politics, Shriver 
considered too many experts as the primary reason for the failure of the Oputa 
Commission. Forgiveness, always associated with religious sentiment, acquired a 
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new paradigm in his work. Thereby having the author continue to affirm that in 
the modern context, forgiveness may need to “escape its religious captivity and 
enter the ranks of ordinary political virtues”. 
Other works in this category include that of Yusuf (2007), “Travails of Truth: 
Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria,”180 Zehr (1990), Changing 
Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (3rd ed.)181, Akinyeye (ed.) (2003), 
Nigeria and the Wider World in the 20th Century182 and Lillian Grissen, That We 
May Be One: The Autobiography of Nigerian Ambassador Jolly Tanko Yusuf.183 
On his part, Yusuf discusses among others the Human Rights Violation 
Investigation Commission (the Oputa Commission), and its mandate and 
contributions to the discipline of “transitional justice and rule of law”. Above all, 
Yusuf underscores the factors responsible for the establishment of the 
Commission, and how its mandate was changed during tenure. He then concludes 
by suggesting guidelines on future attempts at truth and reconciliation in the 
country. Another valuable contribution is that of Howard Zehr, popularly known 
as the ‘father of restorative justice,’ which underscores the concept of restorative 
justice, an important attribute of the Nigerian TRC. The author suggests that 
“restorative justice requires, at least a minimum consolation that it will address 
victim’s harms and needs, hold offenders accountable to put right those harms, as 
well as involve victims, offenders and communities in this process”.184 Through 
this discourse, Zehr aptly frames a restorative justice process and procedure, thus 
providing us with the key to the actual meaning and implications of the idea.  
Along the same lines, Akinyeye’s examines contemporary issues of 
international relations and the place of Nigeria in the wider world.185 The book has 
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bearing to this work, but central is Solomon O. Akinboye’s Nigeria-South Africa 
Relations in the 20th Century: A Case of Symbiosis and Reciprocity.186  
Similarly, Grissen’s autobiography of Jolly Tanko Yusuf, cogently explores 
the life and times of this patriot. Tanko was Nigeria’s ambassador to Germany, 
China, North Korea and Sierra Leone. An interesting aspect of his memoir is his 
fight to defend his faith, which offended the military junta of the day, leading to 
his incarceration. Other studies on human rights violation, bad governance, 
insecurity and corruption include that of Oarhe and Aghedo (2010), “The Open 
Sore of a Nation: Corruption and Internal Security in Nigeria”,187 Oluwaniyi (2011), 
“Police and Institution of Corruption in Nigeria, Policing and Society”,188 Onuoha 
(2009), “Corruption and National Security: The Three-Cap Theory and the Nigerian 
Experience”,189 Ogundiya (2010), “Democracy and Good Governance: Nigeria’s 
Dilemma”,190 and Bello and Odusote (2013), “The Matrixes of Bad Governance, 
Corruption and Insecurity in Nigeria”.191 
These authors and their various works examine the dynamics of the multi-
dimensional connections between bad governance, corruption and insecurity, and 
how they underpin the structure of human rights violation and impact negatively 
on other spheres of life.  Their studies employ appropriate theories and concepts 
to analyse the connection between these phenomena and vices in other spheres 
of life including human rights. Bello and Odusote also explain the role of 
constitutionalism in maintaining appropriate human rights culture.192 Some 
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studies consider constitutionalism and appropriate legal structures as the primary 
instruments of eradicating or minimising human rights violation.193  
However, they fail to effectively relate this to the proper implementation 
of the constitution and law enforcement. These works are germane to the study. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the analysis by Adeyemo (2013),194 Guaker 
(2009),195 Ikhariale (2008),196 Yusuf (2007),197 Akhihiero (2001/2002)198 and Kukah 
(2011)199 provided clear insights on how these writers perceived the work of the 
Oputa Commission. Adeyemo described Nigeria’s attempts at confronting the past 
as inadequate, ineffective and a farce. He went ahead to posit that the outbreaks 
of violence in the Northern part of the country and the resurgence of violence in 
the Niger-Delta region of the country were because of the absence of prosecutions 
of perpetrators of human rights violations.  Gauker opined that the Commission 
was a complete failure due to the non-release of its report, Kukah who was a 
prominent member of the Commission, had a different view, he concluded that 
beyond the legal arguments canvassed by the government to justify its refusal to 
officially publish the report of the Commission, the Nigeria state missed an 
opportunity to come to terms with its destiny. Another writer Yusuf blamed the 
many setbacks suffered by the Oputa Commission on bureaucratic red-tapisms 
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while Akhihiero on his own questioned the constitutionality and powers of the 
Commission. 
Conclusion 
The reviewed literature could be said to be adequate for a work of this 
nature, which has a legal and historical perspective. The choice of literature was 
also deliberate, even though some works appear to have been published long ago 
but are closer to the events, compared to the work of revisionist authors who 
rehearse known events by adding colour. In light of the above, newspaper 
publications, magazines and oral interviews will be augmented in the body of the 
work. Similarly, a theoretical framework on truth commissions will continue to 
evolve as more doctoral theses focus on conflict resolution, peacebuilding and 
transitional justice in developing countries. 
1.13 Summary of chapters and conclusion 
This thesis is structured into five thematic chapters and a conclusion. 
Chapter One introduces the study. It provides background by highlighting 
the purpose of the study, aim and objectives, problem statement, research 
questions, research hypothesis, operational definition of terms, significance of the 
study, methodology and justification, limitations of the study, and the literature 
review.  
Chapter Two examines the efforts of Nigerian people to entrench 
democratic rule and extricate the country from being a pariah state.200 The move 
became expedient following the various allegation of human rights violation,201 
extrajudicial killing,202 and the indifference of the military class to the yearnings of 
the Nigerian people.203 It therefore investigates the nature of nationalistic struggle 
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in the colonial state and an imbalance in Nigerian federalism.204 The study also 
interrogates the factors that influence and sustain the hegemony of power of 
military rulers in Nigeria, as well as the interrelated role of ethnicity and class in the 
transition experiment. To what extent did the Nigerian civil war contribute to the 
elongation of military administration and by extension the transition to civil rule? 
Can it be safely argued that prolonged military rule and attendant human rights 
violations expanded the growth and development of civil society, human rights 
organisations and other non-governmental organisation (NGOS)205 these are the 
main questions debated in this chapter. The sub-themes discussed include an 
overview of Nigerian pre-colonial history, the first republic, tension and political 
disintegration, the emergence of military rule in Nigeria, democracy in Nigeria, 
among others, and the chapter’s summary and conclusion.  
Chapter Three highlights the human rights situation in Nigeria during 
military regimes. It will be informative to discuss why so much gross violation of 
human rights occurred in the country during military rule even though Nigeria had 
ratified most of the international human rights instruments. The study will 
interrogate why the instruments have not translated well into domestic law for 
the protection of human rights in the country.206  
Significantly, the failure of human rights culture in the country and the 
evolution of the State in the military and post-military period, as well as the pursuit 
of state security, and law and order to the detriment of the promotion of the 
regime and rights will be analysed. Sub-themes discussed in this chapter include 
military and human rights violation in Nigeria, 1966–1999,207 the impact of military 
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rule on police and other agencies, the minority question and Ogoni human rights 
violations,208 and human rights under democratic dispensation, followed by the 
chapter’s summary and conclusion. 
Chapter Four investigates past human rights violations in Nigeria. The 
political atmosphere in Nigeria, prior to General Sani Abacha’s death, was not only 
frightening but also unstable.209 The regime had been the subject of criticism by 
the international community for human rights violations.210 It was suspended from 
the Commonwealth for this and other reasons. But, more importantly, for the 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa under a dubious system of justice.211 Nigeria was 
therefore on the verge of disintegration on the eve of General Abacha’s death. 
It was the series of events under his government that triggered the 
demand for a ‘truth’ commission to investigate human rights violations under the 
military regime. As previously mentioned the long period of military rule in Nigeria 
led to a progressive rise in gross violation of human rights, which ultimately led to 
the call for some form of accountability for abuse that had occurred during this 
period.  
Before undertaking an assessment of the work of the Oputa 
Commission, it is imperative to highlight the theoretical framework that underpins 
this study, (i.e. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions). The theories include 
retributive and restorative justice, criminal and non-criminal sanctions, amnesty 
or amnesia, acknowledging the past, compensation, restitution and rehabilitation. 
Sub-themes in this chapter include the origins, aim and objectives of the Oputa 
Commission, its mandate and select cases of human rights violations, the theory 
of transitional justice, compensation, restitution and rehabilitation, and an 
overview of comparative regional experiences in transitional justice, followed by 
the conclusion. 
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Chapter Five examines the lessons of the Oputa Commission for 
countries in transition. This chapter attempts to learn from Nigeria’s experience 
of transitional justice.212 This may benefit other countries in transition from a 
violent past, repression and gross violation of human rights, such as Ghana, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Togo, and Guinea Bissau, Kenya, South Africa, Rwanda, all of which 
share similar stories to Nigeria. Though it is neither desirable nor possible to 
impose a certain model on any other country, it is important to use the experience 
of one country to inform and influence others who’s past are not too dissimilar to 
that of Nigeria.213 Some of the broader issues before the Oputa Commission which 
require insight include the following: whether the absence of any form of amnesty 
in the Nigeria process would have strengthened or weakened the process214; 
whether more truths would have been revealed if perpetrators had an incentive 
such as immunity from prosecution215; and truth versus justice: what choices are 
available in a transitional justice process.216  
Chapter Six concludes the thesis. It relates findings to the aims, set out 
in the general orientation of the study. This thesis presents one of the known 
major academic works on Oputa Commission, as there are few detailed studies 
that has been conducted on transitional justice in Nigeria.217 The research is timely 
and the topic apt because of the understanding it provides in conflict and 
peacebuilding studies. Here the conclusions on the various issues that made the 
Oputa Commission relevant for Nigeria will be highlighted.  A major lesson for 
those holding public office in the country is that there is a day to account for their 
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actions in office. That day may come long after they have left office, as is the case 
with Generals Buhari, Babangida and Abubakar.218 
The military rule was carpeted as no alternative even for the worst 
democratic government.219 The study concludes that the military more than any 
other institution in the country contributed to the decay of the Nigerian State.220 
The military it must be noted had found ready ally in the political elites who 
collaborated with them at all times to truncate democracy.221 The traditional 
rulers in Nigeria did not do well for democracy, as they have always been willing 
tools in the hands of the military as they usually accept the military’s plan for and 
viewpoint of democracy.222 Instead of standing for democracy, they rather used 
any opportunity they had to demand an increase in their eroded powers and 
spheres of influence.223 The activities of other institutions of the Nigerian State 
were also reviewed. The work establishes some findings, recommendations and 
contributions to knowledge that could move the country forward.
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POLITICAL TRANSITION SINCE COLONIAL NIGERIA 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on Nigeria’s political transition in colonial and post-
colonial periods. The debate is important because it stands to provide insight into 
the efforts of the Nigerian people to participate in governance, as well as decide 
their fate regarding democratic principles. The purpose of this chapter therefore 
is to critically examine remote and immediate causes of ethnic and prebendal 
politics,1 which is largely enshrined in the works of Joseph (1999) in chapter one 
in ‘Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second 
Republic’,2 religion and domination, as well as the effect of the transition on the 
people and the nation.3 The challenges of political transition in Nigeria can be 
evidenced in power relations and three-cornered contests among northern, 
western and eastern Nigerian political classes in the years of cultural nationalism4 
and the independence era which according to the discussion in the literature 
reviewed, laid the foundation for corruption and tribal sentiments, thereby 
corroborating the arguments of Nnoli5 and Coleman6 respectively. Specifically, this 
chapter discusses the crisis of transition politics during military rule and human 
rights violations.  
The theme of this chapter is significant in the overall analysis of the thesis 
and on the grounds that political transition had long posed a challenge to the unity 
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and progress of the Nigerian State. Indeed, Nigerian communities are known to 
have developed indigenous political and socio-economic life before the advent of 
British colonialists. Indeed, it was these structures that sustained their integration, 
pattern maintenance and overall social system.7 Therefore one can safely say that 
colonial rule did not only distort the social system of the people but truncated the 
political culture of the communities including their boundaries.8 The analysis by 
John de St. Jorre on the Nigerian Civil War reinforces the argument canvassed 
here. The effects of this development on the people in particular and the nation 
in general cannot be overlooked. This development created major social division, 
agitation and ethnic politics. Therefore, a discussion of the effects of ethnic politics 
on the survival of democracy is or seems to be highly desirable.9 As can be seen 
from the works of Nnoli (1978) Ethnic Politics in Nigeria,10 and in Coleman’s (1958) 
work on Nigeria: Background to Nationalism.11 
On a broad spectrum, it contributed to corruption,12 which is rooted in the 
works of Oarhe and Aghedo (2010), “The Open Sore of a Nation: Corruption and 
Internal Security in Nigeria”,13 Oluwaniyi (2011), “Police and Institution of 
Corruption in Nigeria, Policing and Society”,14 Onuoha (2009), “Corruption and 
National Security: The Three-Cap Theory and the Nigerian Experience”,15 
discussed in chapter one, underdevelopment of the nation and undemocratic 
behaviour of the political class. Above all, corruption contributed to the problems 
of political transition that brought about military rule from 1966 to 1999 which 
was characterised by human rights violations.  
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This chapter is imperative in contemporary debate because the political 
class has rarely thought it wise to initiate a national debate on the tottering, 
nascent democracy in Nigeria, coupled with the clamour in some quarters for the 
return of military rule and impunity,16 A case that is also highly presented by Ojiako 
in 1979, in his ‘’13 Years of Military Rule of 1966–1979”.17 
These among others are salient issues that will shed light on the factors 
and forces that shaped the colonial state and its implications in post-colonial 
Nigeria, which eventually led to endless transition politics in relation to the military 
and human rights violations that heralded the Oputa Commission. 
Why was it difficult for ethnic regions to harness their diversity and forge 
a common political transition, even in the era of decolonisation, instead of 
dwelling on ethnic politics, social exclusion and hegemony caused by colonial 
administrators? To what extent did politicians attempt to correct the political 
imbalance in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria? These are some of the questions 
and issues this chapter will attempt to address. 
Against this backdrop this chapter is divided into three main parts: Nigerian 
history before colonial rule; background to the evolution and development of 
political transition in Nigeria; and finally, political transition of the military 
government and its effect on ethnic and prebendal politics18 in post-colonial 
Nigeria. The analysis attempts to link the chapter to the central theme of the 
thesis, which is accountability for past events and human rights violation that led 
to the establishment of the Oputa Commission. Having said this, it is imperative 
therefore to undertake a general overview of the immediate events and 
situations19 that characterised the politics of transition in Nigeria before 
embarking on detailed analysis. 
                                                          
16    ADEKOYA, A. 2009. Wanted: Action On High Points of Achebe Colloquium  
  Resolutions, , December 22, 46.  
17    Ibid. 
18   JOSEPH, R.A., 2014. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (Vol. 56). Cambridge  
  University Press: Cambridge. See Also NNOLI, O. 1978. Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Fourth  
  Dimension Publishers Ltd: Enugu. 




The impact of political transition in modern Nigeria cannot be 
overlooked.20 It began with the Gowon administration in 1967 and continued till 
the end of military rule in 1999. Indeed, the transition politics of the military 
reached its heights with the annulment of June 12, 1993 elections by the 
Babangida administration,21 which led to political and economic sanctions from 
the Commonwealth of Nations and their European counterparts. The situation 
was further aggravated by the Abacha’s regime following the judicial murder of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and his kinsmen,22 assassination of Kudirat Abiola and Pa Alfred 
Rewane, and others allegedly by Abacha’s goons.23 Thus Nigeria lost her position 
in the comity of nations as the junta increased its human rights violations, 
clamping down on the media and opposition groups, including civil society 
coalitions. Nigeria therefore degenerated into a pariah state,24 with different 
ethnic groups calling for secession and war, to address the injustices against their 
people.  
The internal disorder at that time was frightening as European nations 
warned their citizens against travelling to Nigeria until the situation improved. 
With the death of Abacha on June 8, 199825 and the coming to power of General 
Abdusalami Abubakar, tension was reduced as he made promises to return the 
country to peace, democracy and respect for human rights26, A situation analysed 
by Ogundiya in 2010, in “Democracy and Good Governance: Nigeria’s Dilemma”.27 
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The government announced the death of Chief Abiola, the acclaimed winner of 
June 12, 1993 presidential elections. This prompted eminent groups to embark on 
a peace building mission across the country to settle the myriad of problems 
including human rights violation facing the nation. It was in consideration of the 
numerous challenges confronting the nation that prompted the establishment of 
the Oputa Commission as a truth and reconciliation commission to address these 
issues.   
A cursory look at the remote causes of political transition in Nigeria reveals 
that from the beginning, the Nigerian State was confronted by the following 
factors: The Caliphate institution and hegemony, the British colonial agenda for 
the Muslim controlled north against the Christian dominated south,28 the 
backwardness of Northern Nigeria caused by the rejection of western education 
and civilisation,29 and the forces of a classical, indirect rule system which nurtured 
the politics of regionalism in 1946.30 It should be noted that the latter is 
demystified to inform this study by Akpofure & Crowder in 1966 in the chapters 
on consular rule, loss of sovereignty and the origin of regionalism.31 It was this 
development that gradually led to the politics of transition, military rule and 
human rights violations that culminated in the need for Oputa Commission to 
address the ills of the past and chart a way forward for the nation.  
Nigeria’s quest for political participation began in the colonial state. Not 
many people knew the best form of government for the country and regions at 
the time, probably due to its inherent composition and traditional political culture 
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on the one hand, and the spirit and theory of colonialism on the other. In 
successive years, the British succeeded in creating the constitution of regionalism 
and ethnic politics, which aggravated social division and sectionalism in the 
Nigerian political space. At first, the consequences of this development were not 
very clear to the Nigerian political elite, because they were in a hurry to achieve 
self-determination until the military intervened in the 1960s.32 Since 1966 when 
the military made incursions into Nigerian politics, there has been one form of 
political transition or another.  
 
2.2 Understanding political transition relevant to the thesis 
 
What is political transition? A clear understanding of this concept is 
important, since it is the fulcrum upon which the theme revolves. Political 
transition, according to Onuoha (2002), is the process of handing over political 
power to an elected government and referred to as “transition” (to civil 
rule).33Political transition as it relates to this study is the totality of efforts, 
postponement, abuse of power and deceit by the Nigerian military in the process 
of handover of power to a civilian democratic government. As indicated earlier, 
transition politics in modern Nigeria began with General Yakubu Gowon’s regime 
from 1966 to 1975. Since that period, the nation has been involved in one form of 
transition34 or another without implementing all the schedules of the programme, 
or attaining desired objectives35until 1999, when the idea for a truth commission 
was set up to resolve the problems.  
In the intervening years of military rule, it was discovered that the Nigerian 
military was not ready to hand over power to an elected civilian government, 
because of accumulation of wealth (soldiers and oil),36 the comforts of office, and 
selfish ambitions. A holistic view of this dilemma led Professor Abiodun Odusote 
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to describe it as the matrixes of bad governance, corruption and insecurity in 
Nigeria.37 Nigeria therefore succumbed to prolonged military rule for about 29 
years, without direction or vision other than to take power and commence a whole 
new political transition agenda that aggravated human rights violations. 
Corroborating this view, Joseph (2014) observes that: “…the effect of rule 
by the military government was to accentuate the centrality of the State in the 
nation’s economic system and thus in a circular fashion, to fuel the various 
features of prebendalism”.38 Onuoha and Fadakinte (2002) also note that the 
confidence in perpetuating power stemmed from the fact that the military would 
have discovered that the first and second republics of civilian government did not 
positively contribute to democratic cultural practice, accountability, good 
governance, and democratic learning and practice, to mention a few.39In order to 
accomplish the process of transition, a new military government would usually set 
a timetable or programme to bring the military’s understanding of transition 
programme to a civilian government.40 This stemmed from the factors that 
contributed to the Nigerian Civil War and the entry of the military into politics41 
that is listed in the preceding chapter by Miners in 1971. 
The colonial period was experiential because British colonialists had 
divided Nigeria into three ethnic compositions: northern, western and eastern 
regions following Arthur Richard’s Constitution of 1949.42 This development 
created a state of hegemony, which influenced the three major regions over 
their people. Therefore, the regions operated with greater autonomy post-
independence in 1960, with the dominant groups of Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and 
Igbo controlling politics and the economy in their respective regions.43 The 
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effect of this development was the challenge of political transition that brought 
about military rule and human rights violations that culminated in the Oputa 
Commission. 
Despite the seeds of ethnicity that germinated over a long period with 
each of the three forces competing for relevance and control over the other, 
no single ethnic group commanded a majority to gain political control of the 
centre without the support and alliance of one of the dominant groups. In the 
first republic the Hausa/Fulani forged a marriage of convenience with the Igbo, 
which ended in the 1966 coup in which the majority of casualties were 
Hausa/Fulani leaders.44 Consequently, following the counter coup of July 1966, 
the program against the Igbo and the civil war, the Hausa/Fulani who fought 
alongside the Yoruba’s formed the core of the ruling military class that was to 
hold Nigeria hostage for the duration of military rule.45 It is therefore the reason 
Ojiako in 1979, in the first chapter under reviewed literature decided to explore 
the life of Gowon and his connection to military rule and his political 
engineering, and then highlights the democracy agenda, which was truncated 
by the Dimka’s coup of 1976.46   
It was transition politics in Nigeria that brought civil society into conflict 
with the military. Their role became timely in the dark years of military rule, as 
Nigerians were not only tired, but also dissatisfied with prolonged military rule 
and their deceptive promises of transition to democracy. Therefore, the 
military deployed unorthodox strategies, which aggravated human rights 
violations to maintain state power.47 Comparatively, a reflection on colonial 
times reveals that the same tactics has been used by the colonial administration 
to hold on to power in the heat of cultural nationalism and agitation for 
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independence. The military, as the colonialists had done, resorted to a 
clampdown on the media, political associations, human rights organisations 
and perceived enemies of government to quell dissent and maintain state 
power.48 The effect of this was the challenges of political transition that brought 
about military rule and human rights violations that culminated in the Oputa 
Commission. 
The military junta introduced several draconian decrees to silence dissent, 
violate human rights and perpetuate power against the aspirations of Nigerians.  
Pro-democracy and human rights activists were targeted by the junta who used 
secret tribunals and draconian decrees to subject them to long jail terms.49 These 
inhumane incidents are covered in the chapters on military administration, 1966–
1979 and the second republic, 1979–1983 which provide a rich study on activities 
of the military junta and attendant human rights violation in the country,50 as 
evidenced in the preceding discussion. 
In some cases, military regimes, especially that of General Sani Abacha 
resorted to political assassinations to silence critics. The courts were not spared as 
the military had to introduce decrees that effectively barred the courts from 
questioning any actions carried out under a decree.51 This affront on the judiciary 
showed how much the Nigerian State had degenerated in protecting the rights of 
its citizens. The implication of the assault on the judiciary was so severe that there 
was no longer any state institution to act as a defence to protect the rights of 
Nigerians. Therefore, all state institutions were weakened, leaving citizens without 
any protection from abuse. This development as noted in this chapter left pro-
democracy and human rights activists to the mercy of roving bands of military 
junta and their security operatives, who unleashed terror in their desire to 
maintain state power for the junta. 
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2.3 Evolution and development of political transition in Nigeria 
 
This section explores the evolution of political transition in colonial Nigeria 
and the attendant effect post-independence. This is important because of its 
legacy in colonial and post-colonial periods, particularly the military incursion into 
politics from 1966 to 1999 and the associated human rights violations. The reason 
for this approach is to show that British colonial operators did not have a pan 
Nigerian agenda.52 This discussion is also critical because a lot of people did not 
know that the problems militating against Nigeria’s political transition began in 
the colonial state, simply because British colonisers wanted to set the regions 
apart53 and exploit the opportunities to their advantage.54 
This section establishes the fact that the European political model was not 
ideal for some African societies, especially Nigeria, with different regional ethnic 
groups. It also demonstrates that constitutional developments in the colonial state 
did not accommodate the aspirations of all interest groups,55 hence the problems 
for political transition, ethnicity and hegemony, which worked against all forms of 
development.  
Ofeimun (1995) 56 suggests that: 
"On a matter of principle, such as the necessity for democracy to be 
the basis for interaction between all nationalities, there should be a 
point at which hegemony must be given no comfort or quarters. The 
presumption that Nigeria must be broken to stop a tyrannical 
hegemony from triumphing or that the future of Nigeria needs to be 
measured in military explosions for hegemony to be defeated is 
simply a contingent issue. Not a matter of principle”.  
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From the outset, the British divided society and sowed seeds of discord and 
rancour amongst the major ethnic groups.57 Owing to this ethnic grouping, Kirk-
Greene’s work provides a rich study on the early colonial barracks located in 
strategic areas in the country, which he notes was composed along ethnic lines 
with the Hausa in the majority as discussed In the preceding chapter.  They also 
exploited the power of religion to cause disunity among religious groups, which 
was not ideal in intergroup relations.  Arguably, if the various ethnic groups were 
united and directed towards one vision, it might not have been possible for the 
colonialists to take the resources of the colonies for their benefit.58  
But more importantly was the fact that the divide and rule policy employed 
by the British worked because of the pre-colonial setting which they inherited, and 
therefore exploited the use of divide and rule, coercion and human rights violation 
to intimidate those who opposed their agenda. Also, the hegemonic influence in 
Northern Nigeria and the interplay of religion59 allowed them to effectively adopt 
colonial rule,60 As discussed by Obaro Ikime’s edited work in 2012; part 4 of the 
book covers Nigeria in the twentieth century, is most valuable to this study, 
particularly, Tamuno’s “British Colonial Administration in Nigeria in the Twentieth 
Century”, and “The Nationalist Struggle for Independence”.61 A recap has already 
presented in the literature review. 
Records suggest that political transition in a colonial state was arranged to 
suit ethnic groups, since they were composed of diverse identities, social origins, 
language, traditions and cultures. The effect on the nation was political division, 
ethnic sentiment, military incursion and transition politics characterised by human 
rights violations. It was hoped that the Oputa Commission would address the 
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challenges created by the military junta. Ten ethnic groups accounts for about 80 
percent of the population of Nigeria; therefore, the diversity of the country, rather 
than being its strength appears to have hindered development and progress. Most 
geographical zones (i.e. their histories and traditions) were related to external 
influences,62 while others had complex systems of government independent of 
external contacts.63 In a country of diverse strengths, such diversity would have 
been positively exploited to grow the economy and develop the country, but the 
reverse was the case in Nigeria. Nigerian diversity rather than being its strength 
has been a source of stiff competition and bitter rivalry amongst different ethnic 
groups.64 Therefore it was earlier noted in the chapter one, this is an affirmation 
that the interesting aspect of these accounts is the argument that Nigeria’s crises 
had its roots in ethnic politics. The two chapters in Coleman’s book additionally 
put a seal to this argument and were listed in chapter one as Ndukaeze 
Nwabueze’s “Towards a Wider Understanding of Inter-group Relations and Mark 
Chabad’s “South Africa: The Challenge of Building a Rainbow Nation”.  
Indeed, the Nigerian experiment shows that each ethnic group has used 
their strength to fight and work against each other because there is no pan 
Nigerian loyalty unlike some other countries.65 This chapter establishes the fact 
that the loyalty of the people lies with their ethnic groups rather than their 
country. This seemed to have been one of the factors that militated against 
Nigeria’s political transition in colonial and post-colonial periods that eventually 
aggravated human rights violations. 
The explanation for this shambles can be found in the amalgamation of 
Nigeria and its religio-political groups that formed the bedrock of ethnicity and 
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regionalism.66 Another factor that contributed to the situation was the fear of 
religious crisis, which made the Caliphate reach out to the British authorities not 
to extend Christianity and Western education to the Islamic society of Northern 
Nigeria67 where Sharia and fuqaha had been successfully established.68The effect 
of this agreement is that to date the southern part of Nigeria, which embraced 
Christianity, has benefited extensively from Western education while Islamised 
Northern Nigeria still lagged behind in terms of education and development. This 
paternalistic agreement forced Islamic leaders to create what they called 
‘sabongari’69 meaning ‘strangers quarters’ in order to checkmate the migration 
and infiltration of alien cultures and politics. It should be argued that the creation 
of exclusive zones for migrants hindered acculturation and inter-group relations.70 
To explicitly put it, I refer to the work of Akinyele (2003)’s, Race Ethnicity and 
Nation Building in Africa: Studies in Inter-Group Relations,71 which is already 
explored in chapter one. 
The explanation for the creation of exclusive zones has always been 
attributed to Islamic teaching, but the truth of the matter is that it was the 
beginning of social division in both the public and private domain. The effect on 
the people was a feeling of religious superiority and domination. Indeed, it was 
this state of affairs that motivated the Moslem elite to accept and adopt the 
classical, indirect rule system and other political architecture of empire building. 
What the country needed at that moment lies in the thinking of Obasi (2005): “It 
could be proposed that Nigeria is in dire need of a progressive change. Such a 
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change should be radically different from our catalogue of cosmetic changes 
experienced since independence”.72 
2.4  Development of political transition in colonial Nigeria  
This section explores the different approach employed by British 
colonialists to forge a political process for the Nigerian people following the 
limitations and effects of the indirect rule system, and changes in global affairs. 
Throughout the early twentieth century, Nigerians fought hard to confront 
colonial rule and human rights violation through cultural nationalism,73 strikes and 
media campaigns. These efforts were aimed at democratic principles and all-
inclusive government. In this section constitutional developments in colonial 
Nigeria and its effects on the people in particular and the nation in general will be 
examined. 
Since the amalgamation of the country was not total and had continued to 
distort political transition and socioeconomic culture, the need for political 
participation became even more expedient for the political class74, a notion 
elucidated by the chapter on the “Nigeria-Army in Government”75 that was earlier 
on broadly discussed. This is primarily because the amalgamation of different 
nationalities into one country called Nigeria was not a democratic process, but a 
colonial enterprise executed through conquest and pacification. Immediately after 
the amalgamation, the colonial powers adopted an undemocratic system of 
governance called indirect rule where it imposed its stooges and warrant chiefs as 
rulers over the colonies.76  Colonial powers also entrenched ethnicity and tribalism 
through its regionalisation policy77 that failed to establish a pan Nigerian agenda 
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for the nation.78  This policy unfortunately laid the foundation for corruption and 
tribal sentiments, thereby corroborating the respective arguments of Nnoli79 and 
Coleman80, which are so significant in the literature covered in the preceding 
discussion. 
 The effect of these developments is still being felt in Nigerian polity as no 
meaningful progress has been recorded. Instead, it has left the country to contend 
with ethnic politics, military rule and human rights violations. Nnoli (1978), 
extending this idea, notes that ‘Northernisation’ must be condemned as inimical 
to national unity because of its tendency to engender ethnocentricity in the North. 
The East and the West could afford to demand ‘Nigerianisation’.81 
In view of the above, this discussion focuses on how colonial politics and 
constitutional engineering developed up to independence and the effect it had on 
the progress of post-colonial Nigeria. The agitation for Nigeria’s independence 
was supported by pressure groups from other nations, including liberal thinkers 
and reformers in Britain.82 John de St. Jorre in 1972 provides a detailed analysis of 
the Nigerian Civil War, which began after British colonial rule. The author offers 
background to the military regime in Nigeria, which he elaborates on, citing its 
human rights violations and widespread brutalities. 
It should be recalled that by 1946 the British had responded by introducing 
a new constitution that divided Nigeria into three regions: Northern, Eastern and 
Western.83 These regions had their own legislative assembly, mainly appointed 
rather than elected members, and were overseen by a weak federal government. 
Although short-lived, the constitution had a serious long-term impact through the 
encouragement of regional and ethnic-based politics.84 With the creation of the 
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regions in the constitution, ethnic and regional politics was promoted and 
encouraged, thereby corroborating the views of Hugh Clifford, the colonial 
Governor of the country in the 1920s, who made it abundantly clear that his 
administration would seek to secure for “each separate people the right to 
maintain its identity, its individuality and its nationality, its chosen form of 
government; and the peculiar political and social institutions which have been 
evolved for it by the wisdom and the accumulated experiences of generations of 
its forebears”.85  
The political and constitutional engineering of Governor Hugh Clifford 
created regions and regional politics, as well as the forces of hegemony and social 
division. It made each region conscious of its resource control and created 
positions of authority. This is why eminent scholars believe that regional politics 
bred sectionalism and nepotism, which promoted the British divide and rule 
policy. It also brought about stagnation, corruption and underdevelopment, since 
every region wanted to have more of the resources than others. Indeed the 1921, 
1946 and 1951 constitutions did not consider the development and unity of the 
Nigerian State; rather it brought the nation to a standstill as politicians struggled 
for domination and resource control that eventually brought about military rule 
and human rights violations which the Oputa Commission was created to address.  
Available evidence shows that it was the spirit of ethnic nationalism that 
contributed to the July 1966 coup and many years of military rule and attendant 
human rights violation that characterised autocratic rule. Unfortunately, there 
was the replacement of rule of law with rule of might, and Nigeria degenerated 
into a pariah state.86 This dichotomy remained potent even after the democratic 
rule of 1999, as the Igbo and Niger Delta groups where the oil economy of the 
nation was produced, continued to suffer marginalisation in the affairs of the 
nation.87 Thus in the previous chapter though, Adeyemo described Nigeria’s 
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attempts at confronting the past as inadequate, ineffective and a farce. He went 
ahead to posit that the outbreaks of violence in the Northern part of the country 
and the resurgence of violence in the Niger-Delta region of the country were 
because of the absence of prosecutions of perpetrators of human rights violations.   
According to Obi (2002), oil provides the ample resources used in political 
transition, and is the reward of political power. Thus, the oil factor is a critical 
aspect of the politics of transition in Nigeria. It is inextricably linked to the fragile 
and mono-cultural (oil) economic base, and the desperate struggles among 
factions of the Nigerian ruling class for power.88 
This chapter argues that it was the constitution of regionalism that drove 
Nigerian peoples into ethnic politics, hegemony and resource control.89 This 
development became profound post-independence leading to the military 
incursion. The negative role of ethnicity, tribalism and religion brought unhealthy 
rivalry for the control of central government by ethnic loyalists. Some unpatriotic 
politicians who intended to cripple the nation because of what they stood to gain 
also aggravated colonial problems to the extent that there was no pan Nigerian 
project or vision. Unfortunately, the nation teetered until independence as the 
seeds of ethnic discord were already planted. Post-colonial Nigeria was also 
nurtured along this trajectory, and the consequences were lack of patriotic spirit 
and vision.90 
Nigeria has struggled with misplaced priorities, for example, it was 
expected that the regions with mineral deposits should be given attention in terms 
of development and provision of social amenities, but the reverse was the case in 
Nigeria, as the people of those regions remained marginalised and on the 
periphery of development. How therefore would the country move forward? It is 
for this reason that the Niger Delta militants took over the creeks and engaged in 
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the kidnapping of oil workers to press home their demands.91 It also prompted the 
National Conference of 2014 to suggest how the six geo-political groups in Nigeria 
could be balanced in the power equation. The suggestion was to create one more 
state in Eastern Nigeria dominated by the Igbo. These were some of the teething 
problems in the current agitation for the establishment of Biafra92 that were 
informatively discussed by Madiebo (1980), in The Nigerian Revolution and the 
Biafran War,93 coupled with Uwechue’s detailed study that dwells on the situation 
before and after the civil war, which did not differ much from that of Miners and 
Eliagwu. As discussed earlier, it focuses on one man’s account and participant 
observation of the war, and this raises much argument on Uwechue’s involvement 
(on the side of Federal troops at the beginning) and his change of position as an 
ambassador to the Biafran government, which is highly informative as earlier 
discussed in the preceding chapter. 
It should be recalled that in 2009, Chinua Achebe noted in a colloquium 
that the tragedy, so far, is that the nation’s powerful elite, across all ethnic groups, 
has repeatedly deferred action in response to national dialogue, instead preferring 
to appease aggrieved tendencies through state and local government creation, co-
opting agitators, and dispensation of patronage to stifle dissent, where 
pacification will not work. However, as the years rolled by, it was increasingly 
becoming clear that Nigeria could not avoid a genuine dialogue for much longer.94 
These were some of the problems created by the colonial state that 
eventually led to political transition, military rule and human rights violations. 
What was the nature of historical legacy of ethnic and prebendal politics in 
Nigeria? And to what extent did it affect political transition in the era of 
decolonisation? These and other issues will be discussed in the next section. 
                                                          
91    It Was the Quest For Equity and Justice That Ken-Saro Wiwa and His Kinsmen Were Extra- 
  Judicially Killed in 1995. 
92    thedemand of the Igbo For A Biafra Republic Has Resonated Since 1999 When  
  Democracy Returned To Nigeria. Today, That Agenda Is Being Championed By Mr  
  Uwazurike and Mr Kanu, and Scores of Igbo Indigenes Have Paid the Supreme Price in  
  the Struggle, Just Like That of the Niger Delta. 
93    Ibid. 
94   Politics Special, “Wanted: Action On High Points of Achebe Colloquium Resolution” (2009,  




2.5 Historical legacy of political transition, ethnic95and prebendal politics96  
This section analyses the legacy of ethnic and prebendal politics in Nigeria 
pre and post-independence. This is important in the production of knowledge. It 
will enable us to put into perspective where Nigeria missed the trajectory of 
political development as a nation, and how those early miscalculations negatively 
affected the country.97 The chapter further provides insight into the spiralling 
effects of ethnicity and cultural nationalism98 that contributed to the crisis of 
military intervention in politics in 1966 and human rights violations.  
Kirk-Greene in 1964 in ‘’A Preliminary Note on New Sources for Nigerian 
Military History99 ‘’ is positively correlated with Ojiako’s later submission in 1980 
that religion, ethnicity and undemocratic behaviour by political elites were key 
factors that led to military intervention in Nigeria.100 The military faction that 
intervened in the coup of July 1966 was predominantly made up of Northerners, 
who were keen to pursue the agenda of the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy, and promote 
northern hegemonic interests over other ethnic groups. In the course of this 
discussion, the term ‘hegemony’ will be defined. It is therefore not surprising that 
all military rulers that emerged in successive military coups were northerners, 
controlled by the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy. This was not coincidental because it was 
driven by the actualisation of a pan Northern Nigeria agenda to entrench its 
hegemony over other ethnic and religious groups.101 Most importantly though is 
what Shriver (1995) talks about forgiveness, always associated with religious 
sentiment,’’ in which he continues to affirm that in the modern context, 
forgiveness may need to “escape its religious captivity and enter the ranks of 
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ordinary political virtues” and thereby deal with hegemony.102  To maintain their 
grip on power the military regime committed gross human rights violation hitherto 
unknown in the history of Nigeria.103 This violation of human rights by the military 
brought about the Oputa Commission, as most developed nations of the world, 
including the Commonwealth of Nations and France, had isolated Nigeria in the 
comity of nations, coupled with the economic embargo, which had a telling effect 
on the country.  
This study reveals that the British strategy of divide and rule, particularly 
the shielding of Northern Nigeria from Western influence104 and civilisation, did 
not help the development of the country. The legacy of this was exposed in 1956 
when Anthony Enahoro moved a motion for self-determination; invariably the 
northern oligarchy claimed they were not ready, due to the fear of domination by 
Southern Nigeria and lack of manpower.105 The fallout from this situation was 
revealed in post-colonial Nigeria where ethnic politics and contestation of power 
led to the fall of the first republic and the intervention of the military into politics. 
Among its resultant negative consequences as observed by Babangida in 
(2002) is, wastage of enormous human and material resources in ethnically 
inspired violence, encounters, clashes and even battles, heightening of fragility of 
the economy and political process, threat to security of life and property and 
disinvestments of local and foreign components with continuous capital flight and 
loss of confidence in the economy; and increasing gaps in social relations among 
ethnic nationalities including structural suspicions and hate for one another.106 
                                                          
102    Ibid. 
103    Details in OJIAKO, J.O. 1980. Thirteen Years of Military Rule, 1966-1979. Daily  
  Times Publication Ltd: Lagos, Also See UWECHUE, R. 2004, Op.Cit.   
104    COLEMAN, J.S. 1986. Nigeria: Background To Nationalism. Ilupeju Press Ltd: Benin City.,  
  137-140.  
105   See COLEMAN, J.S. 1986, Op.Cit.398-402. Also See NNOLI, O., 1978. Ethnic Politics in  
  Nigeria (Enugu: Forth Dimension). JIBO, M., GALADIMA, H. S. & SIMBINE, A.T., 2001. 
Ethnic Groups And Conflicts in Nigeria: the Northcentral Zone of Nigeria. the Lord's 
Creation, 4. 
106    SALAWU, B. AND HASSAN, A.O., 2011. Ethnic Politics and Its Implications For the Survival  
  of Democracy in Nigeria. Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research, 3(2), 28- 




This also establishes that election manipulation and human rights 
violations, which began in the colonial state continued in contemporary times 
because of ethnic politics, impunity and hegemony. Therefore, election rigging and 
manipulation had become an acceptable conduct in power contestation.107 The 
voice of the people and their prerogative to elect their leaders in a free and fair 
election has frequently been disregarded. Richard (2014) also notes that leaders 
no longer owed allegiance to the people, as they knew they could always 
manipulate the electoral process. The effect of this impunity was electoral apathy 
and lack of faith in the Nigerian elections108. The attendant corruption associated 
with voting and civilian government intermittently led to the overthrow of the so-
called democratically elected government in Nigeria, as experienced in 1966 and 
1983,109 An issue broadly covered in chapter one in Ogundiya (2010), “Democracy 
and Good Governance: Nigeria’s Dilemma”,110 and Bello and Odusote (2013), “The 
Matrixes of Bad Governance, Corruption and Insecurity in Nigeria”.111 The coming 
to power of successive military regimes and their transition politics pitched civil 
society against them, because of human rights violations unleashed by the military 
during agitation for democratic rule.112  
To deepen our discussion, it is important to understand the meaning of 
ethnicity, as indicated earlier, in view of the negative role it played in the 
democratic struggle of modern Nigeria. According to Parkin (1978) “Ethnicity is 
basically a cultural system denoting group boundary”.113 Cohen (1974) also notes 
that ethnicity is “fundamentally a political phenomenon. It is the intensive struggle 
between groups over new strategic positions within the structure of the new 
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state”.114 These definitions clearly illustrate the situation in Nigeria since colonial 
domination. The accumulation of wealth and state resources led to transition 
politics and the Oputa Commission. Most importantly is the fact that such 
investigative bodies have been employed in at least 20 countries and are being 
considered for such nations as Bosnia and Kenya.115 
In retrospect, it is posited that Nigeria got into this predicament following 
the 1946 Constitution that introduced ethnic politics, and this continued in 
successive years. The constitution later failed because of the gaps it created and 
by 1949 it was automatically abrogated. The Macpherson Constitution 
consolidated the policy of ethnic politics and regionalism. This constitution 
emerged from the proceedings of the General Conference of January 9, 1950. It 
came into effect in 1951 and recommended to the Secretary for the colonies that 
there should be three regions – Northern, Eastern and Western regions with the 
independent municipality of Lagos.116 
This was followed by the Lytelton Constitution of 1954, and both 
constitutions had to contend with powerful ethnic forces.117 By the early 1950s, 
other parties had emerged, notably the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), a 
conservative group led by the Hausa-Fulani elite. The ethnic power bloc of these 
parties foreshadowed divisive regional politics that would later lead to 
independence.118  The later was thus elucidated on as posited in chapter one by 
Tamuno, T.A. (2012), In Ikime, O. ed. (2012). Groundwork on Nigerian history119 
the result of ethnic based political parties as seen in their manifestos pursued a 
narrow ethnic agenda instead of a pan Nigerian philosophy. It was the pursuit of 
narrow ethnic interests by regional powers that in the long run affected the 
development of Nigeria as a cohesive and powerful nation.  
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Since the intervening years (1966–1999), ethnic and prebendal politics 
have been accepted in Nigerian politics.120 The fact that the three major ethnic 
groups had different agendas made it impossible for leaders to work together to 
uplift the interests of Nigeria as a nation. Divisive ethnic politics weakened the 
fabric of the nation, as energy was mainly dissipated in the struggle for control of 
the central government and its resources while little effort was put into stabilising 
national unity. It should be recalled that after Nigeria’s failed experiments with 
parliamentary and presidential forms of government, the Samuel Cookery Political 
Bureau was set up to fashion a new political order for the country, travelled far, 
but failed to find new waters to test the nation’s turbulent politics.121  
Additionally, it is argued in some quarters that ethnicity played a major role 
in the reluctance of the military administration of Babangida to cede power after 
June 12, 1993 elections, in which a Yoruba, M.K.O. Abiola, was poised to win.122 
The negative role ethnicity played in the quest for the validation of the election 
could be seen in the manner that both Hausa/Fulani and Igbo political elites were 
reluctant to support the validation of Abiola’s mandate. This scenario created 
opposition to actualise the mandate and keep Nigeria on the path of progress. An 
Igbo, Chief Arthur Nzeribe and his allies masterminded the infamous Association 
for Better Nigeria (ABN);123 even Chief Abiola’s visit to Igbo land to seek for support 
for his mandate was not successful, as the Igbos remained non-challant. The 
failure of this outing exacerbated the reaction against Babangida’s regime, which 
eventually led to violent reprisals and human rights violation, and the decision to 
establish the Oputa Commission as a transitional justice mechanism.  
Since the colonial period the Caliphate had used religion and hegemony to 
capture the minds of northerners to do their bidding.124 The implication of this 
strategy lies in the fact that other ethnic groups have also sought to assert their 
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own ethnic agendas and supremacy, thereby rendering any pan Nigerian agenda 
impossible. Instead of the country moving forward during military rule, it 
succumbed to transition politics, corruption and human rights violation.125 
Consequently, Nigeria was blacklisted among the worst, corrupt nations in the 
world, an image the country wrestled with after the democratic civilian 
government of 1999 headed by President Olusegun Obasanjo.  
The basic argument was that British withdrawal after independence would 
leave Northerners at the mercy of Southerners, they therefore conspired to delay 
the independence until 1960, to effectively consolidate the philosophy of 
hegemony and by extension perfect the thinking of ethnic politics that would not 
only guide them as a geographical entity, but also as a people. The diversity of 
Nigeria, rather than being its strength, appears to have become a source of 
weakness to the extent that some Nigerians lost faith in the vision of their 
forefathers.  
This is because of lopsided politics, the domination by Hausa/Fulani 
oligarchy and the elections of impunity. At the dawn of Nigeria’s independence, it 
was visible that the British had bequeathed weak structures that became a source 
of ethno-religious conflicts from 1960 to 1966, which impacted negatively on the 
human rights profile of the country. Among these conflicts were the Census crisis 
of 1962/63,126 Action Group crisis of 1962, Federal election crisis of 1964 and 
Western Region election crisis of 1965.127 These events precipitated problems in 
Yoruba land as the election results and population census were rejected because 
of allegations of manipulation.  
Consequently, there was violent reaction and burning of houses belonging 
to opponents, leading to human rights violations as innocent citizens were 
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molested or killed during the violence.128 This eventually culminated in the military 
coup of January 1966 and the counter-coup of July 1966.  Falola et al. (1991) note:  
By 1965, most Nigerians had become disillusioned and disaffected 
towards the various governments of the federation. The mounting 
political, economic and social problems facing the country were not 
addressed by the politicians rather nepotism, corruption, 
indiscipline, tribalism, sectionalism and a host of other vices became 
rife. Institutions, which could have helped in solving the problems, 
for example, the courts, the Census Commission, the Federal 
Electoral Commission, the police and finally the armed forces, were 
being politicised.129 
 
Overall, Nigeria became a troubled nation as the virtues of 
sustainable human rights and democratic structures continued to elude 
the country even after 1966 when the military claimed that it had the 
answers to national problems. Unfortunately, the military rested on 
human rights violation, corruption and impunity, as well as ongoing 
transition politics.  
From a broad perspective, Nigeria’s political history has been a 
litany of brinkmanship, incoherence, and uncertainty.130 This is attributed 
to ethnic and religious diversity, which even civilian political leaders 
manipulated for selfish ends before 1966. Indeed, ethnic and religious 
conflicts remained a major problem while the scramble for control of the 
central government topped the priorities amongst contending political 
forces and their backers.131 Yet it did not end with the fall of the first 
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Republic.  Instead they have become recurrent issues in Nigeria coupled 
with the agitation in the oil rich Niger Delta region of the country.132 
Nevertheless, the elections of 1979, which ushered the second Republic 
from 1979 to 1983, did not depart from ethnic and prebendal politics.133 It was 
characterised by corruption and nepotism, which showed that Nigerian politicians 
did not learn enough lessons from the events of the 1960s and the emergence of 
military rule. Incidentally, General Buhari in his main broadcast after the 
December 1983 coup remarked that “it was in the discharge of national role as 
promoters and protectors of the nation’s interest that the armed forces decided 
to effect a change in the leadership of the government...to clean up the mess and 
save the country once again and pilot its affairs from the path of insanity”.134 
Nigerians who felt betrayed by the politicians and their corrupt tendencies 
at first welcomed the coup. This support, however, was short-lived as human 
rights violation orchestrated by the administration, including the gagging of the 
press became increasingly apparent, which explained that military rule was not 
the answer to the myriad of challenges facing the country. The problem of ethnic 
politics and prebendalism also had a spiral effect on electoral fraud and human 
rights violation.  
 
2.5.1 Political transition, electoral fraud and human rights violation: a colonial 
factor. 
 
The Nigerian transition crisis revealed the increasingly predatory and self-
interested character of military rule, a proclivity that had intensified social discord 
and internal military disaffection. Moreover, an anaemic democratic movement, 
weakened political institutions and a fragmented civil society that provided 
tenuous foundations for the revival of democratic pressures or the 
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implementation of a workable political transition135. An absurdity however rested 
in, the problems of hegemony and impunity therein that was manifest in the 
colonial state because they did not stop at national level; but was so evident in the 
internal and local elections in the Northern region. The emirs and the oligarchy 
exploited this chance to meddle into the politics of the country. 
This chapter therefore establishes the fact that hegemony and impunity 
had become a cankerworm in Nigerian polity and would remain so until the 
Northern oligarchy avoided interfering in politics.136   
It is a well-known fact in the colonial state that the election results of 
1951137 were manipulated in personal homes and offices with the connivance of 
accredited electoral agents. This scenario also manifested in modern elections 
where fictitious names and fake electoral materials were freely used to gain more 
or popular votes.138 The effect of this was electoral apathy on the part of voters 
and impunity on the part of politicians who were eager to take power at all 
costs.139  
This did not help the country in its quest for unity and progress. For 
instance, the elections of 1951140 and 1959 did not take place without elements of 
malpractice. Sir Bryan Smith, a colonial administrator, confessed that in the 
elections of 1951, he not only helped to prepare NPC’s manifestos, slogan and 
strategies, but he affirmed: “I had to hold and guide the pen hand, after cajoling 
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from them the names of those for whom they wished to vote”.141This shows a 
regrettable incident because those who were meant to set an example of the 
political process as administrators of empires and colonies suddenly became 
destroyers of an evolving process. Smith also confessed to election manipulation, 
even where the supporters were in a minority, so the party could win ninety per 
cent of the vote.142In the run-up to elections conducted under the Electoral 
Commission of Nigeria in 1959 there were allegations of rigging, stuffing of ballot 
boxes, as well as obstruction and intimidation of opponents.143 Corruption eroded 
the first and second democratic governments and led to the inception of the 
military into governance which bred the latter’s human rights violations in a bid to 
quell democratic dissent. Such factors eventually led to the establishment of the 
Oputa Commission. In the realm of human rights, the profile of the British was less 
than impressive. British rulers exiled some African rulers to achieve their 
objectives.144 Others were dethroned and deprived of their economy as the 
colonialists were determined to monopolise them for the benefit of the 
metropole.145 It should be recalled that most British industries in this period 
depended on raw materials to sustain production, and these materials as well as 
markets for finished goods were dependent on the colonies.  
Cases of rape and kidnapping of women by colonial agents and soldiers of 
the West African Frontier Force, who engaged in the plundering of villages were 
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brought before the courts.146 The observation of prominent individuals attest to 
the fact that these horrors were better imagined than experienced. It was evident 
that colonial agents committed human rights violations that were unprecedented 
in the history of the nation. Therefore, the theory of colonial isolationism by the 
colonised was tantamount to outright rejection and repudiation of their 
objectives.  
This development was conspicuous in post-colonial Nigeria, because the 
military brought with them endless political transition147 that never saw the light 
of day.  
It was the flagrant behaviour of colonial agents that frequently sent people 
into the bush for days and months, knowing full well that their human rights would 
be violated. This is epitomised in the senseless killing of Aba women in 1929148 for 
protesting the draconian policies of the colonial administration like the imposition 
of special tax on market women. This was an abuse of the right to work, freedom 
from discrimination based on gender and sex to mention but a few. The inquiry 
later condemned the actions of the British and to ease the tension and agitation 
of the people, a change of policy was effected in Eastern Nigeria.149  
The culture of brutality and oppression in the colonial state was apparent 
when the military took power in 1966. To remove the legal protection of human 
rights violation available to Nigerians, the constitution of the federal republic was 
suspended to deny people access to freedom and justice. 
According to Ojiako (1980): “The national military government took the 
following actions as soon as they overthrew the civilian government in 1966. First, 
was the suspension of the provisions of the constitution of the federation relating 
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to the office of the president and the office of the prime minister, as well as those 
relating to the press?”150  
This chapter contends that the action of the military was aimed at 
neutralising the claim from any quarter that power belonged to them, or to rally 
support from dissident soldiers and ethnic loyalties to usurp power based on the 
problems of ethnicity and regional dichotomy. The second action was 
promulgation of Decree No. 3,151 “which deals with the detention of certain 
specific persons in the interests of security of Nigeria for a period not exceeding 
six months”.152 It was this section of the decree that opened the chapter on human 
rights violations and impunity in relation to the activities of military government 
in Nigeria.  
The argument in the previous discussion shows that the military did not 
learn anything from the colonial state, because they simply emulated the 
negativity of the colonialists. A similar example is Kenya where in the absence of a 
legalized and official opposition, although the constitution allowed parliamentary 
democracy, President Kenyatta quickly created a highly centralized, authoritarian 
republic, reminiscent of the colonial state.153 
This means that politicians are expected to jealously guard against the 
coming to power of military rule to avert the problems of impunity and human 
rights violations. Thus, from the evidence adduced previously, the study 
discovered that colonial constitutions were tinkered with to accommodate 
northern politicians as well as provide cover for their participation. This singular 
act affected the entire country post-independence as the Nigerian State. 
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Thus, the creation of Legislative seats to favour the Caliphate and 
politicians in the north destabilised the country.154 A case in point is that, while 
Ukpabi explores in detail (in the first chapter of literature review), the origins of 
the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), he claims could be written in terms of the 
history of Northern Nigeria from 1897–1906 because they were the martial 
force.155 
The study also notes that the counter coup of July 1966, orchestrated by 
the northern military class, was aimed at redressing perceived injustices following 
the first coup of 1966 in which northerners and western leaders were killed, while 
Igbo leaders were spared.156  
Therefore, the coming to power of a crop of military officers from the 
north157 was heralded by the Caliphate and encouraged to hold on to power158 at 
all costs, even at the expense of human rights violations. The effect of this 
development according to Tanko Yakassai, one of the northern leaders, was that 
“federalism was completely ruptured, and the traditional one-line command of 
the military was introduced into governance”.159  
On this matter Nnamdi Azikiwe noted: “the role of the military in a state is 
to preserve the territorial integrity of that state…But what we have now in many 
parts of Africa is the military not only seeking to preserve the territorial integrity 
but to rule the state as well”.160 If this is the reality, why did the Northern oligarchy 
pretend that all was perfect? And why did they use AL haji Aminu Saleh to truncate 
the transition agenda?161 This can be explained from the nature of domination and 
the web of political intrigue in Nigeria. 
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It is important to assert that the Caliphate has continued to undermine the 
clamour for a national conference to discuss the state of the union162 as well as 
the Oputa Commission, mainly because past human rights violations were 
committed under the its watch against other ethnic groups. The effect of this 
dilemma is that Nigeria is postponing a critical debate that stands to redefine the 
nation and its obligation to the peoples of Nigeria.  
This could partly be due to difficult logistics of transition, and the 
contentious atmosphere of civilian politics, provided ample pretext for additional 
postponements163. Developing the situation further, the effects of military rule on 
transition politics, as well as the response of civil society to defend the masses 
from autocratic rule will be examined. 
2.6 Political transition of military rule, 1966–1999 
This section is an overview of military rule and the dynamics of transition 
politics in Nigeria from 1966 to 1999. This is important, not just because of its place 
in Nigerian history, but the fact that the military redefined Nigerian politics in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The activities of some military regimes are 
highlighted because of their transition politics and human rights violations 
employed to intimidate opponents and perceived critics to take power.164 
Arguably the military would not have survived long were it not for the 
cooperation of some political elites.165 Thus the autocratic rule of the military 
eventually led to the Oputa Commission, as a transitional justice mechanism, and 
marginalisation that dragged Nigeria into a pariah state,166 a situation in Nigeria 
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described by scholars as the descent of the iron curtain.167 Mutua’s writings on 
‘Kenya and Transitional justice’ re-emphasises the latter’s notion that,  ‘‘In fact, 
policy-makers and statesmen now increasingly realize that a human rights state, a 
political society that internalizes human rights norms - cannot be created unless 
the society concretely addresses the grievances of the past. On the issues 
pertaining the truth commission, he says that it has become the effective tool for 
addressing the abominations of the past’’.168 A case that is correlated with 
Nigeria’s intentions for the creation of the Oputa Commission.  
During the final years of military rule in Nigeria were significant because of 
the atrocities committed during the period and the forceful push of civil society to 
rid the country of autocratic rule. It should be recalled that the Babangida 
administration annulled the June 12, 1993 election won by Chief Moshood Abiola 
for reasons that cannot be substantiated,169 but rather an attempt to continue 
with prolonged military rule and transition politics. With the fall of the Babangida 
administration, the interim government of Chief Ernest Shonekan lasted for six 
months. Thereafter, Abacha’s regime came to power and became more autocratic 
to opposition and perceived enemies including civil society groups. Nigeria 
therefore became a pariah state with sanctions and boycotts from international 
engagements.   
With the death of Abacha on June 8, 1998 the political tension subsided as 
Abdul salami Abubakar took power.170 However, Chief Abiola was pronounced 
dead not long after Abubakar claimed power, following a heart attack. 
Consequently, a six-month transition programme was announced by the new 
regime, and elections were conducted leading to the emergence of Olusegun 
Obasanjo as president in 1999. The link between this section of the chapter and 
the main theme of the thesis – transitional justice – lies in the fact that human 
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rights violations reared their ugly head after the military overthrew a 
democratically elected government in 1966,171 as Ogundiya in 2010 in his paper 
on “Democracy and Good Governance: Nigeria’s Dilemma”,172 argues; Yet this 
continued till 1999 when Obasanjo took power in a democratic election. The study 
argues that the military pursued prolonged transition politics to mislead Nigerians, 
merely for their own selfish ends and wealth accumulation.  
This is seen in the way one military regime overthrows another with 
accusations of corruption and ineptitude, claiming they would resolve corruption, 
infrastructure decay, economic challenges and unemployment in the country. This 
was the mantra that brought Aguiyi Ironsi to power, Yakubu Gowon, Murtala 
Muhammed administration, Buhari’s regime and that of Ibrahim Babangida. The 
effect of this rhetoric set the country backward, as a new political transition date 
would be fixed, leading to experimentation, which was a waste of taxpayer’s 
money.  
It should be emphasised that the tension of the period and political 
disintegration that occurred in the early years of independence led to the 
overthrow of the civilian government in 1966.173 Since then there has been one 
form of transition politics or another, as well as a military coup culture.174 The 
question therefore is: what was the state of the new independent nation? Ojiako 
(1979) notes that, “by far, the most important problem was the unfriendly 
relations among the regions of Nigeria.175 A constant political friction was the 
imbalance in the size of the regions”.176 This imbalance is equally emphasised by 
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Adeyemo when he elucidated on the resurgence of violence in the Niger-Delta 
region as covered in chapter one of the section on literature review. 
With the coming of military rule, an infringement on fundamental human 
rights and increased incidence of human rights violations occurred. The assistance 
of some politicians was generous, as they suddenly became collaborators, passing 
information not only on the position and plans of civil society groups but the 
general reaction of the public towards military rule,177 A situation broadly 
discussed in Ojiako (1979)’s, 13 Years of Military Rule 1966–1979.178 
The tacit support of some members of the political class provided leverage 
to the military in their quest for power. For instance, the military regimes of 
Generals Babangida and Abacha had to appoint seasoned civilian ministers of 
information as against military officers to disseminate information and do their 
bidding, since they understood the language of the political class and what they 
wanted to hear and know about democracy and transfer of power.179  
The hegemony of the military in the political and economic life of the 
country could not have been possible were it not for anti-democratic tendencies 
of civilian regimes removed from office in 1966 and 1983.180 It was this 
development that led to the emergence of military contractors181 and consultants, 
who reassured them time and time again about the strategies to adopt in their 
transition programme and human rights violations182 Which had been reported in 
the Annual Report (1997), A CLO Report on the State of Human Rights in 
Nigeria,183The effect on the nation cannot be glossed over, because there was 
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division and palpable mistrust among the political elites, as some groups were 
friends of the military while others were opponents. Thus, extrajudicial killing and 
human rights violations became widespread.  
It is therefore important to take a critical look at transition politics and the 
human rights record of some military regimes in Nigeria and how they fared during 
the period. This will situate the facts in their proper context, as it has been argued 
in some quarters that the activities of the various military administrations reflect 
the hidden agenda of the Northern oligarchy in their quest for domination and 
resource control.184 
 
2.6.1 Gowon’s regime 
 
The role of Gowon’s regime in the Nigerian Civil War and the promise to 
keep the country as an indivisible entity was commendable.185 The regime 
confronted internal disorder and secession following the overthrow of the first 
republic and the assassination of prominent politicians, mainly from Northern and 
Western Nigeria. This section investigates the contribution of Gowon’s regime in 
fostering unity and the theory of ‘no victor, no vanquish after the civil war’186 as 
laid out in Elaigwu (1985)’s, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman,187 and 
in chapter one of the History of the Nigerian Army 1863–1992 (1992).188  
Ironically, General Gowon did not learn much about the factors and forces 
that led to the fall of the first republic,189 as he began to promote ethnic politics in 
the military and to perpetuate himself in power. Consequently, his regime became 
so corrupt that he told the world that money was not Nigeria’s problem but how 
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to spend it.190 He was further accused of demonstrating Machiavellian traits to 
fellow officers,191 especially his disposition towards non-Hausa ethnic officers and 
eminent groups.   
This period proved to be an ideal situation for the northern oligarchy to 
pursue political and ethnic hegemony and by extension resource control over 
other ethnic groups, even at the expense of the nation’s crisis. Eventually, this 
development led to the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970.192 The effect of the 
war was visible in the nation’s backwardness, political stagnation and human 
rights violations. Gowon’s regime was unashamedly corrupt to the macro level. It 
was not hidden from the public gaze. Thus, the anti-corruption crusade spread to 
the entire public service, thus, the purge of the public service that led to the 
retirement and dismissal of over 10,000 public servants nation-wide193. Arguably, 
if the Gowon administration had settled for peace and diplomacy, as agreed in the 
meeting convened in Aburi, Ghana, perhaps Nigeria would not have experienced 
war or endured transition politics and human rights violations orchestrated by his 
and other regimes.  
Consequently Gowon’s regime capitalised on instability and the support of 
the Yoruba ethnic group to extend the handover date.194 Rather than taking a 
stand on the handover date, the Gowon administration embarked on a number of 
economically and socially divisive projects, such as the Udoji Award, Salaries and 
Wages Review Commission, mandated to increase workers’ salaries throughout 
the country, the population census and change of currency, to mention a few. 
These projects were seen as misplaced priorities because the expectation 
of the masses was the handover date to a democratically elected government. 
Apart from exploring the life of Gowon and his political engineering in chapter one, 
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the work of Eliagwu in 1986 also highlights the democracy agenda, which was 
truncated by the Dimka’s coup of 1976.195   
These actions provoked some elements in the army to overthrow Gowon’s 
government leading to the emergence of the Murtala/ Obasanjo government.196 
Unfortunately, Murtala Muhammed was assassinated in 1976 for his openness 
and willingness to handover to a civilian government.197  
2.6.2. The Mohammed/Obasanjo regime 
This section focuses on the Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo 
regimes. Specifically, it investigates their contributions to Nigeria’s political 
transition and democracy.198 The chapter reveals that they were military 
democrats concerned with the yearning and aspiration of Nigerians to return the 
country to civil rule. Besides, that is not to say there were no traces of human 
rights violations during their period of power. It would be beneficial to clarify from 
the outset that the Mohammed/Obasanjo regimes involved two military rulers.199 
The question here is: was their administration different from others or was it an 
extension or change of baton? Would it have done anything different and what 
were the expectations of Nigerians? These are some of the salient points for 
discussion.  
The military, at all times, claim that it intervened to save the country from 
imminent collapse and disintegration200 and effectively carved a role for itself as 
the saviour and guardian of the nation.201 Murtala’s anti-corrupt crusade did not 
in any way deter the politicians of the second republic from corrupt practices, 
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rather they engaged in different shades of corrupt practices202 rooted in the 
writings of Oarhe and Aghedo (2010), “The Open Sore of a Nation: Corruption and 
Internal Security in Nigeria”,203 Oluwaniyi (2011), “Police and Institution of 
Corruption in Nigeria, Policing and Society”,204 Onuoha (2009), “Corruption and 
National Security: The Three-Cap Theory and the Nigerian Experience”,205 
Ogundiya (2010), “Democracy and Good Governance: Nigeria’s Dilemma”,206 and 
Bello and Odusote (2013), “The Matrixes of Bad Governance, Corruption and 
Insecurity in Nigeria”,207 which are evidenced in the preceding chapter. 
The assumed role was not entirely misguided, as the military had on 
occasion been called upon to play this all-important function by some vocal 
sections of the public in times of serious national crises.208 Following the 
assassination of Murtala Muhammad on 13 February 1976 by a group of dissident 
soldiers in Lagos, it became clear that some military elite were dissatisfied with 
the way the country was governed.  
The assassination of Murtala Muhammad made it possible for Obasanjo, a 
southerner to have the first shot at the seat of power since 1960, the year of 
independence. Despite the shortcomings of the Obasanjo administration, it was 
different because he handed power to a democratically elected government. The 
regime was deemed successful since they met the general expectations of 
Nigerians and rule of law.209 This development rekindled the hope of politicians 
for democratic rule after the botched first republic, unlike the transition politics of 
their counterparts. It has been pointed out that most transition programmes of 
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military regimes, apart from Obasanjo and Abubakar’s regimes, had used 
intimidation and human rights violations to prolong the life of their regimes rather 
than reform the body polity.210  
The effect of this tendency in Nigeria could be seen in the way transition 
politics were organised, thus in 1979, out of about three decades of nationhood 
the civilian government ruled for less than a decade. It was the impunity of military 
rule211 that subsequently led to the human rights violations that brought about 
the Oputa Commission to resolve the shambles of marginalisation, ethnicity and 
corruption.212   
2.6.3 Buhari, Babangida and Abacha’s regimes 
In this section, the three dictators in Nigeria their administrative impact on 
Nigerians their violation of human rights, and extrajudicial killing and incarceration 
of opponents are demystified. Military regimes in Nigeria exhibit patrimonial 
characteristics such as personal rule, absence of separation between the public 
and private realms, patron-client administrative networks, veneration of the ruler, 
massive corruption, ethnic/sectional-based support, and repression of opposition 
and violation of human rights. Most of the dangers posed by military rule to 
democracy are not really because of its intrinsic authoritarian posture, although it 
is the most perceptible. It is the patrimonial tendency in military rule that creates 
the most transcendent and pernicious effect on democracy because of 
unconcealed ethnic/sectional alignment of regime,213 Which are previously 
grounded in the works of Coleman (1958), Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,214 
Nnoli (1978) Ethnic Politics in Nigeria,215 Akinyele ed (2003), Race Ethnicity and 
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Nation Building in Africa: Studies in Inter-Group Relations,216 and Osuntokun and 
Olukoju, eds. (1997), Nigerian Peoples and Culture.217 Since the collapse of the 
second Republic in December 1983, Nigeria witnessed two distinct periods of 
military administration. The first period under General Mohammadu Buhari which 
began in December 1983 and ended in August 1985 and the second period in 
August 1985 until 1993 under General Babangida; thereafter, there was an interim 
government under Chief Ernest Shonekan which lasted six months, leading to the 
infamous regime of General Abacha that was terminated on June 8, 1998 and the 
coming of Abdul salami Abubakar’s regime that handed power to a civilian 
democratic government in 1999.  
It was the deception and highhandedness of the military regime that 
prompted the civil liberty organisation and its coalition partners to take back 
power from the military. The Nigerian military embarked on prolonged transition 
politics to preserve power and accumulate wealth, even against the collapse of 
the Nigerian State.218  
This began with the Buhari administration under which many Nigerians 
witnessed the so-called ‘War against Indiscipline’ (WAI). In his maiden broadcast 
to the nation, Buhari stated “it was in the discharge of national role as promoters 
and protectors of the nation’s interest that the armed forces decided to effect a 
change in the leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”.219 
Because military administrations have tended to see military tribunals as a more 
effective instrument for enforcing social discipline and achieving economic health, 
the Buhari government introduced special tribunals and probe panels to 
investigate public functionaries perceived to be corrupt under President Shehu 
Shagari.220  
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The effect was that past civilian governors were arrested and imprisoned. 
By this action, Nigerians thought that a messiah had come, but the reverse was 
the case. With the introduction of a special military tribunal under Decree No. 3 of 
1984 called the Recovery of Public Property Decree,221 he clamped down on the 
media and opposition groups. The worst aspect of his regime was the overthrow 
of a democratically elected Shehu Shagari government, citing excuses of 
corruption, nepotism and decay in infrastructure. This mantra was not even 
addressed even during the worst erosion of infrastructure in the country. He 
gagged the opposition and got rid of the so-called ‘drug pushers’ disobeying the 
pronouncement of a court with competent jurisdiction.  
Buhari’s administration was one of the juntas that set the country 
backward without vision or motive, to obey the northern oligarchy and perpetuate 
power.222 Nigerians saw the Babangida government as an idle administration, 
particularly the way taxpayers’ money was squandered in fruitless transition 
politics.223 General Babangida took power in 1985 with a view to returning the 
country to civilian rule but that was not to be. Meredith (2011) 224, in discussing 
transition politics under General Babangida, explains:  
The military ruler, prevaricated for four years before authorising 
political activity, then imposed rigid restrictions over the electoral 
process and finally tore up the result when it was not to his liking. 
By raising expectations about the return of civilian rule, allowing 
popular momentum to grow, and then arbitrarily terminating the 
whole exercise at the point when an election had been successfully 
concluded.225  
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At the same time, it became visible to all Nigerians that the Babangida 
administration was massively corrupt.226 He had neither vision nor mission on how 
to better the country. Nigeria had a history of transition politics, and this was to 
engage the population in a series of national debates about when and how the 
military would disengage from politics. Panter-Brick (1978) argues that the 
debates in 1970 to 1974 produced the famous “diarchy” formula, which would 
have allowed both military and civilian collaboration and participation in 
democratic politics.227 Such debates also featured in the process of determining 
the type of constitution for the country. There was also the popular “I.M.F” debate 
in 1985/86 organised by the Babangida regime. On the record, these activities 
were designed to elongate military rule in the country without making any 
headway. It is obvious that military governments in Nigeria employed the rhetoric 
of a transition programme to gain the approval of the masses and promote their 
transition agenda. Normally, political transition was supposed to be a blueprint 
capable of laying the foundation for democratic rule. In other words, it is the 
successful handover from one civilian regime to the other, but the main objectives 
of Nigeria’s military dispensation were to accumulate wealth and promote ethnic 
politics;228 the later already discussed in the works of Nnoli (1978)229 Akinyele, ed 
(2003),230 and Osuntokun and Olukoju, eds. (1997),231 and the violation of human 
rights that incidentally culminated in the Oputa Commission. The Babangida 
political transition began in 1987 with the recommendation by a political bureau 
to hand over power in 1990. Interestingly a minority report by the same bureau 
recommended 1992 as the handover date. The interest in the recommendation 
lay in the fact that the minority report provided General Babangida with “a fait 
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accompli” to accept 1992 as the year of handover to an elected body of 
Nigerians.232 The implication was that Babangida had a blanket ticket to set or 
adjust the transition timetable.  
This was not the first time this had occurred in Nigeria’s political space. For 
instance, General Gowon in 1974 declared that the 1976 handover date, which he 
announced in 1970, was no longer ‘realistic.’ It is remarkable to note that each 
regime had its own transition politics. General Gowon played an exclusive game 
of transition politics which isolated not only his colleagues in arms, but also 
civilians in terms of letting them know how he wanted to proceed with the nine-
point programme announced at the end of the civil war233 which Uwechue (1971) 
in the ‘Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future,’234 explored in 
great detail in the preceding chapters. 
A transition to democracy involves attempts to put in place structures that 
will ensure democratic stability and engender unity. Some of the structures the 
military purportedly employed during the transition period include the party 
system, census, revenue allocation, and creation of new states. Others include 
public sector representatives, constitution making and institutional process to 
ensure access to state power for all groups.235 These became the hallmark of 
military regimes to show Nigerians the impermanent nature of the system and 
assured them of their corrective nature and desire to handover to civilians.236  
The Babangida administration, on the other hand, not only depressed the 
Nigerian economy, but also distorted the unity of the Nigerian State. First, his 
structural adjustment programme collapsed the economy of Nigeria through the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Loan, thereby causing poverty 
and untold hardship.237 Second, his prolonged transition programme plunged the 
nation into isolation leading to the crisis of June 12, 1993 elections, widely 
regarded as free and fair.238  
And third, the administration led the country into ethnic politics and 
insecurity as the Igbo fled ‘en masse’ to avoid a recurrence of civil war in 1966. 
This was because, when Babangida felt secured enough, he began to undermine 
and destabilize the transition programme, which he had extravagantly planned. It 
was obvious that he had a hidden agenda, which was to keep him in power 
through dexterous manipulations. His most favourite strategy was dispensing 
largesse to powerful groups and individuals to buy their support. In the local 
parlance, this came to be known as "settlement"239. Abacha came to power after 
overthrowing the Interim Government set up by Babangida before his exit. The 
Abacha regime could be said to have been more patrimonial than Babangida's.240 
2.7 Change and continuity   
Change and continuity in Nigeria’s political space has been difficult to 
achieve. This was due to the contending forces and factors that shaped ethnic 
politics, hegemony and resource control. It was these factors that installed and 
sustained military rule in Nigeria. Even when there was the desire as in the case of 
June 12, 1993 elections to surrender power to a democratically elected 
government, ethnic politics and regional sentiments prevented this from 
happening.241 Therefore the military assumed that the political class have not 
learnt any lesson on governance, hence a manifestation of autocratic tendencies, 
prolonged military rule.242  
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An important question to be answered by this section is, whether there 
was any change and continuity in the Nigerian process and of what type was it? 
Babawale (2006) argues that: “evidence on the ground showed that in Nigeria little 
has changed about the political culture and the political system in general. Politics 
under this circumstance remains an investment, a business into which you put 
millions with the hope of reaping profits. The politics of ethnicity, region and 
religion continue as evident in the frantic search for a democratic alternative”.243  
Fawole (1999) also asserts that Nigeria had simply lost both the initiative 
and vigour for which it was hitherto famous. General Abacha’s virtual illiteracy in 
global diplomatic affairs did not help matters, nor did Tom Ikimi’s combative 
approach to foreign policy avail much. It was not until the restoration of civilian 
rule in 1999 that the country regained its composure and confidence in foreign 
policy.244 Some other scholars affirm that Nigeria has not left the position it 
occupied in military regime following the human rights abuse human rights 
violations and prevailing politics of hatred and bitterness in the land.  
Nevertheless, this section reveals that there was some change and 
continuity even after the death of Abacha.245 This was the case because well-
meaning Nigerians rallied support to save the soul of the nation from 
disintegration. But change could only be mirrored in the way things were done and 
the structures that were put in place. While continuity reflects the trajectory of 
how certain issues were addressed and solution found in the political and socio-
economic culture of the people, it was the absence of change and transformation 
during the military rule that led to human rights violations and eventually led to 
the establishment of the Oputa Commission. As will be pointed out in greater 
detail in Chapter 3, Abacha’s tenure was ruthless246 to a level unknown in the 
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history of military rule in Nigeria.247 These reprehensible acts, on the one hand, 
aggravated the sanctions and isolation of the country and on the other hand calls 
for secession by marginalised groups. The mysterious death of Abacha on June 8, 
1998 led to the emergence of General Abdul salami Abubakar administration.248  
He swiftly reversed the direction of the dictatorship by releasing scores of 
prisoners including General Olusegun Obasanjo, union chiefs and Ogoni dissidents, 
a move that heralded change. In addition, though, the death of Chief M.K.O. Abiola 
provided a new beginning and a clean break from the past.  It was the continuity 
of ethnic and political alliance that prompted Abubakar’s regime to move swiftly 
and implement a transitional process to hand over power within six months of his 
tenure.249 
This effect led to relaxation of hostilities since victims of rights violations 
together with the political class held meetings of reconciliation and amnesty that 
had been missing over the years; arriving at a deal that assumed that Abdul salami 
Abubakar would successfully surrender power to a democratically elected civilian 
government. It was based on this compromise that the arrangement for a 
transitional justice mechanism was reached and Oputa Commission was set up 
afterwards to deal with all the crises surrounding the nation,250 Which is broadly 
presented by The Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission Report (May 
2002),251 and Shriver (1995), An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics252 in the 
literature reviewed in chapter one. 
Thus, local elections were held in December 1998, followed by state 
elections in January 1999 and elections for the national Assembly and that of the 
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presidency in February 1999. Eventually Olusegun Obasanjo won the election, and 
in May 1999 and was sworn in as president and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces of Nigeria.253 In fact, this turned out to be the much-desired change from 
military rule to democratically elected civilian government in Nigeria. This event 
marked the beginning of continuity of civilian rule last experienced in 1983, and 
the move to reconcile victims of human rights and the marginalised groups 
through a transitional justice process (Oputa Commission). 
The above discussion has revealed the stalemate in Nigeria’s long 
democratic journey and its effects on the nation, particularly the wanton 
destruction of life, economic sanction and the isolation of the country by the 
Commonwealth of Nations and her European partners. The discussion established 
the fact that there was change and continuity in Nigeria’s political transition since 
Abubakar regime even though there are still traces of ethnicity and the clamour 
for resource control. If there was change, then what was the role of civil society 
groups in the change and continuity of this political transition in Nigeria? 
 
2.8 Political transition – human rights violations and civil society organisations 
 
This section examines the contribution of civil society groups in combating 
human rights violations in the last years of military rule in Nigeria. Although this 
theme will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, the discussion here 
focuses on the civil society organisation, its contribution and its affiliates in 
Nigeria. In fact, human rights violations began in colonial Nigeria. This section 
provides insight about the nature of human rights abuse perpetrated by the 
military junta, and the fight by civil society groups to expose injustice and 
intimidation of autocratic regimes in Nigeria, even up to the last days of Abacha’s 
regime.254 
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As previously evidenced in chapter one by Oarhe and Aghedo (2010), “The 
Open Sore of a Nation: Corruption and Internal Security in Nigeria”,255 Oluwaniyi 
(2011), “Police and Institution of Corruption in Nigeria, Policing and Society”,256 
Onuoha (2009), “Corruption and National Security: The Three-Cap Theory and the 
Nigerian Experience”,257 Ogundiya (2010), “Democracy and Good Governance: 
Nigeria’s Dilemma”,258 and Bello and Odusote (2013), “The Matrixes of Bad 
Governance, Corruption and Insecurity in Nigeria”.259  
This aspect of knowledge is equally significant in the wider debate on 
transition politics in Nigeria, the nature of atrocities committed by the military, 
and how civil society institutions galvanise to push the military government away 
from Nigeria’s political space.260 The purpose of this section, by extension, is to 
show that the role of civil society groups cannot be undermined in any society, for 
calling out on the government when its actions are anti-people. Records show that 
it was the concerted effort of the civil society groups that helped uncover the 
reprehensible acts of military rule in Nigeria and their contrived transition 
politics.261 As a consequence, the Abacha regime went after the civil society, but 
while they operated underground they released their reports from time to time, 
describing the horrors of military rule and incarceration of opponents. The 
activities of civil society organisations came to the fore when the Buhari 
administration overthrew the democratic government of Shehu Shagari in 1983 
and exploited repressive measures such as the Special Military Tribunals Decree 
No. 3 of 1984,262 to gag the people in the name of recovery of public property, 
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coupled with the harsh austerity policy which did not endear him to Nigerians. The 
administration became notorious for its poor human rights record and the effects 
it had on the image of the country and citizens. The attack on the media using 
military decrees to arrest journalists under the cover of darkness, including the so-
called drug traffickers and oil thieves, was of great concern. Of more concern was 
the fact that military tribunals instead of civil courts tried those who were attacked 
by government, thereby denying them access to lawyers and a fair trial?263 
The argument thus is that the use of special military tribunals to enforce 
public accountability creates a major social difficulty; it de-emphasises judicial 
control by virtue of the suspension of all legislative assemblies. Since military 
decrees including those that create special military tribunals cannot be challenged 
in court; the judiciary is emasculated by being effectively barred from playing its 
traditional role as a check on the arbitrary exercise of power.264 Babangida’s 
human rights violations and the annulment of June 12 presidential elections 
damaged his profile; thus his position became untenable, forcing him to step aside 
as president in August 1993.265 The reason for this was because the Babangida 
regime made things worse through gross incompetence and unbridled corruption, 
waste and mismanagement of the nation’s resources the neglect of non-oil 
sectors, and misplaced priorities.266 It is important to note that the explanations 
provided by the military did not satisfy most Nigerians, and that the international 
community roundly condemned the Babangida regime.267 
Human rights violations escalated during his regime and that of his 
successor, General Abacha.  This led to the Oputa Commission, because Nigeria 
was on the verge of war. The two administrations revealed the evils of military rule 
in Nigerian polity. Their activities were instigated by a clique that believed that 
power belonged only to them. Babawale (2006) contends that: 
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“Many known Nigerian politicians and critics expressed similar fears. 
Such fears were most probably spurred by the fact that Babangida 
administration subjected the programme to a countless number of 
adjustments…Chief Fawehinmi Gani put the number of decrees 
promulgated to regulate the Babangida transition programme at 57 
as at October 1992 with 1,174 sections, excluding the subsections. 
These adjustments created bottlenecks for the transition 
process”.268 
Similarly, General Abacha in his bid to consolidate his power and gain 
legitimacy that he desperately needed consulted widely with Abiola and other 
prominent political leaders after he assumed power. In fact, sixteen out of the 
thirty-three ministers in Abacha’s cabinet, who were vocal supporters of the 
restoration of the June 12 election, keyed into the administration.269 Abacha’s 
regime responded to this synergy with unprecedented cruelty and hard-line 
repression not seen before in the political history of Nigeria. Abiola, who had 
earlier proclaimed himself president on the basis of the June 12, 1993 election 
mandate was arrested, detained and subsequently charged for treason.270 He later 
died while still in detention on July 20, 1998. Abiola’s arrest and detention as well 
as the human rights dimension of the Abacha regime will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Three. 
One clear lesson from the 1994 uprising was the retrogressive effect of 
deep ethnic and regional divisions in Nigeria, which made its people incapable of 
acting in a coherent way against the military imposition.271 The deep division that 
existed before and after June 12, 1993 cut across different divides. While majority 
of the people of South West in Nigeria resisted the annulment of the June 12, 1993 
Elections, a few politicians in the southwest supported the annulment. For 
instance, the likes of Olusegun Obasanjo never backed Abiola’s mandate. As a 
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vexed national issue, why did Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba, accept the invitation to 
head the interim government knowing full well that the mandate for Abiola, his 
kinsman, was unresolved? The same applied to the North and southeast regions 
that remained nonchalant about the revalidation of the June 12, 1993 mandate, 
because they felt the mandate was ethnic based, as if it was purely a southwest 
affair rather than a pan Nigerian mandate.272  
To promote Abacha’s ambition to remain in power, the regime sponsored 
groups such as Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA), which called for a protest 
march of two million people in Abuja to request Abacha become a civilian 
president.273 To counter the march, civil society staged a five-million-protest 
march in Lagos in opposition to the self-succession bid. The Abacha Must Stay 
march was reported to have cost N3 billions of taxpayers’ money.274 
Other sectors of civil society critical in opposing the Abacha self-succession 
plan were the media and the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), dominated 
by the Yoruba intellectual class. Momoh (2012) observes that NADECO was not 
the first elite social movement or non-governmental organisation to challenge the 
excesses and despotism of military rulers. Olusegun Obasanjo’s Association for 
Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria (ADGN) formed in May 1993 also had 
the intention of enthronement of democracy and equity, respect for rule of law 
and restructuring Nigeria.275  
The ADGN was critical and outspoken but did not receive the kind of 
persecution meted out to NADECO members and adherents.276 NADECO used 
three main tactics to wage its struggle against the Abacha junta – mobilising 
members of the (then) National Assembly against Abacha’s political moves, the 
use of trade unions (not the Nigeria Labour Congress of Paschal Bafyau, but 
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NUPENG and PENGASSAN), and market women and other popular groups such as 
the Campaign for Democracy (CD) and the clergy. This meant that NADECO’s 
tactics were multi-tracked and complex. Attempts by the Abacha government, 
including the Yoruba ministers on his cabinet, to discredit NADECO and its struggle 
failed.277  
Most media organizations in the country also joined forces to oust the 
regime. For some of them, it was a time to pay for a clampdown on their media 
houses and murdering some of their colleagues, for example, Bagauda Kaltho of 
TELL Magazine and several others.) It was obvious that human rights violations in 
the Abacha era painted Nigeria in a bad light, for example, Kudirat Abiola, Pa 
Rewane and several others were murdered.278 It forced a coalition of pro-
democracy and human rights organisations, the Commonwealth of Nations, 
regional and sub-regional blocs, and other advanced democratic nations to 
persuade the military to return Nigeria to democracy. The character of Abacha’s 
regime caused so much strain and disillusionment, even within the military, that 
they lost the will to continue in government after his demise. Records indicate that 
after the death of Abacha, the military in Nigeria had poor reputation and human 
rights record and little support at home and abroad, perhaps due to the campaign 
of the Civil Liberty Organisation279 and NADECO in exile.280  
Onuoha (2002) also underscores that the deceased Head of State certainly 
did not enjoy support from most citizens. This was partly due to his rather 
unpopular bid to succeed himself in office, and because he was discredited 
because of the general opinion that he and his agents sponsored state terrorism, 
including the assassination of prominent Nigerians who opposed his 
government.281  
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The history of human rights violations and atrocities committed by the 
military regime was the main thrust of the Oputa Commission, as a transitional 
justice mechanism, to resolve these crises for the future of the country. After all, 
a nation in deep acrimony cannot move forward without the resolution of internal 
conflicts. One can safely argue that the hostilities of Abacha’s government were 
extreme, for example, the bombing of innocent citizens and state orchestrated 
killing of perceived enemies and opposition groups.  It is why Okafor (2011) has 
stated, that: 
‘’The Abacha strategy was quite clear: divide civil society by playing groups 
against each other; bribe, misinform, and co-opt; intimidate the leaders of 
protests and their organizations into silence; contain restless communities, 
especially the minorities, across the country; rehabilitate discredited politicians 
and retired military leaders; continue the system of graft, waste, and 
mismanagement; consolidate the power of the armed forces; and postpone the 
transition to civil rule for as long as possible. These objectives have run into very 
serious obstacles.’ 
2.9 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above discussion that the Nigerian State was a victim of 
situations that it could not control, considering its political transition in the 
colonial state and the transition politics of the military, characterised by human 
rights violations that eventually led to the establishment of the Oputa 
Commission. The Nigerian State was neither planned nor envisaged to work and 
exist as a federation.  Thus, the people and nation lost a pan Nigerian vision 
capable of taking the country to enviable heights and sustainable political 
organisation. Pre-colonial culture endowed the regions with sustainable political 
and socio-economic life entirely different from one another, but adequate for 
integration and pattern maintenance.  
However, the Richards Constitution of 1947 introduced the politics of 
regionalism simply to create divide and rule politics and administrative 




politics and hegemony that further introduced division, resource control and 
dominance in the colonial state. British crusaders ignored the suggestions of 
nationalists to balance the nation equitably and avoid human rights violations. 
Unfortunately, the constitutional question dragged on till independence, when 
politicians hoped to resolve the crisis at a round table meeting, but that was not 
to be; rather it culminated in population census and the election crisis of 1964. 
This study notes that the interplay of ethnic politics and religion had wide-
ranging and far-reaching implications for Nigeria’s political transition and 
emergent democracy. Without the balance of power between north and south, 
Nigeria as a nation would be in more trouble in future. It is therefore suggested 
that a sincere and holistic national dialogue to examine the political complexities 
of Nigeria and the balance of power will be the way forward. This exercise will no 
doubt compliment the work of the Oputa Commission and various other national 
dialogues that Nigeria has held in the past. 
This study further suggests that the various components of the Nigerian 
State would thrive better as a confederation or a loose federation (as was the case 
in some advanced countries), since it was an attempt to rid the country of 
corruption, ethnic sentiment and power imbalance that initially led to the military 
incursion in 1966. The effect of the change from democratic rule to military 
administration meant the nation stagnated for a long time. 
The Gowon regime came with military decrees that denied people legal 
justice and freedom of the press. Potential enemies of the State and anti-loyalists 
were also arrested. This continued for about nine years during Gowon’s 
administration, in the face of human rights violations and prolonged transition 
politics that finally led to the overthrow of this regime in 1975. On the other hand, 
the Obasanjo administration handed power to a democratically elected 
government in 1979. But the challenges of the nation came to a head during the 
Buhari regime, when the civilian government was overthrown, and draconian laws 
were introduced that gagged the media, freedom of human rights and pro-
democracy organisations.  
The Babangida era did not fare any better. It led the country into a 




that annulled the June 12, 1993 elections, purportedly won by Moshood Abiola. 
He did not tell Nigerians why he cancelled the elections. Even though he was 
invited to attend the Oputa Commission, he turned down the invitation. Well-
meaning Nigerians viewed this as impunity. The Babangida regime was the worst 
administration Nigeria endured. This is because it plunged the country into 
bankruptcy, the effect of which is still being felt today. Abacha’s regime was a 
catastrophic experience for the Nigerian people. It brought the nation into 
international disrepute and isolation, particularly from the Commonwealth of 
Nations and advanced economies for the extrajudicial killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and 
his Ogoni kinsmen, Kudirat Abiola and Pa Rewane.  
The atrocities committed during this era made the establishment of the 
Oputa Commission inevitable. This chapter notes that the coming to power of 
Abubakar Abdu salami gave hope and respite to Nigerians. He was best 
remembered for handing power to a democratically elected government in 1999, 
probably because the military was tired of reactions and sanctions within and 
outside the country. Olusegun Obasanjo won the election. This marked the 
beginning of more civilian rule known as the fourth republic. The evidence in this 
chapter established the fact that there was change and continuity in Nigeria’s 
political transition from military rule to democratic rule.  
The Oputa Commission was a landmark in the history of Nigeria because it 
afforded victims of human rights violation the opportunity to confront their 
opponents in public arena and to some extent, brought home reconciliation and 
unity to warring communities in the country, but attempts at restoration and 






HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN NIGERIA 
 
3.1 Introduction.  
The situation of human rights in Nigeria during the period of military 
regimes is the central theme. The chapter will investigate why so much human 
rights violation occurred in the country at that time, even though Nigeria had 
ratified most of the international human rights instruments.1 The reason as to why 
these instruments have not translated well into domestic law and practice for the 
protection and advancement of human rights in Nigeria will be questioned.2 A 
working guide to this inquisition can be borrowed from the literature reviewed in 
the previous chapters which is in tandem from what Akinyeye’s examines on 
contemporary issues of international relations and the place of Nigeria in the 
wider world.3 The book, was previously noted to have had a bearing to this work, 
but central, was Solomon O. Akinboye’s Nigeria-South Africa Relations in the 20th 
Century: A Case of Symbiosis and Reciprocity (257-283).4 
The standard definition of human rights in this chapter and the thesis is 
taken from the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:  
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[Human rights are] Norms that help to protect all people 
everywhere from severe political, legal, and social abuses. Examples of 
human rights are the right to freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial when 
charged with a crime, the right not to be tortured, and the right to engage 
in political activity. These rights exist in morality and in law at national and 
international levels.5 
Other writers have also defined human rights in similar terms.6 This 
approach clarifies the fact that human rights not only represent moral claims, but 
they are legally enforceable and claimed against the state.7 The claim of 
entitlement is further justified by the fact that Nigeria had ratified all the core 
international human rights treaties, both at the United Nation’s level and the 
Africa Union regional level.8 And further, all Nigerian constitutions since 
independence in 1960 contain a charter on fundamental human rights. It is 
therefore the responsibility of the Nigerian State, as a duty bearer, to ensure that 
human rights are respected, protected and fulfilled. Based on this analogy, this 
chapter argues that the Nigerian State during the period under review had failed 
in its human rights obligations to rights holders, especially during the many years 
of repressive military regimes.9  
This chapter will argue it was because of the failure of state institutions 
to protect human rights that gross violations held sway in the country during the 
period under review.  
Significantly, the thesis will analyse the failure of human rights culture in 
the country, evolution of the State in pre and post military eras, the pursuit of 
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state security, and law and order to the detriment of the promotion of human 
rights.  
This thesis will posit that the Nigerian State failed to comply with its 
international and domestic human rights obligations. In other words, Nigeria’s 
failure to investigate and provide effective remedies in cases of gross violation of 
human rights affected its human rights record. This has cumulatively, over the 
years, encouraged and, indeed, given rise to a culture of impunity, whereby agents 
of the State, public functionaries and others generally need not fear punishment, 
or the application of sanctions for violating the human rights of other citizens.10 
The agents of the State were well aware that they had the support of 
their superiors to commit human rights violations and they also knew they would 
be protected from any form of accountability by the military junta.11 Owing to the 
above, I examination of the evolution of the State in the pre and post military era, 
the pursuit of state security, and law and order to the detriment of the promotion 
of regime of rights.12 Also the use of ouster clauses, secret military tribunals rather 
than conventional courts, further exacerbated the situation.13 
Therefore, it will be argued that, the rule of law and not men should 
govern. This is an important principle of governance, which came under attack 
during the period of military rule.14 
One key question that needs to be posed is whether the origin of the 
culture of impunity is attributable to the nature of military governments 
themselves? This becomes increasingly important, since the military comes into 
power by violating the constitution and supplanting it with military decrees, 
imposed on the people. 
It is noted that over time successive military governments in the country 
have belied their illegitimacy and unconstitutional rule by suspending the 
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constitution upon seizing power by force. They modified the principle of 
separation of powers by proscribing the legislature and assuming its functions and 
powers. Even though the judiciary was not abolished, it was however hamstrung 
through decrees enacted to oust the judicial review of certain legislative action by 
the military government.15 The result is what may be described as legislative 
supremacy of the military, 16 which is elucidated on in chapter one by Oluwaniyi 
(2011), in his writing on the “Police and Institution of Corruption in Nigeria, 
Policing and Society”, 17 this is a fundamental departure from the principles of 
separation of powers and judicial review, which define a federal system of 
government.  
However, it is like countries with no written constitutions or with 
supreme parliaments. The difference is that unlike military dictatorships the 
legislature, in a democratic country (e.g. the United Kingdom, where Parliament is 
supreme), the legislature represents the symbolic expression of popular will. This 
is determined through participatory democratic choice of the electorate in 
competitive elections, conducted under universal adult suffrage. This process 
ensures the accountability of members of parliament but also strengthens the 
legal tradition of rule of law, due process and democratic ethos of the imposition 
of checks and balances, on which the political system is anchored.  
This chapter argues that the abiding desire of the military to govern, free 
of constitutional constraints, was clearly restated in the aftermath of the decision 
of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakanmi and Anor v. A.G. of Western State.18 
The Supreme Court ruled in that case that the 1963 Constitution was the 
enabling statute of the military government rather than the takeover decree. In 
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response to that decision the Supreme Military Council promulgated a decree, The 
Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 
28 of 1970, asserting the nature of the change of government brought about by 
military takeover of government, and affirming that the 1963 Nigerian 
Constitution was not the legal basis for the new government. An important 
implication of the decree was that the 1963 Constitution (and other constitutions 
in force whenever the military illegally seizes power) remains in effect only to the 
extent that decrees enacted by military regimes in the country allow.19 
The story of human rights in Nigeria would be incomplete without 
looking at human rights in the context of oil exploitation in the Niger Delta 
region.20 A pertinent question is why has the area remained impoverished with 
poor water quality, pollution, disruption and degradation of farmlands and fishing 
ports, destruction of wildlife and biodiversity and loss of fertile soil after fifty years 
of oil exploration?21 As if this was not enough, there isn’t provision of adequate 
compensation or planned mitigation policy for those affected.22  
As will be demystified later in this chapter, the response of the people in 
the form of protests and campaigns against multinational oil companies (MNCs) 
and their activities, led to the violation of their rights in the form of extrajudicial 
killings and other human rights violations, which the Oputa Commission report so 
eloquently spelt out.23 
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Because the status of human rights in Nigeria at the time democracy was 
restored in 1999 was in a fragmented state. There was a need to address past 
human rights violation. The new government rightly felt that the country had an 
urgent need to come to terms with its past to move forward. This thinking and a 
vocal civil society were amplified, if not encouraged, by the acclaimed success of 
the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC).24  
The SATRC process was widely acclaimed and arguably, more than any 
other process, influenced Nigerian leaders to establish an accountability process 
based on truth and reconciliation.25 A notion that is in tandem was discussed by 
authors like Yusuf (2007),26 Zehr (1990),27 Akinyeye, ed (2003),28 and Lillian 
Grissen.29 
While the latter was imperative for Nigeria’s transitional justice, there is 
also a nexus from the Truth and reconciliation Commission of Kenya, which 
stipulated that transitional justice cannot be achieved unless the mistakes and 
atrocities of the past are properly, fairly, and comprehensively investigated, the 
perpetrators held accountable, and victims recognized, and their dignity 
restored.30  
The Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (the Oputa 
Commission) was established on June 8, 1999 to investigate human rights violation 
inflicted on Nigerians by successive repressive military regimes that ruled the 
country for thirty years before democracy was restored in May 1999. The 
Commission received over 10,000 petitions which included cases of I) physical and 
mental torture, ii) unlawful arrest and detention, iii) murder/assassinations, IV) 
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assault/battery, v) intimidation/harassment, VI) communal violence, and viii) 
disappearances.31  
The Commission’s mandate was to investigate who was responsible for 
this abuse and to make recommendations to the government on a way forward 
for the nation, divided by numerous ethnic, cultural and religious factions and 
where communal violence was prevalent.32  
Such violence is significantly linked to the reasons that led to the 
establishment of the Kenya Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (KTJRC). 
This is because the forty-year rule of Kenya then, by the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) had failed to foster a culture of the rule of law and respect for 
human rights. Unfortunately, though, the list of these human rights violations and 
economic crimes was too long to tabulate. But the most severe have included 
political assassinations, torture and detention without trial, police brutality, 
massacres of communities, sexual abuse and violence against women and girls, 
politically instigated ethnic clashes, and a host of economic crimes such as the 
looting of the public purse and land grabbing. All these violations were 
perpetrated although the Kenyan constitution on its face guarantees fundamental 
rights. Over time, the government substantially eroded and weakened many of 
the safeguards since independence.33   
President Obasanjo while inaugurating the Oputa Commission said that 
the greatest benefit of the Commission was that: 
“It would serve all of us not only to know the truth but also as a result of 
knowing the truth, for Nigeria not to have to go through the type of 
conditions and situations that they have gone through in not distant past”.34 
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3.2 Issues and problems of human rights in Nigeria, 1960–1999 
This section examines key issues and problems of human rights in Nigeria 
from the time of British colonial rule through to independence in 1960 until the 
restoration of democracy in 1999. The emphasis, however, is on the human rights 
situation from 1966 to 1999, the remit of the Oputa Commission.35 The relevance 
of this approach is underlined by the fact that it was during this period that the 
country witnessed authoritarian military rule with attendant gross violation of 
human rights that became the hallmark of military regimes in Nigeria,36 The issues 
are discussed in the previous literature by John de St. Jorre when he offers a 
background to the military regime in Nigeria, and in which he cites the military 
regime’s human rights violations and widespread brutalities. As will be argued in 
this section, Nigeria did not start off with military dictatorships, but military 
intervention in the governance became a fait accompli due to the failings of 
political leaders in Nigeria.37 These politicians stoked ethnic violence and other 
anti-democratic actions, which eventually truncated democracy and enthroned 
military dictatorship.38  The military made use of decrees and this was mainly to 
abridge civil liberties, give itself legislative and executive powers and insulate its 
actions from judicial review.39   
Nigeria’s history of constitutional development progressed from a unitary 
dependency to a semi-federal system between 1914 and 1951. In response to the 
demands of politicians, a fully federal constitutional system was introduced in 
1954 via the Lyttleton Constitution, which established a federal constitution as 
well as constitutions for the regions. These measures, which granted autonomy to 
the regions, did not dispel the suspicion of ethnic minority groups, which were 
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identified by Nnoli (1978) Ethnic Politics in Nigeria in the previous sections40, 
because they favoured the majority ethnic groups and failed to properly address 
their interests as minorities.41  In essence the regions were dominated by majority 
ethnic groups to the disadvantage of diverse minority groups, which accounted for 
about a third of the population.42 Fearing or alleging political domination and 
socioeconomic discrimination under the regional system, these minority groups 
embarked on a vigorous campaign for new regions or states in which their minority 
status could be substantially ameliorated, or completely eliminated. Osaghae and 
Suberu’s statement points to the unfairness of majority over the minority because 
in it they contend that the period marked the beginning of the institutionalization 
of the regional system and the development of ethnic minority discontent in 
Nigeria”.43  
This period also witnessed the establishment of a colonially appointed 
Commission of Inquiry into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying 
them.44 The Commission was appointed by the Secretary of State for Colonies on 
September 26, 1957, principally to ascertain fears of minorities in any part of 
Nigeria, and to propose means of allaying those fears, whether well or ill-
informed.45 The second mandate of the Commission was to advice what 
safeguards should be included for this purpose in the Constitution of Nigeria. It 
should be noted that it was because of the recommendation of the Willink 
Commission that the 1960 independence constitution contained a charter of 
fundamental human rights.46 
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This section will argue that at the time Nigeria attained political 
independence in 1960 the constitution recognised all core rights contained in 
international human rights treaties as of 1960.47 Citizens were emboldened with 
the right to seek redress in the law courts in case any of these constitutionally 
guaranteed rights were quashed. The 1963 constitution, apart from proclaiming 
Nigeria a republic, was merely a re-enactment of the Nigerian independence 
constitution, which had already put human rights architecture in place.48It is 
important to note that at the time of independence, British colonialists did not 
bequeath to Nigeria a stable and cohesive polity.49 In fact the society post-
independence leaders of Nigeria inherited from the British was a broken one.50 
Important to note is Perham’s work, which investigated the early years of indirect 
rule in Nigeria and the various contradictions of nationhood. The chapters on the 
creation of Nigeria,51 indirect rule,52 and the Lagos opposition,53 were central in 
the early discussion. 
The British expansionism sowed seeds of division and conflict in Nigeria by 
bringing together people from different regions, religions and ethnic affiliations 
under one political umbrella.54 Post-independence the first civilian government 
made no attempt to bridge this divide. The divisions deepened over time because 
of bitter struggle amongst contending regional forces for political control.55 No 
doubt the protracted conflict paved the way for the first military coup in January 
1966. The researcher argues that it was the concomitant effects of Nigeria being 
a broken and divided society, constantly living in fear and suspicion, which 
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affected its cohesion to grow its democracy, which allowed military incursion into 
governance.56 The military took over and refused to be subjected to legislative or 
judicial oversights. Human rights in Nigeria became a major casualty.57 As will be 
seen the military style of governance negatively affected all institutions of state, 
created a climate of impunity, and impacted government’s accountability for 
human rights violation.58 The perception that even the first democratic 
government in Nigeria was reluctant to avail Nigerians of unfettered enjoyment of 
their human rights became evident with independence in 1960.  In a speech to the 
Nigerian parliament, the then Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Belewa sought the 
agreement of parliament to amend the constitution to permit administrative 
detention, but the proposal was rejected.59 Alhaji Belewa lamented his limited 
powers to stop subversion. 
“…We cannot stop, and we cannot forestall people who are planning evil... 
This is a very difficult situation in which we in government find ourselves. 
That was why the suggestion was made that we should find some means... 
to curtail liberty of a Nigerian citizen…”.60 
 
3.2.1 Problems of military rule 
 
This section discusses the problems of military rule in Nigeria and how this 
rule affected the protection of human rights. It is argued that even though the 
military usurped power by unconstitutionally overthrowing a democratic 
government, they claimed they were on a rescue mission to cleanse the Aegean 
stable created by the civilian government, and quickly retreated back to their 
barracks.61 However, in reality, they ended up perpetuating power, insulating 
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themselves from legislative and judicial control through enactment of ouster 
clauses, and assumed legislative and executive functions of government.62 
 They suspended the fundamental human rights sections of the 
constitution, encouraged their roving bands of security operatives to operate 
outside the legal process and in defiance of international human rights standards, 
and finally encouraged a culture of impunity and lack of accountability.63 The latter 
was also traced in Yusuf (2007)’s, “Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims 
of Impunity in Nigeria”,64 in chapter one’s reviewed literature.  I therefore argue 
that the military institution and its officers created the environment in which 
human rights violation thrived in Nigeria.65 The consequences were gross violation 
of human rights witnessed in Nigeria during the protracted period of military rule, 
which the Oputa Commission was established to address.66 Reference can be 
traced from the works of Shriver (1995), An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in 
Politics67 in the preceding chapter. 
In this regard, the Commission may not have been necessary if the military 
had not intervened in Nigerian governance. In Kenya also, this was partly the 
reason for establishment of the Truth Commission because it is evident that Police 
and security forces killed scores of reformers throughout the last two decades by 
2004.  Nevertheless, perhaps the most memorable use of state violence against 
prodemocracy advocates was the Saba incident of July 7, 1997 in which 
government agents killed more than a dozen Kenyans. Thus, the imperativeness 
of the truth commission to investigate Saba and other similar incidents.68 This 
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argument is strengthened by the fact that in an ideal democracy, institutions of 
the State exist to protect and promote the human rights of individuals.69  
The military’s intervention in government has historically frustrated 
attempts to promote democratic rule in Nigeria.70 Evidence of abuse, 
mismanagement, and corruption of military leaders undermines the perceived 
legitimacy of the military's right to intervene to restore order and social 
equilibrium. Yet those in power justified military intervention because of the 
country's complex social, political, and economic difficulties.71In essence, they 
claimed they were on a patriotic mission.72 
Ehusani (2002) contends that the military’s claim of patriotism is deceptive 
and mere camouflage for its real intentions, were not honest and altruistic as the 
military claimed. This is because for the many years of uninterrupted military 
dictatorship and the fact that military rule brought more hardship to the country 
than not”.73 
It has been claimed that the first military intervention in 1966 was justified 
by the need to forestall the disintegration of the federation of Nigeria. However, 
the same cannot be said of subsequent regimes, which were obviously not 
motivated by national interest.74By assuming power, virtually every military 
regime in Nigeria promulgated the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 
Decree, conferring plenary power on the military to ignore or dismantle existing 
legal and political institutions.75 
In order to neutralise the legal rules and processes constraining military 
power, parts of the constitution were suspended, abrogated or modified; political 
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parties were disbanded and civil liberties were severely curtailed.76 The military 
utilised four basic means to assert power: (1) abrogation of legislative and 
executive powers, (2) insulation of executive and legislative actions from judicial 
review, (3) abridgement of civil liberties, and (4) assigning adjudicatory functions 
to tribunals.77 The act of military regimes in abrogating fundamental sections of 
the grand norm, which is the constitution, was a direct affront to the enjoyment 
of fundamental rights.78 To further exacerbate, the situation military compounds 
were an affront to the constitution with further assault on the judiciary, which is 
the “temple of justice”.79 Referring to Ojiako (1979)’s80 work on 13 years of military 
rule as spelt out in chapter one, the military abrogated the powers of the judiciary 
to inquire over any actions of the military regime.81 The concomitant effect of this 
twin assault was to leave the people without any protection against military 
violations of human rights. The decree suspending the constitution and abrogating 
human rights is usually the most potent instrument used by the military to 
override human rights without any avenue open for judicial enquiry into its 
actions. In this regard the military, having blocked avenues to seek legal redress, 
moves against pro-democracy activists and other perceived opponents who dare 
oppose authoritarian military rule and clamoured for a return to democracy and 
rule of law.82 From such occurrences, the Oputa commission was needed, a notion 
that Yusuf discusses among others on the imperativeness of a Human Rights 
Violation Investigation Commission (the Oputa Commission), and its mandate and 
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contributions to the discipline of “transitional justice and rule of law”.83 The 
military regimes enacted policies through which they consistently abridged the 
rights of pro-democracy activists and ensured compliance with military rule. Prior 
to the first transition to civilian rule under Obasanjo in 1979, the main decision-
making body was the military Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), which ruled by 
decrees.84 The council oversaw the Federal Executive Council composed of military 
officers and civilians. The government observed some provisions of the 1979 and 
1989 Constitutions, which were implemented but not adopted, or suspended by 
former military administrations.  
Thus, without fully recognising any constitutional authority, the PRC was 
ultimately unrestricted in its scope of authority. Broad and often arbitrary laws 
promulgated through decrees permitted the harassment, arrest, detention, and 
mistreatment of citizens, and undermined constitutional protection against such 
abuse.85 The military in Nigeria consistently undermined citizens' rights to due 
process, freedom of speech, and freedom to choose one's government, as well as 
other basic civil rights.86 Clearly the military in Nigeria circumscribed the rights of 
the people by violating rule of law and undermining democracy.87 The military 
treated Nigerians as their subjects and used violence to suppress dissent.88 Rule of 
law was suspended with the suspension of the constitution and the replacement 
of civilian courts by military tribunals.89 Members of these tribunals were military 
officers who had little knowledge of the law. The pinnacle of this authoritarianism 
was the public execution of the environmental rights activist, Ken Saro Wiwa, and 
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his eight kinsmen.90 The many atrocities committed by the military gravely 
traumatised Nigerians and created the need for a process of accountability and 
healing when the military regime ended.91 The Oputa Commission sought to 
initiate such a process. The work of the Commission is evaluated in more detail in 
chapter four of the thesis, to determine whether the Commission achieved its 
mandate. 
In conclusion, the violation of human rights during the period of military 
regimes and how the military used a combination of ouster clauses, secret trials 
and military tribunals to violate the human rights of Nigerians created rancour in 
the polity. This divided the nation and made reconciliation and healing a real 
necessity for the country to move forward.92 
 
3.2.2 Military tribunals and secret treason trials 
 
This section discusses how the resort to the use of military tribunals and 
secret trials violated the human rights of Nigerians. This practice is considered a 
major setback in the story of human rights violation in Nigeria and it will be 
elaborated upon further in this section, as it negates the basic tenets of due 
process and fair trials.93 The tribunals did not follow the regular procedure for 
criminal trials, established to ensure due process.94 In essence the military, 
knowing full well that their unorthodox methods would not pass the test of rule 
of law and due process, resorted to the use of military tribunals to legitimise the 
persecution of their perceived opponents and critics.95 The tribunals were given 
wide ranging powers of imposing severe punishments, including the death 
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penalty, but they were not compelled to abide by the strict application of the law 
of evidence.96 This was problematic because the standard of proof required to 
convict a defendant in criminal cases was not required in the tribunals, which 
convicted based on flimsy evidence.97 To compound the already difficult situation; 
the military further resorted to secret trials outside the scrutiny of the public and 
held secret trials involving capital punishment.98 This was the height of military 
disregard for rule of law and the fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens99 as 
already observed in the History of Nigeria by Falola, et al., (1991).100 The tribunals 
undermined the functioning of the regular court system in Nigeria. They were 
created to try politically motivated cases purportedly to bypass the rigorous 
scrutiny and delays that occur in the regular court system. The excesses of military 
tribunals and the violation of rights to due process inherent in military tribunals 
and secret trials raised serious questions of accountability.101 It was therefore 
important to revisit these transgressions on the rights of those affected by these 
trials and hold perpetrators accountable through the Oputa Commission.  
To gain a clear understanding of the tribunals it is important to point out 
their salient features: established on an ad hoc basis; members were appointed by 
the Federal Military Government; jurisdiction of the ordinary court was ousted; no 
right of appeal to a higher tribunal102; and tribunals do not respect international 
standards on the right to a fair trial. Further, the establishment of these tribunals 
was inconsistent with the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.103 
The judges were also appointed by the executive, which calls into question their 
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independence and impartiality inconsistent with principle 14 of the Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.104 Further undermining the 
independence and impartiality of the tribunals was the presence of military 
officers who were members of the tribunal contrary to the clearly articulated 
provisions of article 7 (1) (d) and article 26 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and article 14 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which prescribed the standard of impartiality and independence 
of courts.105 
This section emphasises why the military used this method to circumvent 
rule of law and due process. It will be argued that military regimes historically 
relied upon the use of military tribunals operating outside the constitutional court 
system and outside the reach of an independent judiciary to secure and maintain 
power.106 An example is the secret military trials of alleged coup plotters in 1995, 
The Special Military Tribunal which conducted the trial was established under the 
Treason and Other Offences Decree No. 1 of 1986 as amended107, and was 
composed of armed forces officers appointed by the Head of State. The military 
tribunal was established following the arrest of twenty-nine civilians and officers, 
including General Olusegun Obasanjo in March 1995, for their alleged involvement 
in a plot to overthrow the government.108 
On June 5, 1995, twenty-two were charged before the Military Tribunal 
which conducted most of its proceedings in secret, allowing only one day for the 
trial to be open to the press in contravention of the provisions of Section 36 (3) of 
the constitution, which provides for court proceedings to be held in public. The 
Tribunal was given powers under Decree No. 1 to try any person on charges of 
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treason or other offences related to rebellion against the government. This was a 
vague purview upon which military governments could suppress opposition. The 
Tribunal was not bound by the procedures or practices of military or civilian courts, 
but it can award any penalty prescribed by such courts, including the death 
penalty.109 “The military government must confirm verdicts and sentences, but 
defendants have no right of appeal to any higher or independent court”.110  
The denial of appeal was a gross violation of defendant’s right of 
appeal.111Despite widespread international protests, the government did not 
release any information about the trials until October 1995, when the government 
broadcasted on national television the names of forty-four defendants, the 
charges against them, and their sentences. Penalties under the Tribunal were 
harsh. Fourteen defendants were convicted of treason or conspiracy to commit 
treason, offences carrying the death penalty. The defendants were found to have 
conspired to or levied war against the Head of State to intimidate or overthrow 
the government. Five defendants were convicted of concealment of treason, and 
fourteen defendants were convicted of being accessories after the fact of treason, 
offences carrying mandatory life sentences.112  As stated, earlier this trial fell short 
of due process requirements and violated the rights of the defendant as enshrined 
in international human rights treaties to which Nigeria had ratified, which has 
elaborate provisions to guarantee the rights to liberty and security of individuals 
as well as guaranteeing them a fair hearing and due process.113 The Human Rights 
Committee elaborated further in its General Comment No. 32 that: “Article 14 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is of a particularly complex 
nature, combining various guarantees with different scopes of application. The 
first sentence of paragraph 1 sets out a general guarantee of equality before courts 
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and tribunals that apply regardless of the nature of proceedings before such 
bodies.114 The second sentence of the same paragraph entitles individuals to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law”.115 The Law that is emphasised here lies in the constitutional, 
law enforcement and Oputa commission works of Adeyemo (2013),116 Guaker 
(2009),117 Ikhariale (2008),118 Yusuf (2007),119 Akhihiero( 2001/2002)120 and Kukah 
(2011)121 as reviewed in literature previously. The defendants’ trial was held in 
secret and conducted by a tribunal that fell short of the standards established by 
the principles.122 
 In July 1995, Abacha's Provisional Ruling Council had the powers to 
confirm the final sentences, and amidst international criticism of the proceedings, 
they commuted the death sentences on fourteen defendants to life imprisonment, 
or twenty-five years imprisonment, and shortened many of the other sentences. 
Among those sentences commuted was that of General Obasanjo, whose 
sentence was commuted from twenty-five to fifteen years imprisonment.  Serious 
concerns remained, however, regarding the legitimacy of the proceedings. Human 
rights groups investigating this, and other tribunals cited numerous concerns 
regarding defendants' rights in these secret military tribunals. Considered the 
trials "travesty of justice," critics argued that the tribunal denied defendants 
fundamental rights of defence, basing convictions on weak and inadmissible 
evidence.123  
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Moreover, the denial of rights contravened international human rights 
standards, including the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United 
Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).124 Reports cited torture or severe mistreatment 
of military detainees during interrogations, violating the defendants' rights to be 
safeguarded from torture or ill treatment.125 Nigeria as a party to the above 
international human rights instruments was obliged to comply with its 
provision.126 By subjecting the defendants to the above treatments, the military 
government abrogated those treaties.  
Detainees facing trial were detained incommunicado without access to an 
independent medical doctor. This form of detention is contrary to international 
human rights standards, as no provision existed under the State Security 
Detention of Persons Decree No. 2, providing for medical examination of 
detainees by an independent doctor, or access to detainees by any other 
independent person.127 Because defendants may be detained incommunicado 
under the State Security Decree, without legal recourse for indefinite periods of 
time, political prisoners in Nigeria had no safeguards against mistreatment.128 
Indeed, the State Security Decree prohibited legal proceedings against the 
government for actions taken under the Decree, and forbade court action to 
contest any detention, which could contravene fundamental rights provisions of 
the constitution.129 This is what people like Adeyemo (2013)130, Guaker (2009)131, 
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and Ikhariale (2008)132, to mention but a few discussed in chapters one and two.  
Incommunicado detention of the defendants and depriving them of their rights to 
access the courts raised serious issues of accountability for the government, which 
the Oputa Commission had the mandate to address.133 
Despite the government's use of various decrees to insulate itself from 
judicial review, some high courts attempted to order the authorities to produce 
detainees before them, but such orders were ignored.134 In reaction to this 
seeming affront to the authority of the military; the military junta amended the 
1984 State Security Decree, and precluded the courts from issuing such requests, 
including writs of habeas corpus.135 Even military attorneys appearing for 
defendants were not immune from prosecution thereby contravening the clearly 
articulated provisions of Article 14(3) (d) of the ICCPR. Moreover, it is unclear 
whether the defendants were fully informed of the substance of charges against 
them, their alleged actions, and in what ways these acts were unlawful, in violation 
of Article 9(2) of the ICCPR.136  
This article provides that any persons arrested will be informed at the time 
of his arrest of the reasons for the arrest and will be promptly informed of any 
charges against him. The military never complied with this provision in violation of 
the ICCPR. Therefore, this chapter attempts to bring to fore these infractions on 
the rights of the citizens and the need for the Oputa Commission, which was a 
vehicle to revisit atrocities of the ugly past and offer some form of accountability 
to those who were mostly affected.137 
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In addition, the defendants were not allowed sufficient time or facilities to 
prepare their defence.138 The military tribunal denied defendants the right to an 
open trial by an independent tribunal as guaranteed under Article 14 of the ICCPR, 
which provides that defendants are entitled to be tried by "a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.139 Rather, because of the 
tribunal's interdependence with the government, particularly the military ruling 
organ called the Provincial Ruling Council (PRC); the military tribunal were not 
impartial and did not follow due process of law. The Human Rights Committee 
responsible for monitoring the ICCPR has stated, "Military courts should not try 
cases which do not refer to offences committed by members of the armed forces 
in the course of their duties," which was precisely what the military tribunal did. 
The secrecy of the proceedings prevented evaluation of the evidence used to 
convict the defendants.140  
Nigeria is a state party to the ICCPR and as such was supposed to ensure 
that its institutions comply with its obligations under the treaty. Under the military 
regimes, international human rights obligations of Nigeria were clearly ignored by 
the military, thereby bringing the nation to international disrepute and odium.141 
There is no doubt that the victims of these violations deserved to tell their stories 
and be redressed where appropriate. The bottom line is that the government 
owed explanation to these victims; it had to help them come to terms with what 
had happened and, in that way, start the process of healing and national 
reconciliation.142  
The establishment of the Oputa Commission was to initiate the process of 
national healing by revisiting the ugly past and offering a platform for those 
aggrieved to vent their grievances as well as offer the alleged perpetrators the 
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opportunity to offer recompense to victims who had suffered hardship as a direct 
result of their actions or policies.143 
An evaluation of the tribunal’s proceedings from a human rights 
perspective shows that in almost every case, the evidence used in convicting the 
defendants was deficient.144 A free and unprejudiced court would without doubt 
have rejected the evidence used in convicting the defendants, since they were 
obtained from defendants who were held in long-term incommunicado detention.  
The circumstances of their incarceration could not have shielded them 
from ill treatment or torture by their captors. The defendants before the Tribunal 
were also denied the right of appeal, contrary to Article 14(5) of the ICCPR. 
Therefore, the problematic nature of the procedures adopted by the Military 
Tribunal provoked condemnation as it denied defendants their right to due 
process and other fundamental human rights,145 a notion emphasised by Falola, T. 
et al. (1991).146  
The accountability process that Nigeria undertook was supposed to focus 
on the victims of injustice and human rights violation and hold the perpetrators 
accountable.147 This was supposed to be the focuses of the Oputa Commission. It 
is however arguable as to whether this important mandate of the Commission was 
achieved.148 The next chapter discusses how the Commission addressed its 
mandate and the readers will have the liberty to reach their own conclusions as to 
what extent the Commission achieved the mandate for which it was established. 
In conclusion, examined is how the military administration used military 
tribunals and secret trials to violate the human rights of Nigerians who were 
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subjected to the process.149 It was clearly evident that the procedure adopted by 
the tribunals did not meet the minimum standards of due process and a fair 
hearing as articulated in international human rights law.150 The direct conflict 
between the procedures at the tribunals and human rights principles and 
standards at stake were part of the subject of enquiry by the Oputa Commission. 
It is important to note that during the proceedings of the Oputa 
Commission, attempts were made to compel Generals Muhammadu Buhari, 
Ibrahim Babangida and Abdul Salam Abubakar to attend and give their account of 
their human rights record as military rulers, but the Generals rebuffed the 
Commission and ironically used the same rule of law and judiciary that their 
regimes undermined to shield themselves from accountability.151 It was noted 
therefore, by Yusuf (2007) in the preceding chapters”,152 that the many setbacks 
suffered by the Oputa Commission were because of bureaucratic red-tape while 
Akhihiero on his own questioned the constitutionality and powers of the 
Commission. Resolving the case in favour of the Generals, the Supreme Court in 
its ruling held that the Oputa Commission had no powers to compel the 
appearance of any witness outside the Federal Capital Territory and that the 1999 
Constitution made no provisions for tribunals of inquiry.153In essence, the ruling 
by the Supreme Court shielded the Generals from accountability.154 
3.2.3 Security forces: extrajudicial killing, arbitrary arrests and detentions 
The right to life is a fundamental human right and the basis for the 
enjoyment of other human rights.155 This right is enshrined in the constitution and 
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other international human rights treaties.156 The military regimes, especially those 
under the Abacha junta, were singularly notorious in their disregard for human 
rights; they ignored the sanctity of life with reckless abandon and departed from 
the state obligation to protect the right to life.157 The Abacha regime targeted 
human rights and pro-democracy activists and murdered them to silence any form 
of dissent and to maintain hegemony.158 The period under review witnessed many 
reports of unlawful and extra-judicial killing attributed to bands of roving state 
security operatives. The regime did not properly investigate these murders and 
did not bring any of these operatives to trial, despite reasonable suspicion of their 
complicities to these crimes.159 
This subsection will elaborate that unlawful killing amounted to gross 
violation of human rights for which there must be accountability for Nigeria to 
exorcise the ghosts of the evil past and move forward as a nation, operating under 
rule of law and due process. As the thrust of the thesis is on accountability for past 
human rights violations, there is no way we can carry out a holistic discourse 
without reviewing the violation of the right to life by the military. It is equally 
important to link this violation to arbitrary arrest and detention. Most victims of 
unlawful killing by the Abacha junta were at first arbitrarily or unlawfully arrested 
and detained. It is often while they are in detention, incommunicado, that their 
right to life is violated.160 Such human rights violations are documented in A CLO 
Report on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria,161 as seen in the previous sections. 
Under General Abacha's regime, the government enforced its authority 
through the Federal Security System, which included the military, the State 
Security Service (SSS), the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), and other regulatory and 
law enforcement agencies, as well as through non-governmental security forces. 
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The security forces often abused this power and were unchecked by the courts, as 
they regularly disregarded court orders to arraign or release detainees.162This 
clearly shows that the security forces did not operate within the law and 
disregarded the human rights to liberty and security of persons to which the 
Nigerian State has an obligation to guarantee and protect.163 
Abuse by the security forces was able to continue throughout military 
regimes because of the military's insulation from legitimate governmental control 
and judicial restraint.164 For instance, security forces commonly used extrajudicial 
means to maintain control and order under the military regime, the use of 
excessive force to suppress challengers or dissent and to purportedly combat 
crime in the oil rich Niger Delta region.165 Death or injury to a number of innocent 
civilians occurred as a result, thereby contributing to the culture of fear and 
oppression upon which the military maintained power. The government neither 
acknowledged nor denied the abuses committed by the security forces. Notably 
though is the fact that the government seldom held security forces accountable 
for the death of individuals in their custody, or for their use of excessive force, 
encouraging a climate of impunity in which this abuse flourished.166 
As a dictatorship the Abacha regime did not tolerate dissent and regularly 
took action to silence critics of the government and revelations about government 
practice.167 These included human rights monitors, journalists, and political 
opponents who were routinely detained in violation of the right to freedom of 
expression and opinion, which is guaranteed under international human rights 
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law.168 Because of the above violations, it’s important to understand the reasons 
as to why information  like that in  The Human Rights Violation Investigation 
Commission Report (May 2002),169  and Shriver (1995),170 An Ethic for Enemies: 
Forgiveness in Politics are of great importance to this chapter since they examine 
cogent but related themes, particularly on human rights violation and the Oputa 
Commission. 
It is important to point out here that the suspension of the constitutional 
rights negated any protection of freedom of speech. While the Abacha regime 
frequently claimed that it supports freedom of speech, however in reality it did 
not. Other methods of oppression included intimidation of advertisers, 
surveillance of and interference with printers, and seizure of newspapers from 
vendors.171 The assault of the Abacha regime on basic human rights was but 
regrettable. The wanton disregard for rule of law and abuse of due process under 
this regime thus, clearly showed how the country had degenerated under General 
Abacha’s watch.172  
There is no doubt that after this dark past the country needed to go 
through a process of truth and reconciliation to exorcise the ghosts of the past.173 
In this regard an important remit of the work of the Oputa Commission was to 
consider cases of arbitrary and prolonged incommunicado detention and 
extrajudicial executions committed by security forces of the military 
government.174  
The Oputa Commission offered the victims of abuse a platform to tell the 
story of their suffering to millions of Nigerians.175 The telling of these stories at 
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least had some therapeutic effect for victims.176 It is therefore important to note 
that use of state machinery against civilians is detrimental to the human rights 
regime in any state. A situation whereby the powers of the courts can intervene 
on behalf of the citizen is taken away or abridged spells doom for human rights 
and rule of law.177 It should never be allowed to happen under any circumstances. 
The next section portrays how the military government exploited the resources of 
minorities in the Niger Delta region. 
3.2.4 Oil and human rights violation 
To say that Nigeria is a country rich in oil wealth is to state the obvious.178 
However, successive regimes have depleted the nation's resources, and through 
greed, mismanagement and corruption on the part of the political elite, the 
nation's people have seen little benefit from the mining of the nation's oil. Instead 
of a positive transformation towards prosperity, oil exploitation has enriched a 
small minority, leaving the vast majority of the population impoverished.179 This 
exploitation has been the source of tension between the Nigerian people 
(particularly in the Niger Delta, the main source of the nation's oil reserves), oil 
companies, and the government, the latter of which has often collaborated in 
corruption and human rights violation.180 Multinational oil companies operating in 
Nigeria face complex difficulties in their relationships with both the Nigerian 
government and the communities in which they operate.181 “Successive 
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governments have squandered the oil wealth which the oil companies have helped 
to unlock, salting it away in foreign bank accounts rather than investing it in 
education, health and other social infrastructure and mismanaging the nation’s 
economy to the point of collapse”. 182 Without a means to address community 
grievances in a meaningful way, protesters have resorted to incidents of hostage 
taking, forced closures of flow stations, sabotage, and threatening and 
intimidating the staff at oil companies”.183This section, will briefly review human 
rights violation that occurred as a consequence of the activities of the Nigerian 
government and multinational oil corporations, notably Shell, exploring and 
mining oil in the Niger Delta Region.184 
It is important to note that any discussion of human rights violation in 
Nigeria would be incomplete without mentioning the Niger Delta region, the 
epicentre of oil exploration activities in Nigeria and the battleground of conflict 
between the Nigerian security forces with the support of multinational oil 
corporations and minority ethnic groups.185The most notable human rights 
violation that attracted international attention occurred after the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by writer and activist Ken Saro-
Wiwa, who mobilised 300,000 people in a peaceful protest for environmental and 
social justice.186Shell’s response was to encourage and assist the Nigerian military 
in crimes against humanity and gross human rights violation.187 On 10 November 
1995, the Nigerian military government hanged Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni 
activists after a flawed trial that was condemned as “judicial murder”.188 
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The hanging of Saro-Wiwa and his kinsmen attracted international 
opprobrium and sanctions.189 The concomitant effect of the abuse committed by 
the Nigerian State with acquiescence or tacit support from the multinational oil 
corporations as well as other acts of gross violation of human rights against pro-
democracy, human rights and other civil society activists seriously tarnished the 
image of Nigeria and lowered its standing in the comity of nations.190 
The relationship between government on the one hand and civil society, 
pro-democracy and human rights activists including minority communities on the 
other was at its lowest ebb at the time the Obasanjo government took over in 
1999.191 Therefore, the creation of the Oputa Commission was necessary to 
assuage the feelings of those aggrieved, especially from the oil producing 
communities. The government recognised what the victims had been through at 
the hands of successive regimes, which neglected and impoverished the proverbial 
‘goose that laid the golden egg’ (i.e. oil).192 The fact that various minority groups 
in Nigeria, who felt most aggrieved and short changed by the Nigerian nation had 
the opportunity to vent their grievances before a Commission set up by the 
government to listen to their stories, could be said to have had a cathartic effect 
on these people.193 For them it was important that their story was heard and 
etched in the history books for future generations.194 Therefore, to give voice to 
the voiceless minorities was one of the important foci of the Oputa Commission.195 
Even though the multinational oil companies faced difficult challenges in 
the region, they too have shared responsibility for human rights violations in the 
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Niger Delta.196 The double standards exhibited by oil companies in turning a blind 
eye to wanton abuse and disregard for the rights of the people was most 
unfortunate. It is instructive that multinational companies that were supposed to 
be adept at best practice, operating in an environment devoid of human rights 
violation supported and subsidised some of the rogue security forces. These 
actions unleashed mayhem on the communities to silence them from making 
legitimate demands for oil companies to respect the environment and operate in 
accordance with international standards.197  
It is regrettable that these multinational companies had different 
standards for their home countries and for their host countries.198 The 
international community was also complicit because they did not sanction these 
companies for their involvement in human rights violations committed with their 
support and or acquiescence.199 The governments that host oil companies 
operating in Nigeria should have maintained pressure on the Nigerian government 
to respect rule of law and good governance as well as monitor their company’s 
compliance with international human rights standards.200Further, they should 
have taken steps to ensure compliance with the binding code of conduct for 
multinational oil companies in line with international standards in other civilised 
climes. Their failure and/ or neglect for due diligence make them as complicit as 
the oil companies in relation to the atrocities that occurred in the Niger Delta.201 
This piece of work was analysed perfectly by Adeyemo (2013).202 
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Another concern was the problematic level of secrecy surrounding the 
arrangements for security for the oil companies. “Given the abuse that has 
allegedly been committed by the Nigerian security forces in protecting oil 
installations; it is more important that there be transparency by the oil companies 
to monitor security forces’ performance related to their operations, take steps to 
prevent future abuse, and publicly protest violations that do occur”.203 This lack of 
transparency made abuse possible and lack of accountability the order of the day, 
thereby promoting impunity for violators.  
Thus, the oil companies' relationship with the government, coupled with 
their economic interdependence, created an opportunity for companies to 
influence government policy and negatively influence their protection of human 
rights.204 Yet, companies continually sidestepped this responsibility, and in some 
cases have escaped accountability for their role in human rights infractions. Most 
oil companies failed to criticise security force abuse related to their operations, 
and if they did respond, they often denied knowledge of government attacks on 
individuals, or justified security measures as appropriate responses to threats 
against company security.205 This attitude gave the impression of tacit support for 
abuse by security forces and helped promote impunity.206 
Communities have responded to inequities attributed to the oil economy 
through attempts to mobilise and protest the exploitation of oil, provoking violent 
and repressive response by government.207 Investigations connected to the 
suppression of protests at oil companies have revealed numerous human rights 
violation, including: “repeated incidents in which people were brutalised for 
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attempting to raise grievances with the companies; and in some cases security 
forces threatened, beat, and jailed members of community delegations even 
before they presented their cases”.208 Many local people seemed to be the object 
of repression simply by suggesting a compensation agreement, or for seeking 
effective compensation for land ruined or livelihood lost.209These were some of 
the grievances the community members had against the oil companies and rightly, 
they were aggrieved at the shortcomings of oil companies in failing to play a more 
altruistic role in addressing legitimate community grievances and angst.210 
Although General Abacha's death in 1998 significantly relaxed the 
unprecedented repression of his regime, tension remains in oil producing 
communities, and human rights violations continues.211 
Restiveness in the Niger Delta continued even after the democratic 
government of President Obasanjo was inaugurated. The new government 
continued with the repressive tactics of the military, as evidenced in the Odi 
Massacre in 1999.212 The massacre was an attack carried out on November 20, 
1999 by the Nigerian military on the town of Odi in Bayelsa State in retaliation for 
the alleged killing of twelve members of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) by a gang 
near Odi sometime in November 1999.   
In the attack the military destroyed all the buildings in the town except the 
bank, the Anglican Church and the health centre.213A number of civilians were also 
reportedly killed in the incident.  Human Rights Watch concluded that "the soldiers 
must certainly have killed tens of unarmed civilians and that figures of several 
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hundred dead are entirely plausible”.214 Nnimmo Bassey, Executive Director of 
Environmental Rights Action, claims that nearly 2500 civilians were killed.215 
These assertions were validated in February 2013, when the Federal High 
Court ordered the Federal Government to pay N37.6 billion compensation to the 
people of Odi for the massacre and destruction of their ancestral home. In his 
judgment, Justice Lambo Akanbi condemned the government for "brazen violation 
of the fundamental human rights of the victims to movement, life and to own 
property and live peacefully in their ancestral home”.216  The judgment by the 
court vindicates the truth of the abuse and the fact that government, which was 
supposed to protect the human rights of its citizens, was the real perpetrator in 
this case.  
It was evident that this massacre took place under the watch of President 
Obasanjo, who had established the Oputa Commission to investigate past human 
rights violation. Thus, it raised questions about the credibility of Obasanjo’s 
government in addressing past human rights violation. 
Over two hundred civilians of the Tiv ethnic group in Gbagi, Zaki-Biam and 
several other villages were allegedly killed by the Nigeria army.217 The soldiers also 
allegedly engaged in widespread destruction of homes and properties in these 
areas.218 Reportedly the soldiers carried out these dastardly acts in revenge for the 
earlier killings of nineteen soldiers by a Tiv militia group. Sadly, President Obasanjo 
and senior government and military officials defended the soldiers’ actions, 
claiming they acted in self-defence.219 This was another dent in the human rights 
record of Obasanjo’s presidency.  
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The government did not make any attempt to set up an independent 
investigation into these killings. The alleged perpetrators were also not held to 
account. Of concern is that the government was quick to defend attacks by its 
soldiers on citizens under the guise of self-defence. 
Accountability was at the core of the mandate of the Oputa Commission 
and for a government, which set up such a commission to be, accused of such 
gross violations is telling and disturbing. A government that is genuinely interested 
in accountability and dealing with the past will take such accusations seriously and 
conduct a proper and genuine investigation into this accusation and, importantly, 
hold alleged perpetrators to account.220 Obasanjo’s presidency was not genuinely 
interested in accountability and dealing with the past, and this raised questions to 
its credibility to uphold human rights and to hold violators accountable.221 
 
3.2.5  Right to liberty and security of the person 
 
The right to liberty and security of the person is guaranteed by the Nigerian 
Constitution as well other United Nations and regional instruments Nigeria had 
ratified.222However, during the period of military rule this right was completely 
disregarded, as unlawful arrest and detention became the hallmark of military rule 
in Nigeria.223 Military decrees often empower the state and its security agencies 
to detain citizens without trial in violation of their fundamental human rights.224 
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Most of those who were administratively detained by security officials 
were detained under Decree No. 2 of 1984 as amended.225 This procedure was an 
affront to human rights because it sidestepped the courts and allowed certain 
officials of the military government powers to detain individuals at their whim and 
without recourse to the law courts.226 This was a discretion that was not exercised 
judicially and which courts were not allowed to examine. Administrative detention 
laws are those, which authorise:  
“The deprivation of a person’s liberty whether by the order of the Head of 
State or any executive authority, civil or military. For the purposes of 
safeguarding national security or public order, or other similar purposes 
without that person being charged or brought to trial”.227 
The deprivation of liberty through administrative detention sometimes 
violates series of protective measures developed by international human rights 
law to ensure that individuals are not arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived of their 
liberty.228 It places the individual in custody of the state, even though the person 
has not been charged or tried in a court of law. The individual is detained merely 
as a precautionary measure based on a presumption that he poses a threat to the 
national security or economic wellbeing of the country.  
According to Femi Falana, a prominent Nigerian human rights lawyer, 
administrative detention was used during the military regime of General Obasanjo 
from 1976 to 1979 more so than in previous regimes.229 It was during this period 
that the secret detention camp known as “Ita Oko” was established on an island 
off the Nigerian coast. The island held detainees in destitute conditions until it was 
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exposed by the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) in the late 1980s and was 
eventually closed by the government.230This revelation by Femi Falana gives a 
picture of human rights antecedents of President Obasanjo and supports his 
critics’ contentions that questioned his integrity in setting up the Oputa 
Commission. Some critics insisted he wanted to use the Commission to rubbish 
other leaders while his own human rights records were equally despicable.231 
These contentions may be credible, taking into consideration the fact that 
President Obasanjo did not do enough to make the Oputa Commission succeed.232 
During the first wave of military rule due process of law was to an extent 
available. The remedy of habeas corpus was available and persons who were 
detained could challenge the lawfulness of their detention in court. Many courts 
ordered the release of detainees on procedural and due process grounds. The 
military regime was to contain this seemingly judicial activism by the courts 
through the introduction of “ouster clauses” which become the tool to prevent 
judicial scrutiny.233 The military government was to become more blatant as they 
were later to disobey court orders outright that were against the military 
government.234 According to Femi Falana, of the twenty-three detainees whose 
release was ordered by the courts during the military regime of General Obasanjo, 
only five were actually released.235 The flagrant disobedience of the court order is 
an affront to rule of law, the constitution and human rights, and negated the 
earlier pretensions of the military as an institution that respected due process and 
rule of law. As will be revealed later in this section, the military extended its 
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arrogance to the promulgation of ouster clauses that banned the courts from 
questioning or inquiring into any action of the military government including those 
clauses that interfered with human rights.  
The military government ousted the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain 
complaints in respect of Decree No. 24 of 1967 and in fact any other Decree by the 
combined effect of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1 
of 1967236 and the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of 
Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1970.237 The interference of the military regime into the 
realm of judicial affairs of the nation was another legacy of the military in 
Nigeria.238 Hitherto the judiciary was seen as the last hope for ordinary Nigerians. 
It provided a forum where individuals could seek redress in cases of rights 
violation. Therefore, the concomitant effects of the above decrees were to 
effectively deny Nigerians the last legal avenue where they could seek redress. The 
military had become a law unto themselves and instead of serving Nigerians, they 
served themselves. The conduct of the military in government left much to be 
desired by the time the military were removed from governance in Nigeria. The 
country’s reputation was at its lowest ebb and according to one commentator, the 
will to continue ruling was gone, as the country became ungovernable.239 
The Oputa Commission was awash with testimonies of victims of brutality 
by the security forces. The violation not only affected high profile activists but also 
ordinary Nigerians who were subjected to ill treatment, as the security forces 
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violated the people’s rights with impunity. The impunity of the military rubbed off 
on other security institutions as they all acted with impunity.240 As descriptively 
discussed by Yusuf (2007), in the “Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims 
of Impunity in Nigeria,”241 noted earlier on in the preceding sections. The military 
intervened with issues that were purely civil in character and corrupted the entire 
system.242Military and other quasi military detention facilities were full of civilians 
in military custody on alleged infractions not of a military nature. Nigeria was 
gradually reduced to a banana republic where respect for human rights, rule of 
law and due process had taken flight.243 
It should be mentioned here that when ouster clause provision first 
appeared in 1966 in Nigeria’s legislative lexicon, the courts asserted jurisdiction to 
examine the legality and propriety of acts challenged before them, to judge 
whether they were fully compliant with the law. In the case of Agbaje v. 
Commissioner of Police,244 for example, the late Justice Akinola Aguda, an eminent 
Nigerian jurist held that before the Inspector General of Police could take 
advantage of the arbitrary powers to detain any person under the Armed Forces 
and Police (Special powers) Decree No. 24 of 1967,  
“…the onus is cast upon him (Inspector General of Police) to establish 
before any court in which the exercise by him of powers conferred on him 
by the above provision has been challenged, that he has complied strictly 
with the enactment under which he has acted…”245 
But once it was established that the official had complied with all the 
procedures for the exercise of his powers under the decree, the learned judge 
observed the court would decline jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of his 
actions. Some judges however went beyond this reasoning to hold that provisions 
in a decree curtailing access to court for breach of constitutional rights were 
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legislative judgements and therefore unlawful. The first case to rebut this point is 
the case of Council of the University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun.246 In that case the 
government of the western region of Nigeria enacted an edict, abolishing rights of 
appeal to the Supreme Court, contrary to the provisions of the then 1963 
Constitution. The appellant had appealed against the judgement of the high court 
of the region; an appeal pending judgement in the Supreme Court at the time the 
edict was promulgated. The appellant argued that the edict breached his 
constitutional right of appeal and to that extent the edict was unconstitutional and 
void. The state on the other hand argued that the ouster provisions in Decree No. 
1 of 1966 precluded the court from questioning the validity of the edict. The 
Supreme Court held that Decree No. 1 of 1966 did not preclude inquiry into the 
question as to whether an edict was void or contravened the provision of the 
constitution, but the Decree merely barred the courts from entertaining cases 
questioning the legislative authority of the military government to enact a decree 
or an edict.247 The Supreme Court accordingly declared the edict unconstitutional 
and void, because it infringed on the appellant’s constitutional right of 
appeal.248The courts in this instance showed courage to stand up to the military to 
protect the rights of Nigerians by disregarding the ouster clause. 
The second case in which the courts resisted the erosion of their powers is 
the case of Lakanmi v. Attorney General of Western Region of Nigeria & 
another.249 In that case an edict to confiscate the assets of indicted public officers 
contained a provision ousting the jurisdiction of the courts to inquire into anything 
done under the edict. The Supreme Court held that the ouster clause was contrary 
to the principles of separation of powers, which had been recognised in the 1963 
Constitution.250 Giving the lead judgement for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Adetokunmbo Ademola declared that the ouster provisions in this case were 
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nothing short of legislative judgement, an exercise of judicial power, and therefore 
unconstitutional and void. 
The military government of Nigeria thought the Supreme Court had gone 
too far and reacted swiftly and decisively. Just a few days after the judgement the 
government promulgated the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and 
Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1970 nullifying the court’s decision, 
revalidating the edict and prohibiting judicial inquiry into anything done under any 
decree or edict. This subsequently rendered access to courts for breaches of 
constitutional rights impossible and the courts impotent.251 
The implication of this action by the military was to pave the way for a total 
affront on human rights and due process.252 As later action of the successive 
military government shows, it could now detain critics and perceived opponents 
of the military on any flimsy excuse. The ordinary person had the door shut on 
them to approach the courts, the last bastion of hope for judicial redress.253 Its 
effect was the gross and wanton violation of human rights, which became the 
hallmark and legacy of military governance in Nigeria.254 
The right to liberty and security of the person was one of the rights most 
affected during the years of military rule.255 The military suspended the human 
rights provisions of the constitution, ousting the jurisdiction of courts from looking 
into actions of the military government and, most importantly, with Decree No. 2 
and related laws which allowed indefinite administrative detentions.256 The fact 
that these actions were arbitrary and could not be scrutinised by the judiciary gave 
rise to impunity, and those vested with the powers to implement these actions 
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often misused them without question. Consequently, Nigerians witnessed gross 
violation of human right, which shook the very foundation of the people. Vocal 
attempts to confront this affront to their rights were met with further repression 
by the military and prohibition of judicial access.257This section will consider in 
more detail how the military used decrees to limit and prohibit judicial access.258 
3.2.6 Prohibition of judicial access 
During the period under review various military governments prohibited 
judicial access through the promulgation of military decrees and edicts, which 
forbade the courts from questioning actions of the military government.259 In this 
regard the judicial duty of the courts was to scrutinise executive and 
administrative actions to ensure they complied with human rights standards and 
rule of law. A clear example is that anyone who was arrested under Decree No. 2 
of 1984 could not get redress in court, because when invoked the decree suspends 
the fundamental right of citizens and precludes judicial inquiry into the lawfulness 
or otherwise of the detention.260 
This subsection therefore will review the effects of prohibition of judicial 
access on human rights and due process. It is posited that if the military had 
allowed access to the courts, it would have opened its action up to judiciary 
scrutiny and prevented some of the grave abuses that occurred during the period 
under review.261 It was because the actions of the military that impacted human 
rights were done in the absence of any judicial scrutiny that they were able to 
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operate unchecked and with reckless impunity.262 This impunity can be traced 
previously in the works of Yusuf (2007)263. 
Generally the effect of ouster clauses is to bar the courts from inquiring 
into executive conduct, thereby stripping the courts of their powers to examine 
the lawfulness of executive actions including arbitrary detention of citizens by 
agents of the government.264 Ouster clauses are in direct conflict with the 
provisions of Article 14 of the ICCPR under which everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law, a right that is also guaranteed by the Nigerian Constitution.265 
When the jurisdiction of courts is clearly spelt out by the constitution, 
persons who are aggrieved or affected by the actions of any institution of the State 
can have recourse to such courts for redress.  This was not the case during the 
period under review as access to our courts was greatly restricted.266 
3.2.7 State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984 
When civilian rule returned to Nigeria in 1979, the constitution prohibited 
detention without charge or trial beyond 24 hours.267 The combined effects of 
Sections 1, 32 and 274 of the 1979 Constitution, repealed all the administrative 
detention decrees.268 Chapter Four of the Constitution contained a justiciable bill 
of rights known as Fundamental Rights.269 Federal and state high courts were given 
original jurisdiction to hear complaints and offer redress in respect of breach of 
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any of these rights.270The constitutional regime in place then guaranteed human 
rights, due process and rule of law. Cases of human rights violation were vented 
in courts, which had jurisdiction to grant redress to the victims. 
Further, the 1979 Constitution spelt out the jurisdiction of the High Court 
in each state because the drafters wanted to preclude the proliferation of ouster 
clauses, which had been the practice of military regimes.271 In fact Section 236 (1) 
of the Constitution granted the High Court: 
 “…unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil 
proceedings in which the existence or the extent of a legal right, power, duty, 
liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and 
determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, 
forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed 
by any person…”.272   
However, this was only short-lived, as four years later the civilian 
government was overthrown in a military coup on 31 December 1983.273 With the 
return of the military, the 1979 Constitution was suspended, and the 
administrative detention decree and ouster clauses were reinstated. The military 
government first promulgated the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 
Decree No. 1 of 1984.274 The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 
1984 quickly followed.  
The decree empowered the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters to detain 
without charge persons suspected of acts prejudicial to state security or harmful 
to the economic wellbeing of the country for a renewable period of three months. 
When invoked the decree suspended the fundamental right of citizens and 
precludes judicial inquiry into the lawfulness or otherwise of the detention.275 The 
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detainee had no rights to be informed of the grounds of detention. The absence 
of judicial scrutiny undermined rule of law and encouraged impunity.276  
It was under the application of these unabridged powers that critics and 
perceived opponents of the military government were targeted and their human 
rights violated. Most were arbitrarily detained under this decree as the military 
regimes flagrantly abused rule of law and due process, flaunting Decree No. 2 as 
their authority for the detention.277 No one dared question their legality, as the 
courts had already been hamstrung by ouster clauses contained in Decree No. 13 
of 1984.278 
The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) 
Decree No. 13 of 1984, Section 1(b) provides that:  
(i) No civil proceedings shall lie or be instituted in any court for 
or on account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done or purported 
to be done or pursuant to any decree or edict and if any such proceeding 
are instituted before, or after the commencement of this decree the 
proceedings shall abate, be discharged and made void. The question 
whether any of the provisions of Chapter IV of the constitution or any other 
law has been, is being or would be contravened by anything done or 
proposed to be done in pursuance of any decree or edict shall not be 
inquired into in any court of law, and accordingly no provisions of the 
constitution shall not apply in relation to any such question.279 
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The implication of this section is that persons are now detained at the 
mercy of the military authorities.280 The role of the courts as a counter balance to 
arbitrary or illegal acts were undermined under military rule.281 
The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984 was 
severely amended by successive military regimes. Soon after General Ibrahim 
Babangida overthrew General Muhhamadu Buhari, he amended the decree to 
expand the number of authorities entitled to order detention and to lengthen the 
period for which an order was valid.282 
In 1988 the decree was again amended to permit detention by the Minister 
of Internal Affairs. However, in 1990 the government withdrew the amendment 
and reduced the length of detention to six weeks. The authority to order detention 
was also reverted to a single official, the Vice President.283 
After General Sani Abacha took power in 1993, he amended Decree No. 2 
of 1984 and reverted the period of detention to a renewable period of three 
months, on the orders of the Chief of General Staff or the Inspector General of 
Police.284 In 1996 the government announced the revocation of Decree No. 14 of 
1994, which had forbidden courts from issuing a writ of habeas corpus in respect 
of persons detained under Decree No. 2. The repeal of that decree was 
inconsequential, as the military government through the combined effects of 
Decrees No. 2 of 1984, No. 107 of 1993285 and No. 12 of 1994 still detained citizens 
arbitrarily and precluded judicial inquiry. 
Each military regime toyed with this decree and amended it at will at their 
convenience. The right to rule of law, due process and fundamental liberties of 
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ordinary Nigerians was not considered.286 Successive military governments were 
concerned only with its survival and how to entrench its hegemony by silencing 
critics and perceived opponents.287 
In 1990, the decree was further amended and a weak and dependent 
advisory review panel, headed by the Federal Attorney General and composed 
mainly of members drawn from the executive arm of government, was 
established.288 The Review Panel was charged with the duty of reviewing the case 
of every person detained pursuant to an order made under the decree. If satisfied 
that circumstances no longer required the continued detention of the person, the 
panel would make recommendations to the Chief of General Staff for the 
revocation of the detention order. The Chief of General Staff is however not bound 
by the recommendations of the panel. Its efficacy cannot be ascertained as its 
activities were shrouded in secrecy. The Review Panel was not independent of the 
detaining authority and had no powers to order release of detainees. The 
ineffectual panel was a smokescreen by the military, to appear as if it was making 
some reform of the system. Nothing really changed as the violations of human 
rights through the use of decrees continued throughout the years of military 
rule.289 
These decrees were grossly misused by the military as hundreds of human 
rights and pro-democracy activists were detained mostly incommunicado by 
various bands of security operatives flaunting these decrees, especially Decree No. 
2 of 1984.290 Even though Decree No. 14 expressly prohibiting the issuance of writ 
of habeas corpus was repealed it had no effect, as the combined effects of Decree 
No. 107 of 1993 and Decree No. 12 of 1994 still precluded judicial inquiry.  Some 
victims of human rights violations presented their cases to the Oputa Commission 
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and some of the upper military echelon appeared to defend their actions.291 
Unfortunately none of the top military officers who appeared before the 
Commission accepted any responsibility for their actions. They denied everything, 
and the victims were left with nothing.292 Maybe, if there was an inducement such 
as the SATRC amnesty it may have been a different outcome. Another issue was 
the refusal of the three former leaders to appear before the Commission to render 
account to Nigerians.293 
The refusal of the three former rulers to appear before the Oputa 
Commission was a missed opportunity for accountability and reconciliation.294 In 
relation to the latter, Yusuf asserted that “the fact that these Generals had raped 
the due process and crippled the rule of law under their regimes they should have 
given their account of their stewardship to Nigerians but instead they refused”.295. 
As Kukah aptly put it “the consequences of the non-appearance of the generals 
still remains a dark spot on the work of the Commission.296  
3.2.8 Freedom of expression 
This section will discuss how the media and the military clashed because 
of the role the former played during the period under review. It should be recalled 
that after the legislative arm of the government was abolished, the judiciary, 
greatly weakened by ouster clauses and civil society, was hounded and 
emasculated, as some of its prominent leaders were in jail.297 The press then 
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assumed the position of the most dissenting voice against military misrule.298 The 
Nigerian press was already cut out for this role as the history of its vibrancy and 
combativeness dates back to colonial days.299  
It is therefore important to say that writers like Ikime, ed. (2012), 
Groundwork of Nigerian History,300 Falola et al. (1989), History of Nigeria, vol. 1,301 
Crowder, (1966), The Story of Nigeria302 and Falola et al. (1991), History of Nigeria, 
vol.3,303 qualified this assertion. The press played a salutary role in the struggle for 
independence in Nigeria. When compared to other African countries the plurality 
of the press in Nigeria is quite impressive.304 
The 1979 Constitution gave the press the duties of ensuring that the 
fundamental objectives of the Constitution is upheld and that the government is 
responsible and accountable to the people”.305 In order to perform this onerous 
task, the press should enjoy reasonable freedom. Thankfully both the 1979 
Constitution and the international human rights instruments that Nigeria had 
ratified provides for freedom of the press.306 
At the time General Abacha took over government in late 1993, there were 
35 major daily newspapers, 18 of which were controlled by federal and state 
governments while the rest were privately owned. In addition of the 34 weekly 
newspapers, 16 were government owned and 18 privately owned and of the 
weekly news magazines, 17 out of 19 were privately owned. But when it comes to 
the broadcast media the state dominates with federal and state governments 
owning 50 television and 30 radio stations.307 The impressive credentials of the 
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Nigerian press meant that it could champion human rights and the struggle for 
democracy in Nigeria.308To its credit the media took up this noble task of 
demanding human rights when the military junta was becoming more autocratic 
and desperate.309  
The media brought the abuses by the military to the attention of the 
international community and vigorously campaigned for return to democracy, rule 
of law and human rights.310 The salutary role of the media continued during the 
life of the Oputa Commission as it popularised the work of the Commission, and 
through radio and television brought life images and stories of abuse that the 
military inflicted on individuals who dared to dissent.311 
While the media enjoyed relative press freedom during the short spells of 
civilian government, the scenario under the military had been different as the 
military resisted the attempts by the military to scrutinise its governance and 
became increasing repressive to limit media scrutiny.312 More importantly, the 
section of the media known as the Lagos/Ibadan axis rose to become the 
arrowhead of counter hegemonic values by querying intently the political and 
economic direction of the military regimes. This brought the media into direct 
confrontation with the military. The battle line was drawn. The successive military 
regimes to curb what they perceived as radicalism by the media used a 
combination of decrees and strong-arm tactics to control the free flow of 
information.313 
The first victim of the military attack on the media was the radical editor 
of a Lagos based news magazine called News watch, Mr Dele Giwa, who was 
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assassinated on 19 October 1986 by a parcel bomb.314 There were strong 
suspicions regarding the assassination, which pointed to military involvement 
because of his investigative journalism. Attempts by his legal counsel, Chief 
Fawehinmi Gani to prosecute three military officers, including former Head of 
State, General Ibrahim Babangida for his assassination, was frustrated by the 
military regime.315Later attempts to summon military officers before the Oputa 
Commission failed as the Supreme Court ruled that the Commission lacked powers 
to summon officers to appear before the Commission.316 
Consequently, there has been no accountability for the assassination of 
Dele Giwa, as the killers still walk free from the atrocities they committed. Those 
who were identified by credible evidence for their roles in his death refused to be 
held accountable and used the same courts when they were in power to shield 
themselves from scrutiny. The Oputa Commission was powerless to intervene as 
put forward by Shriver (1995)317, and the case remains one of many unsolved 
killings, which was a grave violation of the right to life.318 The absence of 
accountability is a major blight on the military dictatorship in Nigeria. 
In continuing its military assault on the media, the Abacha regime in May 
1995 arrested four journalists and charged them with being accessories for 
treason for writing newspaper articles questioning the veracity of the claim by 
government that there was a coup plot against General Abacha.319 They were tried 
by a secret military tribunal and sentenced to life.320 The accused persons were 
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not allowed access to lawyers of their choice and denied the right of appeal. The 
sentences were later reduced to fifteen years following international outcry.321 
Three journalists appeared before the Oputa Commission where they 
recounted their agonising experience in detention. They were arrested, detained 
and tortured by security agents and Abacha’s henchmen. They named names of 
those who detained and tortured them. Another case that was prominent at the 
Commission’s hearing was that of James Bagauda Kaltho, a reporter with News 
Magazine, who disappeared while on duty.322  
The Commission summoned the former Chief Security Officer to General 
Sani Abacha, Major Al Mustapha, to appear before the Commission to give an 
account of what he knew about the disappearance of the journalist. Mustapha 
claimed that the journalist was killed in a bomb blast that occurred at a hotel in 
Kaduna on January 18, 1999 and buried by the police on January 19, 1999. The 
same account was earlier given by another Security Chief, Zakari Biu.  The families 
of the journalist had little or no reprieve from the security chiefs who refused to 
take responsibility for past events. These cases exemplify the flawed pattern of 
the relationship between the press and the military government and how endemic 
human rights violation of perceived critics of the military regimes occurred during 
the dark days of military rule.323 
The government arbitrarily arrested a total of seventy-six journalists and 
eight vendors.324 Constant harassment of the press and members of their families 
coupled with physical violence was the hallmark of General Abacha’s regime.325 
Some journalists for fear of personal safely even fled to exile.326 It was surprising 
that, despite this appalling record, General Abacha’s regime pointed to the 
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existence of an independent press to support its own claim to respect and 
promote human rights.327It is ironic that the regime, despite several cases of 
killings and hounding of the media, could lay claim to a free press and could ascribe 
to being a supporter of free speech and media. 
A crackdown on the media continued unabated until Abacha’s sudden 
death on June 8, 1998. His successor, General Abdul Salam Abubakar, made efforts 
at national reconciliation; he invited all exiles to return home to help in rebuilding 
the nation. Within days of assuming power he released political prisoners 
including some journalists. Those who were exiled were able to return home. 
Though the regime did not overtly harass the media it did not however 
repeal the obnoxious decrees, which were used to hound the press. The Abubakar 
regime was brief and focused on returning the country to democratic rule, which 
occupied the regime until handover to General Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 
1999. 
3.2.9 Minorities 
The minorities in Nigeria are found in Northern and Southern Nigeria.328 
However, oil was discovered by Shell in Oloibiri in the present Bayelsa State in June 
1956 and later in other areas of the Niger Delta.329 The Niger Delta region captured 
the popular imagination and was viewed worldwide as the epitome of the minority 
question, due to untold environmental degradation and other forms of human 
rights violations suffered at the hands of the oil companies, especially Shell and 
the Nigerian government.330 The Niger Delta Region captures the plight of the 
minorities in Nigeria, thus our discussion will focus on the Niger Delta.331 
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The Niger Delta covers the six states of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, 
Delta, Rivers and Edo. It is an area inhabited by about twelve million people with 
different cultures, languages and histories who, united by their historical status in 
Nigeria, now share a common identity as southern minorities. Historically, the 
peoples of the area were at the forefront of minority agitation in the colonial and 
immediate post-independence periods.332 “Their situation has not changed as 
their demands and position in the Nigerian federation remain unaltered, despite 
the different commissions that have been set up by successive administrations to 
look at the question of minorities”.333 However, “the Niger Delta region remains 
grossly underdeveloped, pauperised, marginalised, and largely a poverty zone”.334 
“The basic facilities and infrastructure of a modern society like potable water, 
electricity, health care facilities, good roads, cottage industries and employment 
are lacking in the area”.335 It is the complete lack of development, poverty and 
total neglect of the region despite the resources generated from the area that 
brought it into direct conflict with the state and the resultant human rights 
violation.336 This has naturally led to agitation and confrontation with oil 
companies and the Nigerian State. The bid to quell this conflict resulted in human 
rights violation of activists, who were up in arms against perceived injustice in the 
exploration of their natural resources. 
The crisis in the Niger Delta region and the extent of human rights violation 
go beyond legal and judicial issues, and touch on the moral conscience of the 
Nigerian State and society. Successive regimes in Nigeria, especially military 
regimes, have displayed high-handed treatment, insensitivity and poor judgment. 
While the Niger Delta region remains the live wire of the nation’s economy 
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through the oil produced, the activities of the State have been characterised by 
neglect, deprivation, violence and repression of the people.337  
The activities of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) complement those of 
the State. The MNCs, through their oil exploration activities, are largely below 
international acceptable minimum standards, destroying the ecology and social 
systems of oil-producing communities, which form the basis of material 
livelihood.338 The unabashed arrogance and insensitivity of many oil companies 
are premised on its collaborative alliance with the Nigerian state.339  To 
summarise, life in the Niger Delta is nasty, short and brutal.  It was therefore no 
surprise that the Niger Delta region, particularly the Ogoni nation, presented most 
of the petitions before the Oputa Commission to seek redress for untold violations 
that the people of the area suffered.  
The most prominent case as previously mentioned was the judicial murder 
of foremost poet and minority rights activist, Kenule Saro Wiwa and eight of his 
kinsmen.340  These activists were tried under a flawed judicial process, sentenced 
to death and hanged by the Abacha junta and buried in secret graves.341 As a 
further attempt towards national reconciliation President Obasanjo authorised 
the release of their bodies for decent burial.342 This gesture had a cathartic effect 
on the families of the deceased and brought some form of closure in the sense 
that they could say, with certainty, where the remains of their loved ones lie. 
To the credit of the Oputa Commission it made some efforts to reconcile 
the warring groups and factions in Ogoni land. This was an important aspect of the 
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mandate of the Commission, which was to reconcile divided communities and to 
heal the nation.343 
The Commission emphasised in its report that “it managed to unite and 
amalgamate the Ogoni Four and Ogoni Nine into the Ogoni Thirteen”.344 
Unfortunately the Commission failed to reconcile the Ogoni’s with Shell, regarding 
its responsibility for environmental degradation, because of oil production and 
lack of effort in cleaning up oil spills and preventing further environmental 
damage.345 
 As will be further explored, one of the high points of the Oputa 
Commission was the modest effort it made in reconciling the Ogoni nation as a 
group. It was hoped that the success achieved with the Ogonis could have been 
replicated in other divided communities.  
3.2.10 Prisons 
The colonial government created the Nigeria prisons as an institution for 
punishment and deterrence and after independence in 1960; the new government 
unfortunately adopted the same model.346 The Prison plays a dual role, as it holds 
those awaiting trial until the judicial process is completed and it has permanent 
custody of convicts.347 The conditions in the Nigerian prisons are generally 
appalling and pitiable.348 This brings the prison system into direct conflict with 
human rights; the prison was an institution that was used and dumped by the 
military as most victims of human rights violation in Nigeria were incarcerated in 
the Nigerian prison system after flawed or no trials. These detainees were 
subjected to disciplinary measures, which included corporal punishment, and 
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other forms of ill treatment, which did not comply with international human rights 
standards,349 as outlined in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners and other human rights treaties.350 
The discussion on human rights violation in Nigerian prisons will reflect on 
two pertinent issues: to examine whether the administrative structure and 
operations of the Nigerian Prison Service was able to effectively meet its functions, 
and to examine human rights violations that occurred in prisons and under what 
circumstances they occurred. This approach will help us understand the situation 
of human rights in the prison system in Nigeria. 
The Nigeria Prison Service stated in its submission to the Oputa 
Commission that:  
“The large concentration of offenders in the nation’s prisons and 
their status in relationship to the state make incidence of abuse possible.  
The level of attention that hitherto has been accorded the Prison Service in 
Nigeria in reality has served to facilitate the violation of certain rights of 
prisoners”.351 
The Nigeria Prison Service (NPS) identified two main sources of human 
rights violation: violations arising from prison congestion, inadequate facilities and 
delay in the justice process; and violations arising from overbearing state policy 
and state officials, especially during the military regimes. According to NPS the 
above sources were responsible for human rights violation suffered in the context 
of Nigeria prisons. It was important to bring them before the Oputa Commission 
as step towards addressing them.  
The Oputa Commission would give a holistic consideration to the problems 
that were identified and address them in its recommendation. After all, one of the 
                                                          
349   JEFFERSON, A.M., 2005. Reforming Nigerian Prisons: Rehabilitating A  
  ‘Deviant’state. British Journal of Criminology, 45(4), 487-503. 
350   UN Standard Minimum Rules For the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules)  
  the Un Standard Minimum Rules For the Treatment of Prisoners (Smrs) Were Initially  
  Adopted By the UN Congress On the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders  
  in 1955, and Approved By the Un Economic and Social Council in 1957.  
351   NIGERIA PRISONS SERVICE. 2001. Overview of Human Rights Violation and Professional  
  Hazards in Nigeria Prison Service. A Written Presentation of the Nigeria Prison Service At  
  the Special Public Hearing of the HRVIC, Held October 5 At the Women’s Development  




main foci of the Commission was to stop future human rights violations. And one 
way to do this was to review institutional and other practices that encouraged 
human rights violations. For example, the National Committee on Prison 
Decongestion had identified 100 mentally ill prisoners during a prison assessment 
exercise and recommended to the Nigeria presidency that these mentally ill 
prisoners be transferred to the nearest mental health/psychiatric facilities for 
treatment. The recommendation was approved by the President in October 1999 
but was not implemented. Because of the wilful disobedience of the presidential 
directives those mentally ill detainees remained in custody in violation of their 
right to health.352 The continued detention of the mentally ill prisoners rather than 
transferring them to a psychiatric facility amounted to a violation of their right to 
health.  
An inadequate health care provision for inmates was another key violation 
of their right to health.353 The prison officials were unable to transfer sick prisoners 
to state and federal hospitals due to lack of available funds for settlement of 
hospital bills.  They argued that they don’t have funding to pay the bills and the 
hospitals insisted they could not afford to waive the medical expenses. This clearly 
violates the right to health of the prisoners who are in custody of the State and for 
whom the State is supposed to be responsible for their health care as provided 
under international law.354 A perusal of the Prisons and Penal Reform Factsheet 
provides additional information on available statistics relating to mentally ill 
prisoners.355 It was unfortunate that there was no system in place between federal 
government institutions to harmonise their roles, and as a result of this inefficient 
system the right to health of the prisoners were compromised and jeopardised. 
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The NPS no doubt occupies a primary place in the criminal justice 
system.356  The problems militating against effective operations of the NPS have 
been enumerated here and elsewhere.357  The future focus will be to establish a 
strong human rights monitoring and investigation oversight, facilitate multi-
agency collaboration, and the practical implementation of human rights standards 
in the treatment of prisoners and detainees.358 These measures if implemented 
will address the problems associated with the violation of the right to healthcare 
of prisoners, as well as other violations that occur as a result of weak institutional 
operations and lack of accountability. 
The thesis posits that for the justice system to be meaningful, accessible, 
just, effective and humane, it needs to address the problems of prison conditions 
(including congestion) and poor treatment of prisoners. Practical initiatives 
highlighting best practice, non-custodial sanctions, and models of transformative 
and restorative justice need to be supported.  
In addition, training of criminal justice agents/health professionals to 
improve the treatment of prisoners and detainees as well as the execution of 
programmes to address the problems faced by vulnerable prisoners, young 
offenders, women prisoners, foreign prisoners, mentally ill prisoners and prisoners 
on death row need to be encouraged.359   
Planned intervention needs to be well articulated, coordinated and 
monitored with in-built elements of sustainability and civil society–government 
participation.360 Community participation and support is key to providing long-
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term validity and relevance for the programme. In addition, the military must 
desist from interfering with prison operations and statutory functions.  
The reform of the Nigeria Prisons and Penal System should feed in to the 
reform of the wider justice system, which should target the promotion of safety, 
security and confidence in the justice system.361  This will contribute to the overall 
stability of the country – economically, socially and politically.  Also, it is important 
to note that any reform within the prison system should be complimented by 
economic, social and political reforms.  This is the only way we can ensure an 
effective justice system in Nigeria that reflects human dignity. 
3.2.11 The Nigerian Police Force 
The focus of this section is to review the pattern of human rights violation 
by the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), as well as the structural and institutional factors 
that aided police violation of human rights.362 The discussion will start with an 
analysis of the impact of military rule on the NPF followed by the pattern of police 
violation of human rights.  
The institutional factors that aid police violation of human rights will 
follow. The reason for this approach is for the reader to understand how the 
police, who are supposed to be a civil force, colluded with the military in the litany 
of human rights violation that became the hallmark of the military era.  
The absence of functional institutional structures that ensured 
accountability and guided police conduct made impunity possible and even 
tolerable.363Anybody who promoted the hegemonic interest of the military junta 
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was not held accountable for his or her actions.364 It is important to note that Zehr 
(1990)365 explicitly elaborates on the issue of accountability in restorative justice. 
3.2.11a Impact of military rule on the police 
The condition of the police in Nigeria deteriorated due to persistent 
seizure of political power by the military, which prevented the development of 
democratic culture, adherence to rule of law and due process and protection of 
human rights by the police in the country.366  When the military took power in 
1966, it appointed the then Inspector-General of Police, AL haji Kam Selem, and 
his deputy as members of the Supreme Military Council.367 These appointments 
could be described as a marriage of convenience between the police and the 
military, which neither boosted police image among the populace nor enhanced 
their efficiency in discharging their constitutional responsibilities.368 
Writing on why the military co-opted police leadership into their ruling 
council, S.A. Asemota noted:  
…Military personnel at the time (1966) were relatively few (11,000) 
and the only federal law enforcement agency that had presence throughout 
Nigeria was the Nigerian Police [Force]. It became clear that the army could 
not effectively rule without police assistance. Added to this fact, was the role 
the police played during the difficult days after the death of Major-General 
Ironsi. Police Force Headquarters at Moloney Street, Lagos, was used as 
Command Headquarters by Gowon for a short but crucial period, while 
police communication system, which covered the country at the time, was 
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the most efficient. Thus, coalition of military/police in government was the 
most logical given the situation at the time.369 
While this marriage of convenience between the police and the military 
lasted, police needs were largely provided for and its leadership under Alhaji Kam 
Selem was highly respected by the military. However, the romance period did not 
last long. During the civil war, which broke out in 1967, the military had to recruit 
additional hands to prosecute the war. This led to an increase of armed forces 
personnel to about 250, 000, thus making the need for the police in military 
governance less necessary.370 Commenting on the consequences of this 
development, Asemota stated: 
“…With the increased strength of the army, and the existence of 
military formations in most part of Nigeria, some officers then questioned 
the need for the police in government…”371 
This resentment notwithstanding, the police continued to be part of the 
federal military government throughout the period of General Gowon’s regime. 
However, with his overthrow by General Murtala Mohamed in 1975, military 
hostility against police involvement in government intensified and police 
personnel were excluded from direct governance of states. Since then, the 
relationship between the police and the military has become that of a master and 
servant. 
The consequence of police involvement in governance is that the police as 
an institution became complicit with the proclamation of all the draconian decrees 
of the military, which were anti human rights. As the police were directly 
responsible for the maintenance of law and order its cadre were mostly 
responsible for the enforcement of anti-human rights decrees such as Decree No. 
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2 and Decree No. 4. Apart from the militarisation of the police, their cadres were 
undisciplined. They took the law into their own hands and were hardly champions 
for human rights.372 This evidence was traced in the Human Rights Violation 
Investigation Commission Report (May 2002),373 which is earlier on cited in 
chapter one. 
3.2.11b Pattern of human rights violations by the police 
The previous subsection examined how the police were co-opted into 
governance by the military after it took power in January 1966. This subsection 
will review the pattern of human rights violation by the police during the period 
under review, the extent of these violations and how they affected human rights 
culture in the country. 
The reason for this approach is to bring to the fore human rights issues the 
Oputa Commission had to confront in the fulfilment of its mandate. A holistic 
review of the pattern of abuse will guide the reader towards understanding the 
human rights challenges the country faced, and how those who were entrusted 
with the governance of Nigeria used their positions to override the human rights 
of Nigerians. 
A brief account of police powers under various Nigerian laws helps to 
understand the extent of police powers and how they exercised them. The 
Nigerian Constitution, the Police Act, Criminal Procedure Act (CPA), Criminal 
Procedure Code (CPC) and numerous other statutes grants enormous power to 
the NPF to enable them to perform their duties.374 These include the powers of 
arrest, search, seizure, detention and the power to use reasonable force in certain 
circumstances. The exercise of each of these powers affects the citizen and 
therefore their fundamental rights are more directly affected by police activities 
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than by those of other internal security forces in the country.375 Any abuse in the 
exercise of these powers invariably results in the violation of the fundamental 
rights of the citizen. The police are expected to follow due process of law and 
observe human rights in carrying out their duties. Any deviation from the 
principles of due process and human rights invariably leads to human rights 
violation. 
As documented by human rights monitors the police, most of the time, did 
not apply due process and showed utter disregard for human rights standards in 
carrying out their duties. For example, in 1991, the Civil Liberties Organisation 
(CLO) reported that the police killed on average more than three persons under 
extrajudicial circumstances per month in Nigeria.376 Follow-up research by the 
organisation in Lagos State in 1992 made a shocking revelation. Between January 
and September of that year “the corpses of 449 people whose deaths were 
suspected to have been under extrajudicial circumstances were deposited in the 
mortuaries of Ikeja General Hospital alone. This figure shows an average of 49.8 
corpses per month or 1.66 per day in Lagos State”.377 
Although the Lagos State Police Command in a press statement denied the 
report, the CLO’s call for an official investigation into the matter as required under 
the United Nations Principles on Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-
Legal, Arbitrary or Summary Execution was not heeded.378 Principle 9 states: 
“…There shall be a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of 
all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions, 
including cases where complaints by relatives or other reliable reports 
suggest unnatural death in the above circumstances…”379 
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This clearly shows that there was a pattern of extrajudicial killing by the 
police in Lagos state, which the police authorities neither acknowledged nor 
addressed. Their refusal to investigate this allegation meant they continued 
unabated and this led to several cases of violation of the right to life.  
In ‘’Transitional Justice In Kenya: A Historical Perspective and a Synopsis of 
a Troubled Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission’’, a similar trend is talked 
about in sense that, in Kenya also, violent subjugation and suppression of 
resistance by the colonial state, marked by land appropriation, extrajudicial 
killings, torture, detentions without trial, compulsory resettlement and other 
human rights violations.380Jorre (1972)381 is earlier on cited to have discussed the 
human rights violations in Nigeria during the civil war. 
This section clearly demonstrates that even though the police were given 
extensive powers to maintain law and order, an effective system was not put in 
place to ensure they followed due process of law and complied with international 
human rights standards.382 The government institutions that were meant to check 
police excesses were lax in their duties while the efforts of human rights 
organisations to highlight these violations were largely ignored by the police and 
state authorities.383 
The Oputa Commission also highlighted police abuse of human rights and 
made recommendations to address this situation in the future.384 The report of 
the Commission was to lay the foundations for a new Nigeria that would be a 
hallmark for the respect for human rights and due process. In the report, the 
Commission undertook a holistic journey into the past in Nigeria and set a road 
map for the future.385 Like in Kenya, the Truth commission strictly observed that 
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exposing and publicizing these gross violations of human rights is important for 
posterity so that the country's shameful past may never be repeated against the 
people: massacres, colonial oppressions, killings and confiscation of livestock, 
torture of men including castration, human rights abuses, oppressive laws and 
dumping of suspected radio-active material in the Wagalla province.386 
3.3 Human rights under the democratic dispensation (1999–2001) 
 
3.3.1  Transition to civilian rule 
This sub section reviews the state of human rights following a transition to 
a civilian rule programme following the sudden death of the Head of State, General 
Sani Abacha. General Abdulsala Abubakar who succeeded the late Head of State 
decided to depart from the repressive and anti-human rights tactics of the 
previous regime and play a part in national reconciliation.387 The new regime 
embraced reconciliation by releasing imprisoned pro-democracy and human 
rights activists.388 It charted a new cause and signalled to Nigerians that a new era 
had emerged. 
It was ultimately the new approach to governance, which respected due 
process and human rights that gave further voice to the people who demanded 
accountability for past abuse.389 The people reasoned that if the past is not 
reviewed then no lessons will be learnt and there will be no accountability for past 
abuse.390 If there is no accountability then history may repeat itself and the ghost 
of the past will keep haunting the nation, and affect its growth and progress as a 
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nation. This is because the place of a truth commission in a political transition from 
a dark past is not hard to see. Dictatorships leave behind highly fragmented 
societies in urgent need of national healing, harmony and unity.  
The process of looking at the past must be one that helps debunk the 
myths that helped perpetuate the dictatorship by establishing historical truth, 
restoring the dignity of the people through some measure of justice availed to the 
victims and country in general and work towards national unity and 
reconciliation391. The latter was elucidated in the previous chapters by Gutteridge 
(1969), in The Military in African Politics.392 
The history of modern Nigeria from 1960 paints a gory picture of 
successive coup d’état, which prevented the evolution of a democracy in the 
country.393Indeed, after almost a decade of military rule, General Babangida 
annulled the 1993 democratic election of Chief Moshood Abiola, preventing Abiola 
from assuming office.394Abiola was later jailed under General Abacha's regime and 
died under military custody without realising his mandate.395Babangida 
subsequently resigned and was succeeded by Ernest Shonekan. Later that year, 
General Abacha seized power and once again installed military rule. Military rule 
in Nigeria under General Abacha was a serious reversal for democracy and human 
rights. It ended the incremental gains made toward genuine democracy in Nigeria. 
In 1995, General Abacha announced that a military regime would return 
Nigeria to democratically elected civilian rule by October 1, 1998.396 Despite this 
announcement, there was little meaningful progress towards democracy, and 
critics of Abacha questioned whether the regime would have indeed allowed the 
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transition to civilian rule. General Abubakar freed political prisoners, including 
those imprisoned, following flawed trials before secret military tribunals and 
announced a transition to civilian rule.397 
The release of these prisoners indicated that the government wanted to 
toe the line of reconciliation and national healing.  The international community 
had earlier condemned the trial and conviction of these alleged coup plotters by 
the Abacha regime as flawed and lacking judicial legitimacy.398The new regime, by 
releasing these prisoners, showed it was serious in charting a new course and 
distancing itself from the abysmal human rights records of the Abacha regime.  
The action of the new regime lowered the political temperature and 
tensions in the country and restored some confidence that the regime was serious 
in leading the country towards democratic rule.399 This is a notion that is broadly 
shared by Ogundiya (2010). 400 
 
3.3.2  Presidential election 
 
This section will focus on the 1999 presidential election, which was 
remarkable because it came after sixteen years of uninterrupted military rule and 
endless attempts at transition to civil rule by the regimes of Generals Babangida 
and Abacha.401This process was daunting, as military rule had left the body politics 
of Nigeria scarred with serious negative implications for rule of law, due process 
and human rights.402 
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As General Abubakar’s regime commenced its transition programme, 
there was a consensus among the political elite led by the military to concede the 
presidency to the Yoruba ethnic group as compensation for annulment of the June 
12, 1993 election, which Chief Abiola of Yoruba descent was poised to win.403 
In view of this unwritten agreement, the leading candidates in the election 
were both of Yoruba descent and were political prisoners under General Abacha's 
regime. Former US President Jimmy Carter, who led a mission to observe the 
election, regarded this as the most important election in the world in 1999.404 
Indeed, Nigeria is the world's sixth-largest oil producer, and roughly one-quarter 
of the population of sub-Saharan Africa lives in the country.405  
Commentators recognised that although a credible election would not 
ensure democracy, without it, no success would be possible in the transition to 
democratic rule.406In essence the world regarded Nigeria as a country whose 
stability was important for peace in the sub-region. It was considered important 
for the transition to be successful, as this would return the country to a democracy 
with attendant benefits, which included adherence to rule of law, proscription of 
all anti-human rights decrees and promulgation of the 1999 Constitution, which 
contained the Bill of Rights. 
Despite Obasanjo's Yoruba heritage, critics of Obasanjo claim he was 
backed by the military and controlled by powerful northern political interests. In 
light of Nigeria's anti-democratic history under colonial rule and successive 
military regimes, the February 1999 election was regarded as a positive step 
towards democracy, particularly in a political atmosphere in which citizens 
traditionally have not had the right to change their government by peaceful 
means.407 While commentators recognise serious flaws in the electoral process, 
described by one observer as an exercise in organised fraud where principle made 
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way for payoff; the election signified a major shift as a relatively free and fair 
election, and a nonviolent transition to democratic rule in a country marked by 
violent political transition.408 
Olusegun Obasanjo was elected and sworn in as President of Nigeria on 
May 29, 1999, and in an address to the inaugural session of the National Assembly 
in June, Obasanjo articulated a commitment to reconciliation and unity, amidst 
national discussion of restructuring the federation of Nigeria into separate, 
autonomous states. Obasanjo believed that these demands to restructure 
federation are mostly borne out of deep frustration and despair over the 
persistent failure of central governments to meet the hopes and aspirations of the 
people. Obasanjo addressed feelings of marginalisation among Nigerians, 
encouraging reconciliation and unity: 
“This whole nation has been traumatized by misrule. It is perhaps 
understandable that in the absence of a trustworthy, transparent and just 
central authority, each one feels a victim and suspects the other of being the 
oppressor. While not in any way condoning the misguided decisions or 
tactical miscalculations of the past, I will at this time, appeal for calm and 
mature reflections. We have come a long way as one Nigeria. As much as we 
have rejoiced together in times of triumph, let us reconcile our 
misunderstandings in times of disappointments. The imperative of stability 
and progress demands nothing less”.409 
The speech by Obasanjo was a strong argument for national unity and 
reconciliation. It was also an admission that wrongs had been committed in the 
past and that his government was willing to make a fresh start for all Nigerians.410 
President Obasanjo faced complex obstacles to a stable and sustainable 
democratic government in Nigeria. While the 1999 presidential election was an 
important preliminary step toward democratisation, it offered no guarantee that 
democracy would be actualised. Obasanjo had the difficult task of implementing 
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constitutional democracy despite severely distorted institutions, processes, and 
political attitudes of prior military regimes. The new government faced serious 
challenges of nation building and addressing the multifaceted challenges created 
by a long period of military rule. 411 
Moreover, many of those who participated in past corrupt regimes 
continued to hold power in Nigeria.412A major challenge in Nigeria's democratic 
transition was that of preserving and consolidating democracy amidst threats and 
challenges by politicised militaries, morally bankrupt political classes, fragmented 
civil societies, a pervasive and palpable lack of democratic traditions, ethnic 
tensions, and dysfunctional political, economic and legal institutions.413 
Democracy cannot be realised unless human and structural problems that 
threaten democratic reform are meaningfully addressed.414It was also essential 
that collective violence and past human rights violation be examined as part of the 
measures to entrench democratic values and rule of law.415 
However, some commentators have argued that the election that ushered 
in the new democratic government was imperfect or even flawed. It was a 
necessary step to end military rule in Nigeria and begin a process of holistic review 
of the ills of the past towards a process of national healing, rebuilding of damaged 
state institutions and restoring the confidence of the people in the state as duty 
bearers to promote and protect human rights.416 
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3.3.3 Repeal of decrees 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the military proscribed sections of the 
constitution, which protect human rights and democracy and ruled by decrees.417 
It was therefore important that during the period of transition from military to 
democratic rule, these decrees, which are anti-democracy and human rights, are 
proscribed.418These decrees were used by various military regimes to override the 
rights of Nigerians, and through these decrees the growth of democracy and free 
speech was stunted.419 
Before handing power to chief Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999, 
General Abubakar signed Decree No. 63 of 1999 (Certain Consequential Repeals). 
Among the decrees repealed were Decree No. 2 of 1984 State Security (Detention 
of Persons) Decree; Decree No. 1 of 1986 Treason and Other Offences (Special 
Military Tribunals) Decree; and Decree No. 12 of 1994 (The Federal Military 
Government (Supremacy and Enforcement Powers) Decree.  
In addition, Decree No. 63 repealed Decree No. 107 of the 1993 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree, which suspended certain 
fundamental human rights provisions. Omitted from the repeals, however, were 
the State Security (Detention of Persons) Amendment Act Decree No. 3 of 1990 
promulgated by General Babangida, and the State Security Service Detention of 
Persons Decree Nos. 14 and 15 of 1994. Because of these omissions, the Hon. Tony 
Anyanwu sponsored a bill before the National Assembly in July 2001, proposing to 
repeal all "draconian" state security decrees and other anti-democratic laws 
promulgated by former military heads of state. Implicit in the repeals instituted by 
General Abubakar and those instituted in the judiciary was recognition that certain 
decrees served as a foundation upon which previous regimes had abused power 
and violated human rights. The repeal of these decrees thus signified a departure 
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from a history of abuse of power to one in which it is envisaged that the 
constitution will be supreme, and rule of law would guide the conduct of the affairs 
of the State.  
The repeal of these obnoxious decrees was a significant effort to break 
from past military practice. It restored the constitution as the grand norm and 
relegated the military to its rightful place in the barracks. This action guaranteed 
that the nation would be governed by rule of law rather that by rule of force. The 
parliament and the courts were restored so that representatives of the people 
would now make laws after going through a democratic process. The court, the 
bastion of hope for the ordinary person, was restored as an impartial arbiter 
where contentions are resolved in accordance with due process of law. 
3.3.4 Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (Oputa Commission) 
This section is a general introduction to the work of the HRVIC (Oputa 
Commission), which President Obasanjo established as an accountability process 
for human rights violation by the military regimes in Nigeria.420 The Annual Report 
(1997), A CLO Report on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria,421 Annual Report 
(1998), A CLO Report on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria,422 explicitly report 
on this situation and the works of the Oputa commission in the previous 
submissions.  
The Oputa Commission was one of President Obasanjo's first initiatives as 
president. The Commission had the mandate to ascertain the causes, nature, and 
extent of human rights violation or abuse committed between January 15, 1966 
and May 28, 1999. It was established under the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, Chapter 
447, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, an Act initially promulgated on June 
2, 1966 to empower the President to constitute Tribunals of Inquiry and other 
matters ancillary thereto. 423 
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The Oputa Commission project was an auspicious one because it was 
important for the violations that took place during the many years of military rule 
to be investigated and for those who suffered human rights violation to tell the 
truth of what happened.424It was important for families of those who suffered 
violation to know what happened to their loved ones. President Obasanjo wanted 
to heal the wounds of the past; this however is not possible without knowing the 
truth of that past. The Oputa Commission offered the platform for a process of 
truth telling and reconciliation without which a new Nigeria could not emerge.425 
It was an important process to usher in a post military Nigeria. 
The Oputa Commission received an extensive mandate which granted the 
Commission powers to 1) procure written or oral evidence, and to examine all 
persons as witnesses as the tribunal deems "necessary or desirable to procure or 
examine”; 2) require evidence to be given upon an oath "as is required of a witness 
testifying before a magistrate's court”; 3) summons any person in Nigeria to attend 
any meeting of the tribunal to give evidence or produce any document or other 
thing in his possession and to examine him as a witness to issue a warrant to 
compel the attendance of those refusing or neglecting to appear to the 
satisfaction of the tribunal; 4) admit evidence regardless of its admissibility in a 
civil or criminal proceeding; and 5) the power to act upon such evidence.  
Additionally, a person failing, refusing, or neglecting to appear before the 
tribunal based upon a summons, or refusing to answer a question presented by 
the tribunal, shall be guilty of an offence and liable for a fine of two hundred naira, 
or to a term of imprisonment of six months. The above shows that the Commission 
was given extensive powers to achieve its mandate, or so President Obasanjo 
thought. However, future events showed that the president was wrong in setting 
up the commission without going through the parliament as was done in South 
Africa.426 It is also ironic that the president drew inspiration from the acclaimed 
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success of the South Africa process, but refused to follow the good lessons of the 
Commission.427 Some commentators have even argued that the establishment of 
the Oputa Commission was lip service by president Obasanjo, as he never 
intended the Commission to succeed.428These arguments will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter four of the thesis. 
President Obasanjo while inaugurating the Commission stated:  
“the Investigation Panel being inaugurated today is consistent with this 
administration's policy of openness and transparency in the conduct of 
government business as well as our determination to heal the wounds of the 
past and quickly put the ugly past behind us so as to continue to stretch our 
hands of fellowship and friendship to all Nigerians for complete 
reconciliation based on truth and knowledge of the truth in our land. We 
want to reconcile all those who feel alienated by past political events, heal 
wounds inflicted on our people and restore harmony in our country. We 
want the injured and the seemingly injured to be reconciled with their 
oppressors or seeming oppressors. That is the way to move forward”.429 
The above statement reinforces the earlier sentiments that the political 
and human rights situation in Nigeria when president Obasanjo was sworn in 
needed a process of truth telling, reconciliation and accountability to advance the 
country. Professor Mutua the chairperson of task force mandated to establish the 
Kenyan truth commission argued that, ‘’Kenyans want an effective and credible 
truth commission, an institution that will not engage in a witch-hunt or a 
whitewash. Such a commission must have the powers to recommend lustration, 
that is, to bar offenders from holding public office. It must be empowered to 
recommend redress for victims, such as compensation, restitution, and 
reparations. It should be authorized to inquire into stolen property and funds. 
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Moreover, to recommend that they be returned to the public or the individuals 
from whom they were stolen.  
The truth commission should investigate gross human rights violations and 
economic crimes and recommend prosecutions.’’430After the inauguration of the 
Commission, it invited memorandums from all Nigerians who felt aggrieved by the 
ills of the past. They were received from all corners of Nigeria reinforcing the fact 
that all Nigerians were victims of past atrocities. 
The Commission received about 10,000 memoranda of human rights 
violation and after some delays held public hearings across the country. It heard 
testimony regarding human rights violation throughout a period of five military 
dictatorships (beginning in 1966) and examined the actions of the military, special 
security forces, and the administrations of former Heads of State. In a 
controversial action by the Commission, former Heads of State and other high-
ranking military officials were called to testify before the panel to account for 
human rights violation occurring during their regimes.  
The Commission heard testimony by relatives of those believed to have 
been executed by state agents due to their non-violent political activities or 
relationship with critics of the government. Some petitioners before the 
Commission sought justice; others requested reinstatement in their jobs, or 
financial compensation for property seized or to obtain medical treatment for 
injuries resulting from torture or ill treatment at the hands of security forces. 
Testimony before the Commission revealed abuse committed by the State 
Security Services.  
These revelations, however, were often met with denial, as many security 
officers named by witnesses as responsible for detention, torture or murder of 
relatives of petitioners to the panel denied the accusations before the 
Commission. In contrast, some testimony by security officers consisted of 
revelations of human rights violations. The Commission to its credit held no 
Nigerian above the law, calling the highest officials to testify before the 
Commission.  
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The three former heads of State refused to appear before the Commission 
and sought the court’s interpretation of the powers of the Commission to summon 
them. The Supreme Court in its decision limited the investigative powers of the 
Commission to the Federal Capital Territory only and ruled that under the 1999 
Constitution the powers to establish “tribunals of inquiry belonged to the states, 
not the federal authority”.431 This ruling had a devastating effect on the work of 
the Commission, as president Obasanjo relied on this ruling as an excuse not to 
implement the recommendations of the Commission. 
Although some commentators criticised the Commission for presenting a 
narrow and superficial account of crimes committed during the military regimes, 
it enjoyed extensive legitimacy among Nigerians. The Commission, at the end of 
its work, submitted an eight-volume report of about 15,000 pages on human rights 
violations committed during the military era and this report was handed over to 
the government in June 2002.432 It is remarkable that despite all the challenges 
faced by the Commission, it was able to complete its work and deliver the report.  
The thesis will later reflect on the daunting challenges faced by the Oputa 
Commission ranging from lack of budget to staffing during its tenure.433 An issue 
that was earlier on discussed as ethics for enemies and forgiveness in politics, in 
which Shriver (1995)434 considered too many experts as the primary reason for the 
failure of the Oputa Commission. Unfortunately, the government, citing the 
decision of the Supreme Court, refused to publish the report and none of the 
recommendations were put into effect. The dissemination of the report was 
consequently limited although a few civil society organisations published the 
Commission’s report on the Internet.435 
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The significant work of the Oputa Commission will be analysed in the next 
chapter. With the benefit of hindsight, it is appropriate to posit that the vision of 
the Oputa Commission was a good one. However, the government of the day paid 
lip service to the Commission and unwittingly undermined its work. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined human rights violations in Nigeria from a 
historical perspective. The starting point was to briefly examine the concept of 
human rights at the universal, regional and national level and where Nigeria was 
in the realm of human rights at the time of independence in 1960 before the 
military intervened in January 1966. The reason for this approach was to explore 
the state of human rights at the time of independence and how human rights 
culture progressively deteriorated under various military regimes and reached an 
all-time low during the brutal regime of General Abacha.  
The chapter was divided into two parts, organised in a chronological 
manner. In the first part, the issues and problems of human rights in Nigeria from 
1960 to 1999 were discussed. The second part focused on human rights challenges 
faced by the new democratically elected government after its inauguration on 29 
May 1999.  
The chapter argued that the reasons for Nigeria’s chequered political 
history were that it inherited a broken society from the British at the time of 
independence. It was noted that British expansionism sowed the seeds of discord 
and conflict in Nigeria by bringing together people from different regions, different 
religions and ethnic affiliations, under one political umbrella. Post-independence 
first civilian government made no attempt to bridge this divide.  
The divisions further depend over time because of bitter struggle amongst 
contending regional forces for political control. The protracted conflict amongst 
political forces paved the way for the first military coup in January 1966, which 
ushered in military rule in Nigeria. The entry of the military into Nigeria politics 
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and governance spelled doom for the country. The military disregarded the 
constitution, due process and rule of law and ruled by brute military force. The 
concomitant effects of military rule were violation of human rights and lack of 
accountability for abuse. The military junta discarded its human rights obligation 
to its citizens and the commitments it made to international communities by 
acceding to various human rights treaties and by belonging to multinational 
organisations such as the United Nations and African Union. 
The chapter argued that military intervention in government frustrated 
attempts to promote democratic rule in Nigeria. Evidence of abuse, 
mismanagement, and corruption of military leaders undermined the perceived 
legitimacy of the military's right to intervene to restore order and social 
equilibrium. Yet those in power justified military intervention based on the 
country's complex social, political, and economic difficulties. The first military 
intervention in 1966 was justified by the need to forestall the breakup of the 
federation of Nigeria. The country was at a tipping point because of difficult 
political problems it faced as regional factions struggled for political power.436 
The chapter posited that the legacy of military rule severely weakened the 
nation’s quest for democracy, as dictatorial military regimes are essentially 
incompatible with constitutional democracy, rule of law and respect for human 
rights. Military rule traditionally assumes the conflicting responsibility, both to 
create laws and to execute them, unchecked by constitutional restraints. In any 
regime, the overarching aim of the law under military government is to 
consolidate state power and induce conformity, and the military in Nigeria had 
discretionary powers to achieve this goal.437 
Virtually every military regime in Nigeria promulgated the Constitution 
(Suspension and Modification) Decree, conferring plenary power on the military 
to ignore or dismantle existing legal and political institutions.  The military regimes 
introduced several draconian decrees to silence dissent, violate human rights and 
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perpetuate power.  The junta, who used secret tribunals and draconian decrees to 
subject them to long jail terms, targeted pro-democracy and human rights 
activists.  
In some cases, military regimes, especially General Sani Abacha’s, resorted 
to political assassinations to silence critics. The courts were not spared as the 
military introduced decrees, which effectively barred the courts from questioning 
any actions taken under a decree. This affront on the judiciary showed how Nigeria 
had degenerated in protecting the rights of its citizens.  The implication of the 
assault on the judiciary was that there was no longer any institution of the State 
that could act as a defence to protect the rights of Nigerians.  
All state institutions were now emasculated leaving the citizens without 
any protection from abuse.  This left pro-democracy and human rights activists to 
the mercy of roving bands of the military junta’s security operatives. The violations 
that occurred in ensuing contests between contending forces were part of the 
mess that the Oputa Commission had to deal with. As stated earlier in the chapter, 
President Obasanjo captured the mood of the nation while inaugurating the Oputa 
Commission. The former president affirmed that the nation has been brutalised 
by past events and needed healing and reconciliation. 
Although Nigeria is a country rich in oil wealth, successive regimes 
depleted the nation's resources through greed, mismanagement, and corruption 
of the political elite. The mining of the nation's oil, instead of enabling a positive 
transformation towards prosperity, enriched a small minority of the political elite, 
leaving the vast majority of the population impoverished. This exploitation of oil 
has been the source of tension between the Nigerian people (particularly in the 
Niger Delta, where most of the nation's oil reserves are located), oil companies, 
and the government, the latter of which has often collaborated in corruption and 
violation of human rights.   
Multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria face complex difficulties 
in their relationships with both the Nigerian government and the communities in 
which they operate. Successive governments have squandered the oil wealth 




accounts rather than investing it in education, health and other social investments, 
and mismanaging the national economy to the point of collapse. 
Finally, the second part of the chapter noted that the civilian regime that 
took power in Nigeria on 29 May 1999 inherited a bruised and divided nation. At 
the time the regime was sworn in the international reputation of the country was 
at its lowest ebb. Nigeria was regarded as a pariah nation following several cases 
of state sponsored assassinations and judicial murder of Ogoni minority rights 
activists. 
This was the motivating force behind the establishment of the Oputa 
Commission, which the president mandated to heal the wounds of the past and 
reconcile Nigerians. Despite the daunting challenges of budgetary constraints and 
poor staffing the Commission rose to the occasion and produced a report. No 
doubt the Commission’s report was a holistic review of the ugly legacies of military 
rule, responsible for gross human rights violation.  
Overall, this chapter has focused more on history and narratives; the 
intention is to lay a solid foundation for discussions contained in the main foci of 
the thesis, which is the work of the Oputa Commission and whether the 






INVESTIGATING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
This chapter focuses on the Human Rights Violation Investigation 
Commission (HRVIC) in Nigeria known as the Oputa Commission.1 The Commission 
was a transitional justice mechanism adopted by Nigeria as a country emerging 
from many years of autocratic military rule and human rights violation.2A number 
of countries with different outcomes had already exploited the option of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a transitional justice mechanism. These 
countries include South Africa, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Chile, to 
mention a few. It is in this regard, therefore, that the Nigerian Government 
decided on this mechanism to come to terms with the problems of human rights 
violation perpetrated by the military junta from 1966 to 1999.3 Falola, T. et al. 
(1991)’s4 work provides a rich study on activities of the military junta and 
attendant human rights violation in the country as discussed in the preceding 
chapters. 
The purpose of this chapter is to take a general view of the role and 
contribution of the Oputa Commission as a transitional justice mechanism in 
Nigeria. It specifically interrogates how much truth and reconciliation, the 
Commission’s strengths and weaknesses in its quest for justice to victims of human 
rights violations in Nigeria, and by extension the unity of the whole country after 
                                                          
1   http//: www. Oputa Commission, Synoptic Overview of HRVIC Report: Conclusions and  
  Recommendations  (Including Chairman’s Foreword) Presented To President,  
  Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chief  
  Olusegun Obasanjo GCFR Submitted By Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission.  
  May, 2002 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations (Accessed 5/5/2017). 
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  Their Butts.  For Moredetails See MEREDITH, M., 2011. the State of Africa: History of the  
  Continent Since Independence. Simon and Schuster: New York. 
3  http/www.Research Report On the Oputa Commission.Vol.3 (Accessed 5/5/2017).2-3. 




military rule. Additionally, it highlights the utility of the Oputa Commission in a 
country divided by ethnic politics and religious culture on the one hand, and 
hegemony and power on the other.  
Available records show that the lopsided nature of the 1947 Constitution 
pitched the Nigerian State into ethnic and regional politics in an environment 
divided along religious lines and hegemony.5 By 1960, it became abundantly clear 
that independent Nigeria would not easily wrangle itself out of regional politics 
and domination. Thus, the first signs were evident in the elections of 1964 and the 
population census results, which caused crisis and violent attacks in Western 
Nigeria and other parts of the country. Evidence shows that the rejection of the 
results centred on the fact that census figures and demography in Nigeria 
determine resource allocation to the regions and appointments at the federal 
level.6 
Therefore, the military took power in the hope that they would correct the 
ills of the society and perhaps return the country to democratic rule. Ironically, the 
military promulgated decrees that gagged the press and human rights. Thereafter, 
the military became corrupt and embarked on wide-ranging transition politics, 
which led to the emergence of one regime after another.7 It reached its high 
watermark during the administration of Generals Buhari, Babangida, and Abacha 
when Nigeria became isolated from the Commonwealth of Nations and her 
European partners.8 
These regimes became notorious for their human rights violations and 
politics of deception in the intervening years leading to democratic rule. These, 
are discussed in the third category of works outlined already in chapter one and 
three which include: Annual Report (1997), A CLO Report on the State of Human 
                                                          
5    EBEGBULEM, C. 2011. Ethnic Politics and Conflicts in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspective. 
6    MEREDITH, M., 2011. the fate of Africa: A history of the continent since  
  independence. Hachette UK.Op.Cit. 75-77. 
7   For Details of Nigeria’s Coup Culture, See SIOLLUN, M., 2009. Oil, politics and violence:  
  Nigeria's military coup culture (1966-1976). Algora Publishing.Op.Cit.  
8   ADENIYI, O., 2005. the Last 100 Days of Abacha: Political Drama in Nigeria Under  
  One of Africa's Most Corrupt and Brutal Military Dictatorships. Bookhouse  
  Company.Op.Cit. 211-236. Also See FAWOLE, W.A. 2003. Nigeria’s External Relations and  




Rights in Nigeria,9 Annual Report (1998), A CLO Report on the State of Human 
Rights in Nigeria,10 and de St. Jorre (1972), The Nigerian Civil War11, that The 
Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission Report (May 2002),12 and 
Shriver (1995)’s, An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics13 were also drafted 
out of rights violation concerns in Nigeria. These events prompted civil society 
groups and their coalition affiliates to oust the military from power.14 The attempt 
to move the country forward eventually led to the inauguration of the Oputa 
Commission to resolve the crisis created by military dictators in Nigeria. 
It has already been pointed out (see Chapters Two and Three) that human 
rights and political instability in the country prior to General Sani Abacha’s death 
was not only frightening but also worrisome.15 The regime had been the subject 
of criticism by the international community for its human rights violations and 
autocratic tendencies antithetical to modern development.16 Thus it was 
suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations and sadly for the execution of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa under a flawed judicial process.17  
Nigeria therefore was on the verge of disintegration, as the country had 
been economically sanctioned and isolated by European friends and partners 
before the death of General Abacha.18 It was the sequence of events during his 
regime that triggered the demand for a ‘truth and reconciliation commission’ to 
investigate human rights violations under military rule.  
Available evidence also reveals that prolonged military rule in Nigeria 
brought about a progressive rise in gross violation of human rights which 
                                                          
9   Ibid. 
10   Ibid.  
11   Ibid. 
12   Ibid. 
13   Ibid. 
14  ISAAC, A. 2013. Military Regimes and Nation Building in Nigeria, 1966-1999. African  
  Journal of History and Culture, 5(7).138-142. 
15  ROBINSON S. 1999, “Olusegun Obasanjo”, Time Magazine, December 27.  
16   ONYEGBULA, S. 2007. the Human Rights Situation in Nigeria Since the Democratic  
  Dispensation; U.S. Department of State (1999) Nigeria Country Report On Human Rights  
  Practices For 1990, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour,  
BIRNBAUM, M. 1995. A Travesty of Law and Justice: An Analysis of the Judgement in the  
Case of Ken Saro-Wiwa and Others. Article 19.  
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ultimately led to the demand for some form of accountability for past abuse.19 
Nigeria’s chequered colonial past left a legacy of discrimination based on ethnicity 
and religion, and therefore an overall assessment of how much truth and 
reconciliation the Commission achieved is critical to this debate. The challenges of 
ethno-religious discord were exacerbated as each of the dominating ethnic groups 
sought to entrench its hegemony over the others.20 It was unhealthy rivalry for 
control of central government and the nation’s resources that led to prolonged 
military rule, which aggravated the human rights situation in Nigeria. Indeed, 
successive military regimes also compromised state institutions, effectively using 
them to flagrantly violate the human rights of Nigerians while military leaders and 
their acolytes perfected the looting of the nation’s resources.21 
At first, the efficacy of the Oputa Commission was in doubt from different 
quarters, particularly from civil society and affiliates, political observers and 
academia. This is argued on the grounds that the military elite could obstruct 
justice since they had just stepped aside from governance, accumulation of wealth 
and personal gratification.22 It was also believed that the present composition of 
the Nigerian nation had not yet matured for such a process because of ethnic 
politics and regional sentiment of godfatherism.23 Further, the issue of the mode 
of transitional justice mechanism that Nigeria should adopt at the end of the 
military government was not sufficiently discussed. The Obasanjo’s regime just 
                                                          
19  CAMPBELL, E., 2001. Days of Atonement: Searching For Justice in Nigeria, Doctoral  
  Dissertation, These Times. 
20   OJO, J.S. AND FRANCIS, F.O., 2014. Military Governance and Civil War: Ethnic Hegemony  
 As A Constructive Factor in Nigeria. Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research. 
21  HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, 2007. HRVIC Report,  
  Conclusions and Recommendations, Synoptic Overview. Unpublished, Available From  
  http://www. Nigerian Muse. Com/Nigeria Watch/Oputa/ (Accessed, 19 February 2017). 
22   “Chairman’s Forward” Oputa Commission, Synoptic Overview of HRVIC Report:  
  Conclusions and Recommendations. 2. 
23   ‘Godfatherism’ Is Both A Symptom and A Cause of Violence and Corruption That Together  
  Permeate the Political Process in Nigeria…. Godfathers Are Only Relevant Because  
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Nigerians. For Moredetails See.  ABDULQUADIR, I.A., YUSUF, I.A., OBA, A.A., IJAIYA, H.O., 
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announced the Commission without national debate and clear understanding of 
the enormity of the work of a truth and reconciliation commission. 
Notwithstanding these initial misgivings, the government went ahead and 
announced the establishment of the Oputa Commission. The announcement 
coincided with one of the highlights of the maiden address of President Olusegun 
Obasanjo when he took over the reign of power on 29 May 1999. President 
Obasanjo in his speech pledged to fight the twin evils of institutionalised 
corruption and human rights violations, which characterised Nigeria’s experience 
during the era of military rule.24 The latter was already discussed in chapter two 
and three from Ojiako (1979)’s, 13 Years of Military Rule 1966–1979.25 
In light of the above discussion, this chapter examines the evolution of the 
Oputa Commission, membership of the amendment to the Commission,26 and the 
mandate and terms of reference of the Commission; all previously evidenced in 
chapter one and two from the rich works of commended In the Annual Report 
(1997), A CLO Report on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria,27 Annual Report 
(1998), A CLO Report on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria,28 and de St. Jorre 
(1972), The Nigerian Civil War.29 The Human Rights Violation Investigation 
Commission Report (May 2002),30 and Shriver (1995)’s, An Ethic for Enemies: 
Forgiveness in Politics.31  
The methodology and process of the work of the Commission, its 
achievements and evaluation will be discussed. Insights into these issues will offer 
knowledge about the work of the Oputa Commission and evaluate its efficacy as a 
transitional justice mechanism. The Commission was a child of circumstance and 
was not in the interests of everyone. Consequently, the inability of the 
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25   Ibid. 
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government to release the report, as would be discussed shortly, shows on the 
one hand that the Oputa Commission was not the right model for the country, 
while on the other hand, it explains the fact that the problems of ethnic politics 
and hegemony were deeply rooted in the country’s polity.  
This chapter argues that even though the government of President 
Obasanjo did not officially release the report of the Oputa Commission and 
implement its recommendations; it made great strides to unearth the human 
rights situation in the country during the protracted military rule.32 Information on 
such rights violations then, was discussed from the works of Coleman (1958)33 and 
of Nnoli (1978)34. Most of the sad events of the past hitherto discussed in hushed 
tones were publicly discussed on national television and in media outfits.35 Some 
victims and their families faced alleged perpetrators in public and were able to 
learn what happened to their loved ones.36 
The revelation of the truth to these families had a cathartic effect on them 
and helped bring closure and healing for some. The Oputa Commission’s report 
represents the undisputed official truth of past events and is a reference point for 
future attempts toward accountability and reconciliation. The Oputa Commission 
essentially forged the foundations that will underpin the transitional justice 
debate in Nigeria in the future.37 It will also remain a reference point and a mine 
of information for researchers on peace building and conflict resolution, as well as 
nations emerging from human rights violation and war.38 
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Therefore, the role of the Oputa Commission in the political history of 
Nigeria cannot be overlooked. It succeeded to a large extent in unearthing human 
rights violations and the perpetrators in Nigeria. It may not have achieved total 
success for Nigerian peoples and regions, but it made a great impact in resolving 
the community crises of ethnic groups and national unity.39  
Shortcomings in the Commission’s work reflected the problems 
confronting the nation and this is why some scholars contend that it was not the 
right model for Nigeria, particularly in the dissolution of ethnic politics, hegemony 
and imbalance in the country. It is therefore important to look at the evolution of 
the Oputa Commission and why it was established, to solve the problems of 
human rights violations caused by military rule. 
  
4.1.1  Evolution of the Oputa Commission 
The Oputa Commission was a truth and reconciliation commission 
established to address human rights violation by the military regime in Nigeria 
from 1966 to 1999.40 The human rights issues were previously spelt out and 
discussed in the preceding chapters in the works of Miners (1971),41 Elaigwu 
(1985)42 and in History of the Nigerian Army 1863–1992 (1992),43 Uwechue 
(1971),44 and Ojiako (1979).45 
When Nigerians heralded the coming of the military in 1966 due to 
undemocratic behaviour of the politicians of the first republic, little would they 
know that military rule would transform itself into prolonged transition politics 
with attendant abuses of human rights and dictatorial culture? It was the series of 
events during the military regime in which perceived and potential enemies were 
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killed and incarcerated without trial that led to the Oputa Commission. The period 
of military rule in Nigeria witnessed untold repression and gross violation of basic 
human rights for Nigerians.46 Thus the report of the Commission states: 
“…Clearly, the military are to be held accountable for gross human 
rights violation in the country, during the period under review. This is 
exemplified by the cases of torture at the Inter centre, Directorate of 
Military Intelligence (DMI) headquarters in Lagos and Jos Prison by the 
military. All the other prisons in Nigeria failed so far below the standards 
of the United Nations that they became torture centres”.47 
The most dastardly acts that occurred during the period were killings that 
pointed to either direct involvement or complicity of the State and its security 
agencies.48 Therefore the years of the junta were characterised by repression of 
political opposition, civil society groups and the media. Thus, respect for rule of 
law and due process was abandoned for reckless abuse of power. The press 
reported several cases of people being harassed, detained without trial, tortured, 
extra-judicially murdered and sometimes forcibly displaced from their homes.49 
These violations by the military were aimed at perpetuating power and fulfilling 
their endless transition politics. Writing in the same vein, Okonta and Douglas 
(2001) note that even in the oil rich Niger Delta, environmental pollution, 
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degradation and wanton destruction of the ecology, because of oil exploration 
activities, were a common phenomenon.50 Since the 1980s, successive military 
governments had enacted decrees aimed at curtailing the freedom of 
fundamental rights and liberties by the people to silence them. This experience 
continued till the extrajudicial killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his Ogoni kinsmen.51  
Since the exit of military dictators, the Ogoni question remains a national 
discourse in the country. Where did the country derive its roots of human rights 
violations and incarceration without trial? The answer is not so far-fetched, 
because the available literature suggests that the overthrow of a democratically 
elected government on January 15, 1966 introduced decrees by which certain 
sections of the Nigerian Constitution that dealt with fundamental rights of 
individuals were suspended.52  
Arguably the decrees were enacted to give the military unlimited powers 
to unleash mayhem and incarcerate those who opposed military rule and 
campaigned for human rights. Perhaps, it was also published to enable them to 
control the resources of the nation if they desired, without handing over power to 
a democratically elected government.  
In this regard, it would be appropriate to assert that all military regimes 
carried out gross human rights violation during their tenure because they all 
worked with decrees.53 It is also safe to state that this abuse to varying degrees 
was severe because the Gowon and Obasanjo regimes did not commit as many 
atrocities as those of the Buhari, Babangida and Abacha administrations.54 The 
effects of the horror and stagnation these latter regimes caused the nation far 
outweighed those of Gowon and Obasanjo’s regimes. The image of the country 
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declined as the June 12, 1993 election was annulled under Babangida; the killing 
of Kudirat Abiola and the murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his Ogoni kinsmen, 
including Pa Rewane, occurred during the Abacha administration.55 When the 
military seized power in January 1966, it promulgated the State Security 
(Detention of Persons) Decree of 1966.56 This legislation ordered the detention of 
named persons who were considered a threat to national security. 
This was closely followed by the Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) 
Decree No. 24 of 1967.57 This decree was considered necessary because of the 
Nigerian Civil War. Both decrees remained in force until 1979 when the Public 
Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 1 of 1979 repealed the 1967 Decree.58 
In continuing the military tradition, the regime of General Mohammadu 
Buhari that had overthrown the civilian government in 1983 enacted the State 
Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984. This was a re-enactment of 
the 1966 Decree that allowed the regime to indefinitely detain persons without 
recourse to the law courts.59 Buhari further detained several politicians and 
targeted the press with the notorious Public Officers (Protection against False 
Accusations) Decree No. 4 of 1984. 
General Ibrahim Babangida on assuming power abrogated Decree No. 4 
and pretended to pursue a human rights agenda. According to Adejumobi and 
Momoh (1995), it was not long before the regime relapsed and made effective use 
of all the available anti-people decrees enacted by Babangida’s predecessors to 
target the media, human rights and pro-democracy activists, students, and the 
labour union.60 Eventually, General Sani Abacha’s regime surpassed previous 
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regimes in terms of gross violation of human rights of Nigerians. The regime 
carried out widespread repression of human rights advocates. Extrajudicial 
killings, torture, assassination, imprisonment and general harassment of critics 
and opponents were the hallmark of his administration.61 His cruel tactics were 
discussed in chapters two and three and are made recourse to in Ojiako (1979)’s, 
13 Years of Military Rule 1966–1979.62 
The role of civil society and its coalition partners during the period cannot 
be overlooked. They played a major role in reminding the government of the need 
to officially investigate human rights violations that occurred from 1966 to 1999 
in Nigeria. The initial efforts of civil society, mainly human rights organisations 
both within and outside the country to document abuse and publish in their 
annual human rights reports exposed the atrocities perpetrated in secret.63 The 
report brought to the public domain various gross human rights violations that had 
occurred in the Abacha years. The effect of this development for the outside world 
was horrific.  
Therefore, efforts to reveal the violation of the Abacha junta was 
intensified in October 1997, when the Centre for Democracy and Development 
provided technical expertise and administrative assistance to several Nigeria pro-
democracy and human rights groups to hold a public hearing on human rights 
violations in the country. The event was held in London and presided over by two 
British legal luminaries, Mr Geoffrey Bindman, QC and Dr Paul Okojie. The hearing 
attracted a huge response and those who had witnessed or suffered human rights 
violations testified.  
As a follow, on to this initiative the Centre for Democracy and 
Development carried out research on truth telling and accountability for past 
human rights violations with reference to the truth telling process in South Africa. 
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This research led to the publication of a manual that could be adapted to address 
incidences of such abuse that occurred in the West Africa sub-region.64 The effect 
of this gathering energised civil society groups and pro-democracy activists to 
effectively remove the military junta from power.  
The effect of the hearing on the Nigerian masses was encouraging, as they 
believed that their plight would be given attention sooner than later. Immediately 
after the democratic space opened in Nigeria following the sudden death of the 
military ruler General Sani Abacha in 1998,65 human rights organisations, civil 
society groups and the media formed a coalition to hold a public hearing on human 
rights violations that had occurred under the military regimes of Generals 
Babangida and Abacha. The public hearing, purely a civil society initiative, was 
intended to pressure or persuade the government to institute a formal process to 
investigate past human rights violations. 
Indeed, the rationale behind the setting up of the Commission was for 
Nigerians to come to terms with developments in their political history including:  
colonial inheritance; collapse of the first republic; the civil war; the inherent 
dilemma of military rule, ethnic and prebendal politics; the annulment of June 12, 
1993 presidential elections; the use of political assassinations, torture and judicial 
murder as deliberate instruments of state policy to eliminate and harass perceived 
opponents and pro-democracy activists; to confront the past in order to build the 
future; and trends and developments in the international community which 
prescriptively universalised  human rights and criminalised gross violation. In this 
way rulers and perpetrators of such gross violation are held accountable by the 
international community.66  
The latter was outlined in chapters one and two from the works of 
Akinyeye, Y., (ed.) (2003)67, but central to this study was Solomon O. Akinboye’s 
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Nigeria-South Africa Relations in the 20th Century: A Case of Symbiosis and 
Reciprocity in the former’s book. 
It could be safely argued that since the military made an incursion into 
politics in Nigeria, ethnic violence has remained rife, especially in North-Central 
Nigeria and the oil rich Niger Delta regions.68 On the other hand, religious conflicts 
between Moslems that dominated Northern Nigeria and the Christian dominated 
South have also left thousands of people dead and properties worth millions of 
Naira lost.69 Therefore, it is the concomitant effect of the above scenario that 
witnessed many years of gross human rights violation and collapse of rule of law 
and due process. Fundamental human rights were recklessly violated, and due 
process of law was completely non-existent during military rule, leading to 
stagnation and underdevelopment.  
Due to the findings, this section has revealed that human rights violation 
became a problem in the years of military rule as many people suffered one form 
of violation or another.70 Some other persons perceived as enemies of the regime 
were imprisoned, tortured or murdered.71 The role of civil society and coalition 
groups was significant during this period. The pressure mounted by these 
institutions led to the Oputa Commission.72 
This guaranteed impunity on the part of security agents of the State, and 
this phenomenon remained until June 8, 1998 when General Sani Abacha suddenly 
died. 73 His death brought with it a ray of hope for the Nigerian nation, as his 
successor, General Abdul Salam Abubakar promised in his maiden address to 
return the country to democratic rule. Olusegun Obasanjo won the Nigerian 
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election and he was sworn in as a democratically elected president on May 29, 
1999.74 In a bid to address human rights violations caused by the military regime, 
the Oputa Commission was established, but this model later became problematic 
and was challenged in the Supreme Court, regarding its validity in the Nigerian 
Constitution. Thereafter it became clear that truth and reconciliation would be 
difficult to achieve. 
4.1.2  Membership of the Commission 
 
Membership of the Commission was drawn from across the country to 
ensure equitable representation to avoid of complaints of marginalisation, which 
was part of the problem, the Commission intended to resolve. The Oputa 
Commission was made up of the following distinguished and eminent Nigerians, 
with rich experience in public affairs: Hon. Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (rtd) 
(Chairman), Rev Mathew H. Kukah, Mrs Elizabeth Pam, Abubakar Ali Kura Michika, 
Mallam Mamman Daura and Dr Tunji Abayomi (members) and Mr T.D. Oyelade 
(Secretary).75 The broad ethnic representation and perceived patriotism amongst 
the members of the Commission inspired confidence among Nigerians in their 
ability to do justice and equity. In this regard Professor Eno Ikpe notes of the 
members of the Commission, they were “detribalised Nigerians” who were not 
tainted by corruption.76 
Despite this approval, the process of appointment of members as well as 
the composition of Commission staff was flawed. There was no consultation with 
civil society or other critical sectors of the society before members were 
appointed. Similarly, most members had no prior knowledge of human rights or 
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the transitional justice mechanism, as they were mere spectators throughout the 
duration of the Commission’s tenure. Further, all staff were initially seconded from 
the civil service and had no first-hand knowledge or experience of the workings of 
TRCs. These were some of the factors that affected the efficiency of the Oputa 
Commission and undermined its efforts to achieve desired results. 
After their inauguration, a special retreat was organised for members of 
the Commission to share knowledge with experts from other countries, since this 
would help them in their work. At the retreat, it was pointed out that the number 
of commissioners (totalling seven) was too few to carry out the mandate of the 
Commission and therefore membership should be expanded. Also recommended 
was the creation of departments and offices situated in the six geo-political zones 
in the country to be headed by a commissioner and regional manager.  
The expansion of the Commission would have helped to strike a balance 
between top-notch professional staff and political appointees.  This would have 
also helped the Commission to function effectively with an expanded mandate. In 
contrast, the SATRC, from which the Oputa Commission drew extensive ideas, 
consisted of seventeen commissioners, appointed through a competitive and 
consultative process, which involved civil society and relevant sectors. The 
extensive consultation and transparent process in the appointment of members 
of the of the SATRC shows the importance of an independent, representative, and 
competent truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) as a precursor to 
guaranteeing the rights of victims to truth, justice, and reparations. Even though 
the Oputa Commission claimed inspiration from the SATRC, the creators of the 
Oputa commission did not include in its enabling law the attributes that made the 
SATRC the success they applauded. These initial blunders, which the Obasanjo’s 
administration did not rectify, were a minus to the Oputa Commission. 
In his commentary on the Oputa Commission, Professor Yadudu criticised 
the religious composition as the Commission had only one Moslem 
commissioner.77 This was not appropriate because religion is a contentious issue 
in a volatile country such as Nigeria, and government ought to have considered 
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the pros and cons before appointing commissioners. The duration of the 
Commission was from June 14, 1999 to May 2002,78 and this was a considerable 
period to achieve results. However, it should be noted that when the Commission 
was established, it was given three months to complete its work, which was later 
extended because of the enormity of the tasks at hand and consultations from 
different regions.79 
It was not long before four members initially appointed to serve on the 
Commission were replaced for undisclosed reasons. The members replaced were 
Abubakar Ali Kura Michika, Mallam Mamman Daura, Dr. Tunji Abayomi and Mr. 
T.D. Oyelade (Secretary).80 They were replaced by Dr. Mudiaga Odje, SAN, OFR 
(member), Barrister Bala Ngilari (member), Alhaji Lawal Bamali (member), and Mr 
N. B. Dambatta, (secretary).  
The instrument for appointing the Oputa Commission was also amended 
and it was renamed The Judicial Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of 
Human Rights Violation. It also contained amendments to the initial terms of 
reference of the panel. The President was asked to consider upgrading the panel 
to a Human Rights Abuse and Reconciliation Commission, with powers to 
command and enforce the attendance of witnesses. Significant amendments 
were: 
(I) the reference in terms of references (a) and (b) in the amended 
instrument to “gross violations of human rights…,” as opposed to the more specific 
reference to “…all known or suspected cases of mysterious deaths and 
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assassinations or attempted assassinations…” in terms of reference (I) and (ii) in 
the original terms of reference.  
The request for upgrading the panel was probably to make it assume 
acceptable international standards and mandate for a TRC. Perhaps, it was also 
intended to give credibility to their task, findings and recommendations.81 But, 
more importantly, it was to provide greater latitude in the Commission’s task of 
investigating and interrogating victims and suspects without hindrance. To what 
extent did the Commission’s terms of reference help to fulfil its mandate and 
objectives? This question will provide knowledge about the Commission’s work, 
since it is obvious that the scope of the mandate and terms of reference would 
lead to the question of how much truth and reconciliation the Oputa Commission 
achieved. 
 
4.1.3  Interpretation of the Commission’s mandate82 
 
An interpretation of the Commission’s mandate will provide knowledge on 
the powers and authority conferred on the Oputa Commission. This section will 
elaborate on the mandate, and salient issues and debates in the public domain 
that appear to have undermined the Commission’s work, especially the refusal by 
three former Heads of State and their lieutenants to appear before the 
Commission.  
Many questions arise. Was the Commission’s mandate adequate for the 
task? Was the TRC the right model for Nigeria, given that the country had struggled 
with balance of power and ethnic politics issues for some time? Did the 
Commission succeed within the ambit of its mandate and to what extent did it 
bring peace to the Nigerian State? The answers to these questions are imperative 
because they will provide insights into the work of the Oputa Commission. The 
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objectives of the Commission determine its mandate, as articulated by its 
Chairman during public hearings, which include:   
1. To heal the wounds of the past;   
2. To achieve reconciliation based on Truth and knowledge of Truth; and   
3. To restore harmony in our country.83 
From a broad perspective, the mandate of the Commission was to 
ascertain the causes, nature, and extent of human rights violations or abuse 
committed between January 15, 1966 and May 28, 1999. The Commission was 
established under the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, Chapter 447, and Laws of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria.84 
Beginning with the above listed questions, one can contend that the 
Commission’s mandate was adequate for the task before it, because it had the 
blanket powers to invite victims and perpetrators alike, irrespective of stature. It 
was also given the powers to effect arrest to ensure compliance85 but it never 
exercised such authority, perhaps due to the objective of achieving peace in the 
country. Arguably, the mandate was adequate for the task as three former heads 
of state and their cronies were invited to account for human rights violations 
under their regimes, though they took cover under the pronouncement of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria. Therefore, the efficacy of the Oputa Commission has 
been challenged regarding how much truth and reconciliation it achieved.   
Similarly, there was the question of whether the Commission was the right 
model for Nigeria. The answer is in the negative, considering the power of 
hegemony and religion that characterised the regions throughout. It is also 
instructive to note that those who held on to power did not surrender it easily 
because it is regarded as a birth right. A coalition of foreign and local mediators 
appointed to unify the country would have been the best solution, but the idea 
would have been opposed by those in power, including eminent politicians and 
the oligarchy that stood to benefit from the situation. They would draw on shame 
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and in extreme cases paint a picture of international law to stop the involvement 
of international participants. It should be recalled that Nigeria’s ethnic division was 
created by colonialists and would easily be resolved through international 
diplomacy. This is the only way forward otherwise secession would be achieved by 
various ethnic groups through war and human rights violations. Reconciliation, on 
the other hand was achieved for warring communities, especially the Ohaneze and 
Arewa, Modakeke and Ife, Agulere and Umulere and Lagos State and Maroko 
indigenes. This feat was commendable considering the effects of rivalry and war 
over the years. 
What was the nature of gross violation investigated by the Commission 
and how was the hearing organised? The Commission received more than 10,000 
petitions from the public, most of which fell under one or more of the following 
broad categories: (a) murder/assassination, (b) abduction, (c) torture, (d) 
harassment and intimidation, (e) prolonged detention (with or without trial), (f) 
employment related cases, (g) contractual and business-related cases, and (h) 
attempted assassination.86 
It is important to note here that out of the 10,000 petitions receive by the 
Oputa Commission; about 9,000 were petitions from Ogoni land alone. The Ogoni 
petitions were coordinated by the umbrella body of Ogoni people called 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP).87 The Commission 
eventually consolidated all the Ogoni cases into one case. Eventually, about 150 
cases were heard, while most others were sent to other government institutions 
for adjudication. The chairperson of the Commission stated clearly that the first 
task that the Commission undertook was to clarify the petitions that the 
Commission received and identify those that amounted to gross human rights 
violations. The Commission then decided to conduct public hearing only for those 
cases that it identified as amounting to gross human rights violations.88 Such 
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procedural safeguards correlate with those previously outline Yusuf (2007)’s, 
“Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria”.89 
The conduct of public hearings was organised within the legal framework 
of the Tribunal of Inquiry Act, particularly Sections 9 to 13, which state as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, the Panel shall have and 
may exercise any of the following powers, that is to say, 
(1) To procure all such evidence, written or oral, and to examine all such 
persons as witnesses as the Panel may think it necessary or desirable to procure 
or examine;   
(2) To require such evidence to be given on oath as is required of a witness 
testifying before a court;   
(3) To summon any person in Nigeria to attend any meeting of the Panel 
to give evidence or produce any document or other thing in his possession and to 
examine him as a witness or require him to produce any document or other thing 
in his possession, subject to all just exceptions; 90 
(4) To issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any person who, after 
having been summoned to attend fails or refuses or neglects to do so and does 
not excuse such failure, refusal or neglect to the satisfaction of the Panel; 91 
(5) To admit any evidence, whether written or oral, notwithstanding that 
such evidence might have been inadmissible in civil or criminal proceedings before 
a court, and power to act on such evidence;   
(6) To enter upon any land or premises personally or by any agent or 
agents duly authorised in writing by the Chairman, for any purpose which, in his 
opinion is material to the inquiry, and in particular, for the purpose of obtaining 
evidence or information or of inspecting or taking copies of any documents 
required by or which may be of assistance to the Panel, and for safeguarding any 
such document or property which, in the opinion of the Panel ought to be 
safeguarded for any purpose of the inquiry.   
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The mandate goes on to state that the Chairman has the power to issue, 
on behalf of the Panel, all such summons, subpoenas and other processes and 
make such necessary appointments as may be required under this Instrument, 
either before or during the inquiry until the submission of the Panel’s final 
report.92 Evidence taken under this Act shall be inadmissible against any person in 
any civil or criminal proceedings whatsoever, except in the case of a person 
charged with giving false evidence before the Panel.93 
Any person who (a) threatens, insults or injures any person for having 
given evidence or on account of the evidence given before the Panel; or (b) hinders 
or attempts to hinder any person, or by threats deters or attempts to deter any 
person, from giving evidence before the Panel; or (c) gives false evidence upon 
oath before the Panel shall be guilty of all offence and liable on summary 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two (2) years.94 
Any person who, after service on him of a summons to attend as a witness 
or to produce a book, document or any other thing and, notwithstanding any duty 
of secrecy however imposed, fails or refuses or neglects to do so or to answer any 
question put to him by or with the concurrence of the Panel shall be guilty of an 
offence, and liable on summary conviction to a fine of two hundred Naira or to 
imprisonment for a term of six months: provided that no person shall be bound to 
incriminate himself and every witness shall, in respect of any evidence written by 
him or given by him for the Panel, be entitled to the same privilege to which he 
would have been entitled if giving evidence before a court of justice.95 
The above provisions no doubt gave extensive powers to the Commission 
to carry out its mandate. Because of the overwhelming mandate, a commentator 
was forced to describe the powers as frightening, because it opens up the 
possibilities for retributive justice96 Different from what Howard Zehr (2001)97’s 
discussed restorative justice in chapters one and two. These extensive powers, 
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though utilised were guided by the principles of healing, reconciliation and 
restoration of harmony. It was not as if the Commission was not empowered or 
equipped with the necessary means to achieve its mandate.  
The mandate is encapsulated in the following comments: “This is what we 
have attempted to do in this Report. We have tried to be faithful to our terms of 
reference and to our mandate, both of which imposed on us the obligation “to 
review the past”; and to map out or indicate pathways to enable us as a people to 
“redress the injustices of the past; [and] to prevent and forestall future 
violations…”.98 “This has been the raison d’etre as well as the leitmotif of our work 
at the Commission. If this Report contributes, even in the smallest way to a 
national Risorgimento, then our work will not have been in vain”.99 
The argument as to the powers of the Commission is not contestable. It is 
clear from the above that the Commission had wide-ranging powers to achieve 
results, but these powers could not be coercively employed to achieve success 
considering the objectives of the Commission. This is one of the reasons why it 
seemed in some quarters that the Commission did not fulfil its mandate. Extending 
the idea, one can argue that the Oputa Commission was guided by the above-
mentioned objectives of achieving reconciliation, healing and restoration of 
harmony in a complex ethno-religious country and this was followed to the latter. 
It has also been argued in some circles that Nigerians had made many enemies 
within the country over the years, and an attempt to aggravate it would further 
result in war and bitterness; therefore, the task of the Commission was to build 
peace that would endure. This is illustrated in the Report that follows.  
The non-appearance of three former heads of state and a 
number of former top government functionaries, when summoned 
by the Commission, put to test the theory that in a democracy all 
men are equal before the law, that the rule of law and not the rule 
of man should prevail. The Generals rebuffed the Commission 
notwithstanding the fact that President Obasanjo who is their 
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senior in the military and a serving head of state appeared twice 
and testified before the Commission. Obasanjo set an example that 
Nigerians thought the other Generals would emulate. 
 In addition to not appearing, these former Heads of State   filed civil 
actions challenging the Commission. They are:  Generals Muhammadu 
Buhari, Ibrahim B. Babangida, and Abdul salami Abubakar. The former top 
functionaries are: Colonel Halilu Akilu and Lt-Colonel A.K. Togun. Many in 
Nigeria and, indeed, in the international community, wondered why these 
Nigerians, who had held high public office, refused to appear and testify in 
person before the Commission. Although the Commission had the power to 
issue warrants for their arrest, it refused to do so, in the interest of national 
reconciliation. The spirit of the Commission’s mandate and terms of 
reference are both implicitly against impunity, which makes social 
reintegration, rehabilitation and reconciliation difficult. Impunity 
represents the triumph of might over right.100 Yusuf (2007)101’s work on 
impunity was an informative one in relation to the latter analysis. 
As an extension of the above, these men were not arrested because of the 
amnesty theory which underscores this work, coupled with the judicial fiat. The 
argument here is that they were not arrested in the interests of peace, even though 
the Commission had the legitimate right to effect their arrest. Further the fragile 
nature of Nigeria democracy in 1999 meant that such a move might have resulted 
in a serious backlash that might undermine the new government.  
However, it is that the Generals showed no remorse for their past deeds, 
which historically Nigerians expect. As said earlier in chapter 3, the non-
appearance of the Generals was a stain on work of the Oputa Commission. As it is 
today, the Nigerian populace saw the Commission as ‘a beautiful feather of little 
utility.’ In view of the above, it is imperative to highlight the terms of reference of 
the Commission’s work; perhaps this will shed light on the success or failure of this 
all-important task. 
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4.1.4  Objectives and goals of the Oputa Commission  
The objectives of the Oputa Commission can be said to be broad and 
comprehensive to the overall theory of transitional justice mechanism.102 Such 
mechanisms were pointed out by Yusuf (2007)103 in the International Journal of 
Transitional Justice. First, the Commission provides an opportunity for Nigeria, as 
a nation emerging from military rule and human rights violations to confront their 
decade long problems. This could also culminate in violence that might consume 
the nation in yet another conflict and more human rights violations.104  
The truth commission offers victims of gross human rights violation a 
legitimate opportunity to reclaim their dignity. At the same time perpetrators of 
these violations are given the opportunity to expiate their guilt.105 It could also 
facilitate a national catharsis, as future generations would be served by the 
knowledge that the record of past abuses offered. Furthermore, a TRC could also 
satisfy the retribution impulse. The naming and shaming of perpetrators and the 
exposure of their violations constitute punishment through public stigma and 
humiliation.106 According to the Chairman of the Oputa Commission: 
“The main objective of this major undertaking is to document 
for posterity details of human rights violations in this particular, 
significant period in the development of Nigeria. It is also to help to 
unveil the nature, character and dynamics of human rights violations 
that might have occurred in each of the geopolitical zones, as well as 
provide details about the involvement of key agencies of the State, 
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such as the police, the prisons, the military and other security 
agencies, in the violations of the rights of Nigerians”.107 
In his speech during the inauguration, the President, Olusegun Obasanjo, 
pointed out that setting up the Commission was a manifestation of the 
determination of the new democratic government, to heal the wounds of the past, 
and quickly put the ugly past behind them so as to continue to stretch our hands 
of fellowship and friendship to all Nigerians for complete reconciliation based on 
truth and knowledge of truth in our land.108 Obasanjo’s statement was 
contradictory, because he knew from the beginning that the Oputa Commission 
was not the right model for a politically and socially divided Nigeria. The effect of 
this experiment on the nation was simply cosmetic, designed to fail and a waste 
of taxpayers’ money. Why did President Obasanjo not exploit his veto powers to 
publish the Commission’s report, since the majority of Nigerians were eagerly 
awaiting the outcome? President Obasanjo belonged to the military junta that 
plunged the country into the mess that the Oputa Commission was meant to clean 
up.  
Besides, he (Obasanjo) was determined to protect the military, his first 
constituency and those that installed him as a democratically elected civilian 
president of Nigeria, a compensatory move for the death of his kinsmen, Chief 
Moshood Abiola and his wife, Kudirat Abiola, murdered on the streets of Lagos by 
the Abacha killer squad. President Obasanjo also emphasised that the paramount 
intention of the Oputa Commission was to pave the way for reconciliation, peace 
and harmony.109 The peaceful part of the intentions was evidenced in Osuntokun 
and Olukoju (1997)110 ’s work on Nigerian peoples and culture that was discussed 
in chapters one, two and three. 
Obasanjo further stated that, “We want to reconcile all those who feel 
alienated by past political events, heal wounds inflicted on our people and restore 
harmony in our country. We want the injured and the seemingly injured to be 
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reconciled with their oppressors or seeming oppressors. That is the way to move 
forward”.111 The argument glossed over the detail of how the mandate would 
achieve truth and reconciliation, bearing in mind that the Oputa Commission was 
not backed by the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria or published in 
the official gazette. 
Lip service on the part of government actually indicated that various kinds 
of atrocities had occurred in the country and the opportunity to bring them into 
the public domain would not only heal the wound but also assuage the anger of 
people calling for war.112 The political will on the part of government was 
pretentious and deceitful towards the international community, especially the 
Commonwealth of Nations, to lift the sanctions imposed on the nation due to 
Nigeria’s human rights records and dictatorial tendencies.113 
In view of the previous discussion, it is argued that the Oputa Commission 
fulfilled its goals and objectives without knowing that the government designed 
the Commission to fail from the drawing board to the finish line. It will however 
be correct to argue that the Commission achieved its mandate by bringing 
perpetrators to face their victims in public, thereby making some of the 
perpetrators face shame and regrets. The Commission also partly achieved 
reconciliation and peace building among some warring factions in the country but 
did not achieve the unity of Nigerian society. 
4.1.5  Terms of reference114 
The Commission’s terms of reference include to: “(a) ascertain or establish 
the causes, nature and extent of all gross violations of human rights committed in 
Nigeria between the 15th day of January 1966 and the 28th day of May 1999;115 
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(b) identify the person or persons, authorities, institutions or organisations which 
may be held accountable for such gross violation of human rights and determine 
the motives for the violation or abuse, the victims and circumstances thereof and 
the effect on such victims and society generally of the atrocities; (c) determine 
whether such abuse or violation was the product of deliberate state policy, or the 
policy of any of its organs or institutions or whether they arose from abuse by state 
officials of their office or whether they were acts of any political organisations, 
liberation movements or other groups or individuals; (d) recommend measures 
which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, legislative or institutional to 
redress injustices of the past and prevent or forestall future violation or human 
rights abuse; (e) make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of 
the Judicial Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the 
evidence; and (f) to receive any legitimate financial or other assistance from 
whatever source which may aid and facilitate the realisation of its objectives”.116 
The Commission was statutorily required “to submit its interim reports to 
[the President] from time to time but shall, in any case, submit its final report not 
later than one year from the date of its first public sitting or within such extended 
period as may be authorised by [the President] in writing”.117 And it was formally 
inaugurated on June 14, 1999 by President Olusegun Obasanjo to investigate 
human rights violations committed during the military era.118 As the Chairman of 
the Commission noted, “it commissioned extensive research and studies on the 
range, extent, magnitude and ramifications of human rights violation in Nigeria 
between January 15, 1966 and May 29, 1999, which is the period covered by its 
revised terms of reference”.119Continually, the Chairman stated in the report that 
the Oputa Commission provides 
“An overview of the extent of our moral, physical and 
institutional decay under the military rule. The proscription and 
                                                          
116    Ibid.  
117   Ibid.  
118   Oputa Commission, Synoptic Overview of HRVIC Report: Conclusions and  
  Recommendations, Op.Cit. 3. 
119   Oputa Commission, Synoptic Overview of HRVIC Report: Conclusions and  




circumscription of our human rights and freedoms under military 
rule were symptomatic of a much serious malaise, the departure 
from constitutional or limited government and with it the absence of 
accountability and transparency in public life. This was the ultimate 
decay involving the personalization of the governmental process 
around the military ruler. The return to democratic civilian rule on 
May 29, 1999 provided the opportunity for us to rise above this 
decay, to break the silence of the past and to forge ahead, 
determined to lay to rest the ghost of this dark and painful period in 
our national history”.120 
A closer look at the terms of reference revealed that it was broad and wide-
ranging. For instance, the task of establishing the causes, nature and extent of 
gross violation of human rights committed in Nigeria from January 15, 1966 to May 
20, 1999 was robust and the Commission achieved this by inviting memoranda 
from Nigerians and victims of human rights violations. It also succeeded in 
commissioning researchers who helped uncover some of the hidden atrocities 
committed by law enforcement agents. Similarly, it was credited for succeeding in 
identifying persons, authorities, and institutions that perpetrated gross violation 
of human rights on Nigerian citizens. It was in this regard that the likes of 
Presidents Buhari, Ibrahim, and Babangida and their cronies were invited to 
account for their actions, which they never did. 
Nevertheless, available records indicate that the Commission did not 
effectively address most past injustices and neither did it prevent or forestall 
future violation of human rights, even though there were explicit 
recommendations on how to prevent future recurrence. It is against this backdrop 
that one notes that Nigerian society before and after the Oputa Commission has 
not really changed because human rights violations have remained a way of life, 
the same as ethnic politics. As observed over time, the beauty of truth and 
reconciliation commissions lie in the fact that they provide an opportunity for 
victims of human rights violations, not only in bringing their cases to the public 
                                                          




domain, but the privilege of confronting perpetrators and assailants who 
dehumanised them. This section demonstrates that the Oputa Commission 
achieved this objective, despite the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria on the legality or otherwise of the Commission and the observance of 
Shriver (1995)121 on the failure of the commission primarily.  
What was the state of the nation before the Oputa Commission was 
established, and what role did it play as a truth and reconciliation commission in 
Nigeria?  These are the fundamental questions that the preceding discussion is 
going to tackle. The political atmosphere on the eve of General Sani Abacha’s 
death was frightening.122 During the period, cases of bombing, serial killings and 
the threat of war dominated debate all over the country. Thus, Professor Bolaji 
Akinyemi, a renowned statesman, was quick to describe the situation in a lecture 
titled “One Minute to Midnight in Nigeria”, in which he drew attention to the 
unacceptable and dangerous state of the nation.123  
Therefore, developed countries such as America, Britain and France began 
to warn their citizens about travelling to Nigeria, and at the same time advised 
those already in the country to be in constant contact with their embassies for 
updates. Because of concerns emanating from state practice, the Abacha regime 
became a focus of severe criticism from the international community and civil 
society for its human rights violation and endless transition politics.124The ideas on 
transitional politics were ideas broadly shared by Miners (1971),125 Elaigwu 
(1985),126 Uwechue (1971),127 and Ojiako (1979).128 
Therefore, Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations for 
its atrocities and the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa under a flawed judicial 
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process.129 It is therefore imperative to examine the Oputa Commission’s report 
and pattern of investigation as a transitional justice mechanism. 
4.2.  Synopsis of the report and pattern of investigating past human rights 
violations  
This section highlights the synopsis of the report and pattern of 
investigating past human rights violations from 1966 to 1999. It is important 
because of the detailed information therein and the trajectory of the work. But 
more importantly, it is a rich reservoir of knowledge mined by scholars and other 
countries emerging from war and human rights violations. It has also become a 
subject of investigation by researchers interested in the history and politics of 
Nigeria, and peace building in twentieth century Africa. This is the significance of 
the Oputa Commission as a transitional justice mechanism in Nigeria.  
Records show that human rights violations were mostly state sponsored 
and carried out by security operatives under the auspices of various military 
regimes in Nigeria. It is for this reason that the level of expectations by members 
of the public on the release of the Oputa Commission report was high, coupled 
with the fact that the Abacha regime faced ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions 
that almost brought the nation to the brink of another civil war. This must have 
informed the depth of work carried out by the Commission.  
In the ‘Introductory Volume of this Report’, the Oputa Commission drew 
attention to the historical context for understanding not only the development of 
constitutional provisions for human rights but also the violation of those rights in 
the country. The Introductory Volume also provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding and appreciating the burden of the colonial legacy and its 
implications for, and impact on, human rights violation in the country.130 This is 
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clearly elaborated in Chapter Two of this thesis where the negative effects of 
colonial legacy were discussed by Tamuno, T.A. (2012).131 
Volume 2 of the report considers the implications of the challenges posed 
by contemporary processes of globalization for the promotion and protection of 
human rights in Nigeria, by looking at the international dimensions and contexts 
of human rights. Globalization has made it impossible for any nation to try to be 
an island unto itself even it wished to be so. Additionally, it examines at length the 
implications of this internationalization or universalization of the core moral 
imperatives and values of evolving international law and human rights practice for 
Nigeria’s municipal law generally and more specifically for its domestic human 
rights law and practice.132  
Volume 3 of the report attempts to capture the neglected aspect of the 
country’s history and politics. The volume summarises the findings of the 
commissioned researchers by compressing the findings into one volume. The 
Research Reports underscored the fact that there are aspects of Nigeria’s public 
life and public service that needed to be taken more seriously.133  
In Volume 4, the Commission looks at Public Hearings. This is ultimately 
one of the most significant volumes in the report. Its significance lies in the fact 
that it is the volume that almost everyone who followed the proceedings was 
sufficiently knowledgeable about.  
Despite the initial logistic problems over whether the Commission should 
have public hearings, it became clear that, beyond drawing public attention to the 
work of the Commission, the public hearings created the most interactive phase 
of the Commission’s work.134 These public hearings brought the work of the 
Commission within and outside the country to manifest. At the same time, 
testimonies of human rights violations that were discussed in hushed tones, as 
mere rumours of the past, were then televised live on local and international 
media, including social media as a permanent record of what happened in Nigeria. 
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The healing effect of the public hearings for victims cannot be quantified because 
for once, they had the privilege to confront the perpetrators, recounting their 
ordeal and the ungodly deeds of perpetrators in the public domain. Naming and 
shaming of these culprits was an achievement of the Oputa Commission in relation 
to Nigeria’s transitional justice mechanism. 
Volume 5, titled Reparation, Restitution and Compensation, examines the 
philosophical and legal basis for reparation, rehabilitation and compensation. Each 
of these three concepts, by raising ethical-philosophical issues, is loaded with a 
largely subjective meaning.135  
Volume 6 looks at the Findings and Recommendations. This presented the 
exciting challenge of sifting through the material before them and stating the 
Commission’s interpretation of the data before it.136  
In view of the above, one can assert that the Commission’s scope was 
broad and challenging. The question therefore is how did the Commission 
investigate human rights violations reported to them? In its report the 
Commission identified and proposed investigations into 150 high profile cases 
where the evidence against alleged perpetrators met the standards of a prima 
facie case being established that warranted investigation. This is stated in the 
Commission’s report:  
“In trying to discover the truth, we commissioned research 
teams of lawyers, historians and social scientists to write background 
papers for the Commission on various aspects of our mandate and 
terms of reference. The research reports submitted to us have been 
useful in the preparation of this document. In searching for the truth 
about our past, we tried to adhere scrupulously to the requirements 
of due process and fair hearing and to the canons of historical and 
cultural scholarship. We provided the platform, through our Public 
Hearings and Special Sessions, held across the various geo-political 
zones of the country, for alleged victims and alleged perpetrators of 
human rights violations and violations to bare their minds in public. 
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But we were careful not to take their accounts at their face value. 
We had to devise means of corroborating them”.137 
The daily sittings of the Commission however followed the procedure 
outlined below:  
Daily Procedure for Conduct of Public Hearings:138 
(1) Counsel, Commission staff (registrars, verbatim reporters) and 
members of the public are seated, (2) The counsel list is signed by counsel, (3) 
Members arrive and take their seats, (4) Chairman informs gathering of the 
procedure to be adopted by the Commission, i.e.: 
(a) The Commission’s counsel will lead all the witnesses (i.e. the 
petitioners, respondents and any other witnesses).  (b) The petitioner or his 
counsel, or the respondent/witness or his counsel may cross-examine any witness 
if need be, (5) The Registrar calls the petition to be heard, (6) The petitioner is 
called to the witness box, (7) The Commission’s counsel announces appearance,  
(8) Any other counsel interested in the matter announces appearance, (9) The 
Commission’s counsel commences examination in chief, (10) Respondent/witness 
or his counsel is allowed to cross-examine the petitioner, (11) After the 
petitioner’s testimony, respondent goes into the witness box, the procedure is 
repeated and his own counsel also leads him in evidence, (12) After respondent’s 
evidence, petitioner or his counsel may cross-examine him, (13) Commission’s 
counsel may re-examine any witness if need be.139   
Clearly the daily sittings of the Commission were probably aimed at 
orderliness, but more importantly, it was designed to comply with court 
procedures and tradition. It could also have been intended to help security men 
checkmate violence, especially during cross-examinations, as tempers could rise 
on the blatant denial of accusations by opponents.  
Also, zonal public hearings were set up at Abuja, Lagos, Port Harcourt, 
Kano, and Enugu respectively. Petitions heard during the session were 340, 
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petitions struck out 49, and petitions withdrawn 10.140 One can argue that the 
Zonal Public Hearings were specially selected because of the advantage they 
provided. They were home to people of diverse ethnic groups and strategically 
located in cosmopolitan cities. They were also accessible to people from different 
geo-political zones in the country. These were cities that equally commanded large 
security operatives and military formations.  
The Oputa Commission must be commended to produce a six-volume 
report on human rights violations in the country. It shows the determination of 
the Commission to unearth the circumstances surrounding human rights 
violations during military rule. The effect of this could be seen in the fact that none 
of the people or organisations accused the Commission of prejudice or negligence 
in handling their cases. The Commissions’ work was also appreciated in the sense 
that it successfully conducted public hearings and cross-examination of victims 
and opponents as an arbiter.  
Nevertheless, how much truth and reconciliation it achieved remained a 
matter of debate, though one thing is clear about the commission, it failed to 
achieve total truth and unity, but did a lot in bringing about reconciliation to 
warring communities in Nigeria. It must be commended further to produce a six-
volume report on human rights violations in the country. It was also appreciated 
for conducting public hearing and cross-examination of victims and opponents. As 
the Chairman explained:  
“Let me now turn briefly to some of the important issues raised and 
discussed at length in the Commission’s report. During our sessions in Lagos, 
Lagos State, we reconciled the quarrelling communities of Maroko village. 
We also recorded our first major breakthrough when the warring Ife and 
Modakeke communities in Osun State signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding and a Joint Declaration. This is contained in the appendix to 
the report pledging to live in peace and harmony and to adopt only peaceful 
means in pursuing their respective rights and entitlements. It was 
                                                          





unfortunate that the media did not give the Ife/Modakeke reconciliation the 
prominence it deserved”.141 
Beginning with the Maroko case against Lagos State during the Babangida 
administration, the regime of Col Raji Rasaki, as governor of Lagos State, forcefully 
evicted the inhabitants of Maroko, predominantly fishermen. The government 
claimed that the environment was dirty and uninhabitable. Thus, the former was 
meant to carry out a clean-up exercise and resettle inhabitants into low cost 
houses. It turned out to be a ploy; the military junta forced them out and shared 
the land among the military class. Standing on that vast area of land today are 
skyscrapers and high-rise buildings owned by corrupt military officers in Nigeria 
and their contractors. The people of Maroko went to court to contest the matter, 
as they have been rendered homeless, but to no avail.  While pursuing the matter, 
most of them died, while others were traumatised and brutalised.  
This development became heart-rending for the nation in general, that 
people could be rendered homeless in their country, and at the same time denied 
access to a court of law to argue their case. This human rights violation was 
perpetrated by the Babangida regime and yet they refused to honour the 
invitation to account for these brutal acts before the Oputa Commission.142  It 
gladdens the hearts of the people that the Oputa Commission finally brought 
justice to them and their children, some of who had degenerated into street 
urchins, while others were serving various jail terms since they left their profession 
as fishermen. This is the agony of a nation under military siege and human rights 
violation.  
According to the Chairman, “during our session in Port Harcourt, Rivers 
State the Commission succeeded in brokering a Peace Accord among the warring 
factions and groups in Ogoni land”. In particular, “we managed to unite and 
amalgamate the Ogoni Four and the Ogoni Nine into the Ogoni Thirteen”.143 As 
the New Nigerian ‘Editorial’ of 16th February 2001 observed, “The Peace Accord 
signed by the warring factions in Ogoni land will go down in the socio-political 
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development of this country as one of the landmark achievements of the Human 
Rights Violation Investigation Commission”.144 Analysis by Adeyemo (2013),145 
Guaker (2009),146 Ikhariale (2008),147 Yusuf (2007),148 Akhihiero (2001/2002)149 
and Kukah (2011)150 provided clear insights on how these writers perceived the 
work of the Oputa Commission in chapter two on the latter’s work. 
The Chairman further added that “while I do not wish to over-dramatize or 
generalize from these examples, what needs emphasis is that unless we try, and 
try, we cannot even start the long journey to national reconciliation and maintain 
its momentum. The flashpoints of communal unrest in our country constitute 
albatrosses around our necks. Let us with the crossbow of the Commission shoot 
down each albatross in the interest of peace and unity of our country and for the 
sake of the survival of our nascent democracy”.151  
The Commission’s procedure revealed that it required cognisance of legal 
traditions and professional ethics. Thus, the various petitions that were 
entertained, and those struck out, show the determination of the Commission to 
get to the roots of the entire process. Similarly, the efficacy of the latter was seen 
in the signing of the peace accord between and among warring factions in Nigeria 
and this shows the extent to which it fulfilled its objectives and mandate.  
The previous discussion has shown that Nigeria’s human rights violations 
have long been a matter of concern within and outside the country. It was 
despicable to civil liberty institutions and well-meaning Nigerians that a 
government could govern its people with emergency decrees in the absence of an 
emergency. It was also absurd that people could simply disappear in 
circumstances that government operatives could not explain or define. 
Nonetheless, this study argues that the Oputa Commission did its best within the 
scope of its mandate, the victims’ response and government support. Since it was 
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simply a truth and reconciliation commission the extent of apologies and 
revelations might not assuage the bitter experiences of victims. In all, it was 
understandable that against all odds the Oputa Commission met the standards of 
international guidelines. 
4.3  Evaluation and achievements  
The Oputa Commission did not fall short of standards considering its 
mandate, objectives and goals. Apart from the challenges, constraints, and refusal 
of some highly placed individuals, including former heads of state, to honour the 
invitation to testify, the Oputa Commission was a huge success.  
Besides, the immediate resignation and refusal of some appointed 
members to serve in the Commission sent shivers down the spines of many 
observers and political thinkers, the Commission lived up to its mandate amidst 
ethnic, politics and religious divisions. It was the attempt to guide against further 
degeneration of the country that led to the question of how much truth and 
reconciliation the commission achieved because punishments, sanctions and 
compensation were not handed down to perpetrators and victims. 
Indeed, the Commission painstakingly allocated enough time to listen to 
the testimony of relatives of those believed to have been extra-judicially killed by 
state agents due to their non-violent political activities or relationship with critics 
of government. For example, Menon Bagauda narrated how his brother, Kaltho 
Bagauda was arrested and executed for being a journalist of TELL Magazine.152 The 
family of Alice Tumuniyi wept as they narrated how Alice, a student of the College 
of Education, Agbor was killed by a policeman at the Benin-Shagamu 
checkpoint.153 
Another pathetic hearing was the petition of the family of suspected coup 
leader, Lieut. Col. Olu Akinyode who died in mysterious circumstances in prison.154 
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These gory tales of past abuses gave real insight into the atrocities perpetrated by 
the military junta on Nigerians during their years in power. It was sad that security 
agents employed by the state to protect lives and properties of citizens were 
deployed by those who held the mantle of power to oppress and dehumanise the 
same people they were paid to protect. Some petitioners before the Commission 
sought justice; others requested reinstatement in their jobs, financial 
compensation for property seized, as well as medical bills for injuries that resulted 
from torture or ill treatment at the hands of security forces, but to no avail.  
The case of Professor Akinjide Osuntokun, former Nigerian Ambassador to 
Germany, readily comes to mind. He was arrested at the airport and tortured by 
Major Omenka for not regularly corresponding home. As an asthmatic patient, the 
old man was denied the use of his inhaler until he collapsed.155 Such flagrant abuse 
was commonplace as roving bands of security operatives acted with impunity 
because no one could question their actions. Testimony before the Oputa 
Commission revealed abuse committed by the State Security Services (SSS) and 
most of these officers were let off the hook without punishment, to serve as a 
deterrent, especially those that killed Dele Giwa, the editor-in-chief of News watch 
Magazine on 19th October, 1986.156  
A limitation of the Commission was that it did not possess the scientific and 
technical expertise to extract truth from opponents and this frustrated the efforts 
of victims, some of whom refused to make a second appearance. It was also 
frustrating that records of arrest and offence, interrogation and death were not 
made available to the Commission for scrutiny, hence the denial by security 
officers named by witnesses as responsible for their detention, torture or murder 
of relatives of petitioners. 
The Commission purportedly assumed that no Nigerian was above the law, 
calling the highest officials to testify before the Commission, including the three 
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former heads of state that incidentally refused to appear, but sought protection 
in the court’s interpretation of the powers of the Commission to summon them.157  
The decision of the Supreme Court in that case was cited as the basis for the 
refusal of the Obasanjo government to officially release the report of the 
Commission or implement its recommendations. The then Attorney General and 
Minister for Justice, Akinola Olujimi, cited this decision and claimed the Commission 
was unconstitutional.158 A notion that was also cited in chapter one when 
Akhihiero159 on his own also questioned the constitutionality and powers of the 
Commission. 
This claim is untenable because the Supreme Court never annulled the 
Oputa Commission. A clear reading of the decision of both the Court of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court show that both courts affirmed the legality of the Commission 
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights as well as other 
international human rights instruments ratified by Nigeria.160  
The failure of the government to release the Commission’s report and 
implement its recommendation was a direct result of the influence of the military 
class that still holds sway in the new democratic dispensation. Besides, it is 
instructive to note that the same military elite, especially two of the three Generals 
who were summoned by the commission installed the Obasanjo regime. They 
readily posed a threat to democratic government and could readily turn the tables. 
Consequently, a number of civil society organisations were provoked to publish the 
report on the Internet.161 To date Nigerians are still calling for the official release of 
the report of the Oputa Commission because it is a treasure trove for the nation. 
The limitations of the Commission cannot be overlooked in achieving total 
truth, unity and reconciliation. It suffered from inadequate budgetary allocation to 
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finance its work, though this is curious that a government, which set up such an 
important Commission, starved it of funds, because government never wanted it to 
survive or execute its mandate successfully. The poor funding of the Commission 
has been exhaustively discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Additionally, the Oputa Commission was a presidential truth and 
reconciliation commission, which unfortunately meant there was no provision for 
amnesty for perpetrators of gross violation of human rights in its enabling 
instrument. Though this seems to be implied, as no individual victims were arrested 
or imprisoned, perhaps because the goal of the Commission was national 
reconciliation, and this was reiterated in President Obasanjo’s speech at the 
inauguration of the Commission on June 14, 1999.  
To underscore the motives behind the setting up of the Oputa Commission, 
it is imperative to return to the relevant part of the president’s address. He said that 
“underlining the inauguration of the Commission is the determination of his 
administration,”162 “to heal the wounds of the past and quickly put the ugly past 
[behind] us so as to continue to stretch our hands of fellowship to all Nigerians for 
complete reconciliation based on the truth and the knowledge of the truth in our 
land”.163 It should be recalled that the Commission said at the beginning that it was 
not a court of law, as such nobody was on trial before the Commission, and that the 
evidence given before it could not be used anywhere against any person. Such 
assurances by the Commission were not strong enough to persuade perpetrators to 
incriminate themselves by making full disclosures of the atrocities they committed. 
The question of amnesty for past abuse remained controversial in human 
rights discourse and peace building. This chapter therefore argues that blanket 
amnesty should be discouraged and, when suggested by departing tyrannical 
regimes, should be rejected by the international community on the grounds that no 
individual or organisation is above the law. At the same time, prosecution for gross 
violation of human rights must be encouraged to serve as a deterrent.  And it is only 
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in certain circumstance that some form of amnesty should be employed to ensure 
that a fragile democracy could take root in the country. Therefore, in deciding 
whether any form of amnesty should be considered for truth and reconciliation, the 
local situation should be a factor or a basic primary consideration. If local 
circumstance favours granting some form of amnesty to ensure that democracy 
survives and that the truth of past atrocities is revealed for the benefit of the victims 
and their families, it is justified. But this type of amnesty must be granted to ensure 
accountability and discourage impunity.    
Nevertheless, amidst the shortcomings of the Commission, this study 
establishes the fact that the Oputa Commission fulfilled an important part of 
Nigeria’s history. It gave confidence and hope to those clamouring for national 
dialogue, and by extension national conference to discuss national problems and 
ethnic agitation. The confidence to invite the three former Heads of state was a 
great success; it shows that the Commission had fulfilled an important aspect of its 
mandate.164 Its capacity to carry out its mandate and objectives in the face of 
financial constraints also explains the determination of members to contribute their 
quota to nation building, peace and unity of the country.  
Indeed, the present campaign for the release of the Oputa Commission 
report in Nigeria by civil society and the general masses was an indication that the 
Oputa Commission did its best.165 Other spokespersons, like Professor Ayodeji 
Olukoju, affirm that it represents a milestone and national dialogue par excellence; 
as such there is no need for a national conference.166 
A cursory look at the achievements of the Commission reveal that it did its 
best within the period it existed, despite the difficult task of crafting volume 6 of 
the report, entitled Findings and Recommendations, because of the challenges of 
sifting through large numbers of material before the Commission and stating the 
Commission’s interpretation of the data before it. It also arranged the resolution 
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of conflict and peace building of some ethnic groups such as the Modakeke and 
Ife conflicts, the Arewa and Ohaneze and several others.167 Indeed, how much 
truth and reconciliation was achieved remained with political thinkers and 
observers. This section discovered that the Oputa Commission did not achieve 
total truth and unity, even though it succeeded to some extent in bringing about 
reconciliation to warring ethnic communities in Nigeria.  
 
4.4  Reparation options – a neglected theme  
 
This section examines the question of reparation and compensation for 
victims of human rights violations in Nigeria. Over time it has been recognised that 
reparation means much to victims of human rights violations, especially the aspect 
of forgiveness in reconciliation. It is also an indisputable fact that total 
reconciliation and unity can only be achieved through payment of damages and 
compensation to victims of human rights violations for the loss of property, health 
and loved ones. To what extent did the Oputa Commission exploit the options of 
reparation to assuage aggrieved parties and victims for losses incurred during 
military rule?  
The question of reparation for victims of human rights violation has 
remained a contentious issue for most truth commissions including the Oputa 
Commission. This was largely due to the enormous financial cost involved in 
setting up the reparation programme and competing demands for scarce 
resources, thus most governments are reluctant to pay compensation to victims 
of gross violation of human rights.168 From the outset, it was clear that the 
question of reparation for victims was not at the top of the Nigerian government’s 
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agenda.169 The plight of victims was previously covered in the work of Zehr, 
(1990)170 
In his address at the inauguration of the Oputa Commission, President 
Obasanjo’s emphasis was on reconciling those alienated by past political events, 
healing wounds inflicted on Nigerians and restoring harmony to the country.171 In 
the entire six-page address, President Obasanjo made no reference to reparation 
for victims appearing before the Commission, or what the thinking of government 
was on the issue. Therefore, it can be assumed that President Obasanjo believed 
that no amount of money would compensate for loss of lives or other serious 
human rights violations, so it would be insulting to the victims or their families to 
be offered money for the abuse they suffered.  
This thinking is skewed, as it does not take into consideration the needs of 
victims. It is true that no amount of money could compensate for the loss of life of 
a loved one or other grievous human rights violations that victims suffered.172 It 
would be most unjust to leave the victims high and dry without any form of 
compensation when they were unable to provide for basic needs. The instrument 
that established the Oputa Commission gave it the powers to recommend 
measures that would redress past abuses. In that regard it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that the opportunity offered by the work of the 
Commission could be exploited to fashion a full reparation package for victims. 
Some of the victims who testified at the Commission’s public hearings stressed the 
fact that reparation was key to healing the wounds inflicted on them. 
The majority of petitioners that submitted petitions before the Oputa 
Commission and those that actually testified at public hearings were quite clear 
                                                          
169   Oputa Commission, Synoptic Overview of HRVIC Report: Conclusions and  
  Recommendations (Including Chairman’s Foreword). Presented To President,  
  Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chief  
  Olusegun Obasanjo GCFR Submitted By Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission,  
  May, 2002 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations (Accessed 5 May 2017). 
170    Ibid. 
171    Address By President Olusegun Obasanjo At the Inauguration of the Human Rights  
  Violation Investigation Panel On Monday, 14 June 1999 At State House, Abuja, Nigeria,  
  and .2. 
172   See ANNUAL REPORT 1997, A Civil Liberty Organisation Report On the State of Human  
  Rights in Nigeria. Also See ANNUAL REPORT 1998, A Civil Liberty Organisation Report On  




that they needed reparation for past abuse suffered.173 The victims were known 
to have suffered untold hardship for unlawful detention, torture, as well as other 
unjustified human rights violations through the actions of state agents. Some had 
lost their economic base and source of livelihood while in custody. There is no 
doubt therefore that these victims were legally justified in their demands. They 
expressed the same sentiments at the Seminar on the Right to Compensation, 
Rehabilitation and Restitution for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights 
organised jointly by the Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission, Centre 
for Democracy & Development and Legal Resources Consortium from July 31 to 
August 3, 2001.  
The seminar gave voice to various perspectives on the issue of reparation 
for victims including:  Colonel R. S. Bello-Fadile174, Mrs Chris Anyanwu175, Sylvester 
Odione-Akhaine and Professor Femi Odekunle176, and Malam Shehu Sani, Festus 
Okoye and Emma Ezeazu among others.177 The victims who participated were 
unanimous in their demands for reparation. For these victims, nothing short of 
justice, financial compensation and a public apology for gross violation of human 
rights they suffered could start the healing process.178 
In a survey carried out by a human rights organisation, Media Rights 
Agenda in Lagos, Nigeria, a slight majority of respondents said they doubted the 
ability of the Commission to achieve meaningful reconciliation, and insisted that 
reconciliation is insufficient, and asked for "justice" and "adequate" compensation 
for victims. According to indigenes of Lagos, genuine reconciliation is not possible 
in an atmosphere of lies and unrepentant attitudes on the part of perpetrators. 
They contended that people's rights have been blatantly violated and to achieve 
genuine reconciliation a form of restitution was needed.  
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They therefore cautioned that for the Commission to be relevant and not 
lose its integrity, its terms of reference should be expanded to include justice and 
adequate compensation for victims of human rights violations. Lagosians also say 
that the government must ensure that the Commission's findings and 
recommendations were not swept under the carpet, as has been the case with 
similar investigation commissions in the past that were either tampered with or 
jettisoned.  
At the public hearings the plea for reparation was clearly evident and often 
the seriousness of the situation for victims justified their demand. Mostly victims 
were of the opinion that it was the duty of the Commission to grant them some 
form of reparation for injuries suffered. For some very poor victims it was 
paramount that they received financial assistance. This was the driving force that 
brought them to the Commission. They came with high expectations of how the 
Commission would help them financially. It did not seem to matter that the 
Commission had no powers to directly assist them financially.179 In order not to 
raise their expectations the Commission should have made it clear to victims that 
it had no powers to pay compensation directly and could only make 
recommendations.  
The Oputa Commission approached the issue of reparation with utmost 
caution. It could be that caution on the part of the Commission was in deference 
to the views of President Obasanjo, who was not favourably disposed to the issue 
of monetary compensation to victims of gross human rights violation. In response, 
the Chairman attempted to play down the issue of monetary compensation, 
placing more emphasis on symbolic forms of reparation.180  
In its draft report submitted to President Obasanjo the Commission made 
the following recommendations with respect to reparation: There was the need 
for symbolic reparation. In this case the government should recognise the 
sufferings of victims of past human rights violations because some of them paid 
the supreme price with their lives. It would be a recognition of their worth and 
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sufferings if the government recognised their birthdays or the day they died as 
national holidays. The government could also recognise victims’ pain by 
establishing national monuments in recognition of past injustice.  
The Commission also suggested material and financial assistance, though 
this would not in any way compensate for the loss of loved ones in police or prison 
custody, or for many years of incarceration.181 The government could consider 
establishing a fund, in which the state as well as individuals, including perpetrators 
and the international community, could make contributions. There are many 
victims as well as survivors in dire need of financial assistance to make ends meet, 
or even seek medical treatment for injuries sustained while in custody. 
The Commission equally suggested that the President must, as a matter of 
urgency, establish a National Human Rights Trust Fund182 to provide for victims’ 
claims. Money from this fund should not only be used to pay financial claims but 
also support the capacity of appropriate institutions whose activities contribute to 
democratic consolidation, especially building a culture of human rights in our 
society.183 Funds could then be obtained from the national budget, international 
donor community, local and multinational businesses, recovered from corrupt 
public officials and from interest earned.  
Additionally, the Commission articulated the need for access to 
psychological /medical services so that victims and survivors of gross human rights 
violations could be given free access to these services. The money for such services 
should be paid by the state. A proper referral system could also be set up, so that 
psychological counselling services would be accessible to victims in rural areas. 
Having examined the suggestions and recommendations of the 
Commission, why did the government renege on these vital aspects of welfare that 
could address the problems of victims of human rights violations in the country? 
The interest of victims was not central to government because they expected the 
Commission to be a gathering of complainants and an assembly of rhetoric. 
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Therefore, one can conclude that total truth and reconciliation were not the focus 
of government, but to let the world know that a truth commission was going on in 
Nigeria, so the international community would assume the country was now on a 
path of good behaviour and would perhaps lift sanctions imposed during the 
Abacha regime. 
4.5  Lessons of the Oputa Commission     
The lessons of the Oputa Commission must be considered when analysing 
the transition justice mechanism in Nigeria. This is because of the circumstances 
surrounding its establishment, as it was clear that Nigeria was on the verge of 
collapse following the autocratic rule of the military for the period under study 
from 1966 to 1999.184 The assertion comes in line with what Falola et al. (1989),185 
Crowder, (1966),186 and Falola et al. (1991),187 Akpofure and Crowder (1966),188 
Perham (1960),189 and Lugard (1922),190 informed, as mentioned in chapter one 
under reviewed literature. 
This development in Nigeria led to internal disorder and socio-economic 
dislocation. Thus, various ethnic groups began to clamour for secession and war 
to rid themselves of domination and marginalisation. With the death of Abacha in 
June 1998, and the coming to power of General Abdu salami Abubakar as Head of 
State, it became obvious that Nigeria needed a truth and reconciliation 
mechanism to address grievances and human rights violations. This therefore led 
to the inauguration of the Oputa Commission by the democratically elected 
Obasanjo government. 
In light of the above, this section examines the lessons of the Oputa 
Commission from two perspectives: first, for Nigeria and how Nigerians were 
affected, and second, for countries emerging from war, as well as human rights 
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violations. It should be emphasised that this theme is also addressed in Chapter 
Five of this study. In this regard an attempt will be made to highlight salient points 
in the discussion. The goals and objectives of the Oputa Commission as previously 
mentioned were to heal the wounds of the past, to achieve reconciliation, and to 
restore harmony to the country. The important question here is to what extent 
did the Commission achieve these goals and what was the effect on the nation? 
The Oputa Commission attempted to heal the wounds of the past191 by 
inviting aggrieved persons, ethnic groups and victims of human rights violations, 
including observers and civil liberty groups and their coalition partners to testify. 
The Commission met all standards and criteria of a TRC, and doggedly invited 
those of low and high status in society in regard to past abuse that made Nigeria 
a pariah state. This singular act was commendable and a lesson for the Nigerian 
people and nations emerging from war and associated human rights violations.  
The Commission’s work was commendable, even though it did not heal all 
the wounds of the past, because there was no reparation or compensation for 
victims of human rights violations as had happened in other countries. This is valid 
per se because while existing single-case, regional and cross-national studies find 
that truth commissions have a positive impact on human rights protection, they 
present some methodological concerns. For example, single-case studies often 
lack comparative data on human rights from prior to the truth commission192. 
Similarly, attempts to achieve some lessons and legacy in the form of 
resettlement and compensation, particularly for those who lost their job and 
position, including the displaced people of Maroko193, met a brick wall and the 
question for Nigerians was what did the Commission offer victims other than 
forgiveness, naming and shaming of perpetrators? For victims, the lesson was not 
enough for all the sufferings at the hands of the military junta. The victims yearned 
for some form of compensation and punishment for perpetrators, but this did not 
receive the attention it deserved, as it was reiterated time and time again that the 
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mandate of the Commission did not include punishment of victims. However, 
section (d) of the mandate stipulates, “to recommend measures which may be 
taken whether judicial, administrative, legislative or institutional to redress 
injustices of the past and prevent or forestall future violation or abuse of human 
rights”.194 In fairness to the Commission, it made far reaching recommendations 
in its report for government to implement.  It was not a court of law to hand down 
punishments and penalties. The lesson here could be that the government of 
Nigeria was not prepared for a total truth and reconciliation commission, for which 
it has been pointed out previously that the Oputa Commission was a child of 
circumstance. 
In this knowledge, one can safely argue that the lesson of healing was not 
total for Nigerians and this has remained a vexed issue in some quarters, as victims 
watched perpetrators walk the streets free. This is not only a lesson for Nigerian 
people but nations emerging from conflict and human rights violations. This 
chapter therefore establishes the fact that a truth and reconciliation commission 
must have compensatory benefits for victims of human rights to cushion their 
losses and for perpetrators to reveal what happened, including naming their 
partners in crime. This is what the Oputa Commission lacked in healing all wounds. 
 On the other hand, the goal of restoring harmony was also a tall order as 
Nigeria continues the struggle for power, hegemony and resource control. Peace 
in Nigeria today can be likened to one sitting on a keg of gun powder.  
The struggle for domination between northern and southern Nigeria, in 
fact, has been aggravated since democratic rule in 1999 because there has been 
no restoration of harmony or unity. Northern Nigeria set up the Boko Haram 
militants to truncate the administration of Good Luck Jonathan, the same way the 
Niger Delta militants declared war on the Yar’dua administration until amnesty 
was granted. 
In modern times, the Igbo have been calling for a declaration of 
independence for Biafra. It should be recalled that they seceded in 1966, which 
led to the Nigerian Civil War. All the complex issues that have not gone away point 
                                                          





to the fact that the Oputa Commission did not restore harmony to the Nigerian 
peoples and the Nigerian State and importantly, the Commission’s report was not 
published for public consumption.  
The Commission’s mandate was a step in the right direction because it 
brought peace between the Ohaneze and Arewa groups, Maroko and Lagos State, 
and Ife and Modakeke communities.195 These were groups that had long trod the 
path of conflict, and efforts by past governments to reconcile them proved 
abortive until the Oputa Commission.  
This chapter demonstrates that the Commission provided lessons in the 
reconciliation of some warring communities. The achievement of this feat should 
be integrated in intellectual production and research methodology on conflict and 
peace building. In light of the above discussion, the Oputa Commission did its best 
within the prescribed mandate and objectives, amidst the deceit of government, 
to achieve reconciliation and peace building.  
Clearly, its goals could not be met, because the Commission was not the 
right model for Nigeria, due to ongoing ethnic politics, domination and religious 
division, which created hegemony, and economic disequilibrium. The country had 
long been under military rule and things were done with impunity and 
recklessness.196 The impunity of the military regimes demonstrated in the 
preceding chapters was aptly captured in the writings of Yusuf (2007).197 
Additionally, the Commission was careful in that agitation of some ethnic 
groups was still potent; hence the Commission erred on the side of caution not to 
cause further disaster and human rights violations. Nevertheless, the Oputa 
Commission would have followed its mandate to the letter,198 but there was fear 
of retribution and worsening the already charged situation waiting to explode.  
The diplomacy of the Commission in this regard was commendable, even 
though it neither restored unity nor healed all wounds. That is not to say that it 
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did not achieve reconciliation of warring communities.  It was never an exercise in 
futility, and that is why most Nigerians still clamour for the release of the Oputa 
Commission report, including civil liberty groups, since it was the best exercise 
Nigeria had historically undertaken. A case in point therefore for this analytical 
stance is that sometimes, although it may well be that the ‘jury is still out’ and not 
enough time has elapsed in order to evaluate the real long-term consequences of 
truth commissions, it appears that one of the main reasons for the lack of 
evaluation is largely a gap in policy and scholarly literature; namely, the lack of 
established mechanisms for measuring the alleged multiple benign effects 
associated with truth commissions and therefore for assessing their overall 
success.199 
4.6  Conclusion  
In light of the above discussion, the conclusion focuses on the challenges, 
pitfalls and achievements of the Oputa Commission. This is important, considering 
the debate on how much truth and reconciliation the Commission achieved in its 
quest for Nigeria’s unity and development. The Oputa Commission confirmed that 
Nigeria’s problems of nation building could be traced to remote and immediate 
factors. In the former, the amalgamation of diverse and multifaceted ethnic 
groups led to a marriage of convenience and malfunction of identity. It was also 
compounded by the Arthur Richards Constitution of 1946, which introduced 
regionalism and ethnic politics in the country. In the intervening years leading to 
the Nigerian Civil War it became obvious that the problems created by the 
constitution were lopsided as it encouraged domination, prebendal politics and 
corruption. This anomaly brought about military incursion into politics in 1966 that 
led to human rights violations and endless political transition. And the immediate 
factor has been traced to the annulment of June 12, 1993 elections in which 
Moshood Abiola was democratically elected but denied the presidency by the 
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military regime of Ibrahim Babangida, leading to long-term political and economic 
stagnation. 
Writing in the same vein, Adeniyi (2005) notes that the events that 
followed in successive years brought about Ernest Shonekan’s Interim 
Government and the infamous Abacha regime.200 By November 1995, Ken Saro-
Wiwa and his Ogoni kinsmen had been extra-judicially hanged, and the abuse 
continued till the country assumed an odious image. Building on this thinking, 
Fawole (2003) contends that Nigeria swiftly fell from an impressive height of being 
the “African power”, a position occupied since the 1970s, to become a pariah 
nation,201 a country derided and isolated by its traditional allies and friends. In an 
ironic twist of fate, it was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations.202 
Eventually Abacha and Abiola died in mysterious circumstances giving way 
to the Abubakar administration. Fawole (2003) adds that the new regime began a 
slow process of lifting the country from the pit of infamy into which it had fallen 
in the course of Abacha’s four-and-a-half-year dictatorship.203 The effect of this 
was the return of temporary peace to the country and beyond. Abubakar entered 
into an agreement to hand power and escape retributive justice. At the same time, 
it was argued that traditional rulers present at the meeting, including politicians 
who were sceptical of political transition, promised Abubakar that he would not 
only escape retributive justice but would enjoy amnesty with his lieutenants.  
It is from this paradigm that this study establishes the theory of 
retribution/restorative and amnesty or amnesia. It was a series of events in the 
last years of military rule that prompted General Olusegun, who became the 
democratically elected president of Nigeria, to compensate (restorative theory) 
the Yoruba ethnic group for the fate of Moshood Abiola, established the Oputa 
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Commission to address human rights violations perpetrated by the military 
between 1966 and 1999.  
The Oputa Commission, as a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) was 
entrusted with the responsibility of healing the wounds of the past, achieving 
reconciliation based on truth and knowledge, and restoring harmony in the 
country.204 According to the Chairman of the Commission, in making 
recommendations, “we have had to fall back on the relevant sections of the 
instrument that set up the Commission, as a basis for finding the way forward. For 
us, we see the driving force for the setting up of the Commission is the search for 
the truth about our past as the basis for the establishment of a framework for a 
just, fair and equitable Nigerian society”.205 
The challenges and pitfalls of the Commission were not only pronounced 
but also extensive at the beginning, so it had to rely on agencies and governments 
for assistance. When the Oputa Commission commenced, it had to depend on the 
Centre for Democracy & Development (CDD), which had considerable experience 
on issues of transitional justice and accountability for past abuse. It provided 
necessary logistics for the Commission in collaboration with the Swedish based 
International Institute for Democracy & Electoral Assistance. They organised a 
special retreat for members of the Oputa Commission with the intention of 
networking and sharing comparative experience with experts from other countries 
who had been involved in past TRCs. The intervention of the CDD at that point in 
time helped bring civil society into contact with the Oputa Commission's work. The 
Centre helped organise interactive sessions, meetings and seminars for the Oputa 
Commission and this helped bridge the gap between the Commission and 
stakeholders in the country.  
At the time that the Commission requested for memorandum from victims 
of gross violation of human rights, it just had a small office tucked away inside of 
the rooms at the Office of the Head of Service at the Federal Government 
Secretariat, Abuja. Here petitioners from all over the country and beyond, most of 
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them indigent, sent their petitions to the office for scrutiny. One of the immediate 
predicaments of the Commission was the absence of zonal collation centres, as 
they had made no formal arrangements for assisting petitioners with their 
inquiries and complaints. Similarly, it did not employ the services of statement 
takers a clear departure from the SATRC and those of other countries, where 
statement takers visited rural communities to take statements from victims of 
gross human rights violations. 
The Secretariat’s indifference to proper arrangements placed a lot of stress 
on victims who wanted to submit petitions. Another challenge was the inefficiency 
of the postal system in Nigeria. It was at this point that civil society was able to 
assist in moving the Commission forward. These human rights institutions 
including civil liberties organisations, the constitutional rights project, and 
committee for the defence of human rights turned their offices across the country 
into collation centres. They also helped petitioners prepare their petitions at no 
charge. The majority of petitions received by the Commission came from the 
Ogoni region in the Niger Delta. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), the umbrella body for the Ogonis helped the petitioners to 
prepare the petitions.  
At the close of public hearings, the Oputa Commission invited submissions 
as well as recommendations from various human rights organisations in the 
country. These organisations presented detailed accounts of experiences of both 
their members and Nigerian society at the hands of security agencies in Nigeria. 
These submissions helped the Commission conclude that these security agencies 
were responsible for arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture during the period 
under review.206Despite its shortcomings, the Oputa Commission enjoyed 
tremendous support from civil society in Nigeria. These were some of the initial 
challenges and pitfalls encountered by the Commission. 
In the end, the Commission came up with a six-volume report including 
conclusions, findings and recommendations. In addition, zonal public hearings 
were set up in Abuja, Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kano, and Enugu respectively. Petitions 
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heard during the session were 340, petitions struck out 49, and those withdrawn 
10.207 The Commission found that ‘military rule has proved to be a cure that was 
worse than the disease’ and this much was admitted or conceded by military 
officers who appeared before the Commission. It also established that military rule 
left, in its wake, a sad legacy of human rights violations, stunted national growth, 
a corporatist and static state and increased corruption, destroying its own internal 
cohesion in the process of governing, and posing the greatest threat to Nigerian 
democracy and national integration. Taking into cognizance the references made 
by the Oputa Commission in its report on the scourge of corruption in Nigeria, this 
thesis will briefly discuss this malaise in relationship to the Oputa Commission.  
Even though the Commission in its report recognised that corruption was 
a major vice practised by the military alongside human rights violations, the 
Commission was not granted the mandate to investigate the corrupt practices of 
the military regimes. The reason for this omission is obvious as the various military 
regimes indulged in monumental corruption salting away billions of dollars earned 
from oil revenue and looting the treasury of Nigeria. The military catapulted 
corruption into an art and a state policy. This they did with the connivance of the 
civil service, political class and the traditional rulers. Afam Nkemdiche a Columnist 
in ‘’The Guardian Newspaper’’, in his article titled Corruption, truth and 
reconciliation dated 27 October 2016 wrote as follows: 
“This deliberate falsification of our history is the worst form of 
corruption confronting Nigeria, because it distorts the healthy 
development of the present and future generations of Nigerians for purely 
selfish reasons. Eradicating corruption from Nigeria would take much more 
than running after allegedly corrupt persons. As the experience of similarly 
circumstanced climes clearly shows, the effective eradication of corruption 
in a polity is subsumed in Truth and Reconciliation”.208    
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With benefit of hindsight, this thesis will posit that the Oputa Commission 
in the way and manner that it operated and with the deficiencies in the staffing 
and resources may not have been able to investigate cases of corruption even if it 
had the mandate. Corruption is a sophisticated crime that requires enormous 
resources to tackle and in the case of Nigeria where it had reached pandemic 
proportion and rooted at the top the task would not have been more arduous. In 
his study titled “An appraisal of the legal and institutional framework for 
combating corruption in Nigeria” Nlerum S. Okogbule (Department of 
Jurisprudence and International Law, Faculty of Law, Rivers State University of 
Science and Technology, Port Harcourt, Nigeria) discovered “that the earlier 
statutory enactments have proved ineffective in combating corruption in 
contemporary Nigeria, hence the enactment of the Corrupt Practices and other 
Related Offences Act, 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
Act, 2004, with the objective of dealing with various aspects of corruption. The 
implication of this finding is that to be effective, legislative measures to tackle 
corruption must take cognizance of the multifarious nature of the menace coupled 
with the requisite political will to enforce the provisions of such statutory 
enactments”.209 
The Oputa Commission finally came up with findings and 
recommendations to help victims of human rights violations in the country, and 
the government of Olusegun Obasanjo overlooked this. As earlier mentioned in 
this chapter, the Commission suggested the efficacy of symbolic reparation. 
Though in practice, addressing the past involves emotions, which may lead each 
side to demand justice, which may in turn impose unbearable costs on the party 
found guilty.210 
This means that there is a need for government to acknowledge the 
sufferings of victims of past human rights violations because some of them paid 
the supreme price with their lives. Therefore, it would be appropriate to recognise 
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their worth and suffering if the government recognised their birthdays or the day 
they died as national holidays. The government should also recognise victims’ pain 
by establishing national monuments to immortalise them. Unfortunately, the 
government of President Olusegun Obasanjo jettisoned the idea on the grounds 
that there was no money.  
The effect of this means that the government was not sincere with the 
programme of a truth and reconciliation commission. As a consequence of the 
government’s action aggrieved civil liberty groups, the National Democratic 
Coalition (NADECO) and opposition party of the Yoruba states proclaimed and 
instituted June 12 as a Democracy Day, and a public holiday in honour of the 
struggle of Moshood Abiola, who won the election on June 12, 1993 that was 
annulled by the military, and subsequently died in defence of democracy with 
several pro-democracy activists.  
In Yoruba states, Moshood Abiola Polytechnic and Abeokuta Stadium were 
established by the governors of Ogun State, not the federal government of Nigeria. 
The insincerity of the Obasanjo administration came to public attention when he 
declared that May 29 would be democracy day instead of June 12. For this singular 
act the civil liberty organisation and its affiliates challenged Chief Obasanjo’s 
behaviour, because he benefited from the struggle of June 12, 1993 without 
participating in it and without June 12, 1993, there would not have been the 
Obasanjo administration of May 29, 1999 in Nigeria.  
Secondly, the Oputa Commission suggested, to the government, the need 
for material assistance to victims of human rights violations in the country. Though 
material assistance and compensation in the form of monetary payments do not 
in any way compensate for the loss of loved ones in police or prison custody, or 
for many years of incarceration. This argument centred on the fact that many 
victims as well as survivors were in dire need of financial assistance to make ends 
meet, or to seek medical treatment for injuries sustained while in custody. The 
Commission suggested that the President as a matter of urgency establish a 
National Human Rights Trust Fund211 to cater for the claims of victims.  
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Money from this fund should not only be used to pay claims but also to 
support appropriate institutions whose activities contribute to democratic 
consolidation, especially building a culture of human rights.212 Contributions from 
the fund could be obtained from the national budget, international donor 
community, local and multinational businesses, monies recovered from corrupt 
public officials, and from interest earned.  
On the issue of monetary compensation, the Commission recognised there 
was a temptation to dismiss claims by victims as unrealistic, given the huge sums 
involved. The criteria for determining the amount of compensation need to be 
carefully addressed; however, this should not diminish the intrinsic value of the 
principle itself, stated in the universal declaration of human rights, that everyone 
has the right to an effective remedy.213 Justice has to be forthcoming for the 
victims of human rights violation, irrespective of concerns about resources. The 
government unfortunately did not heed this advice.  
The Kenyan Truth Commission when among the recommendations the 
reparations for victims, public apologies, and a judicial review of possible 
perpetrators, who are mentioned by name, including the commission’s own chair, 
also recommended this compensatory style to President Uhuru Kenyatta214. 
The Oputa Commission equally suggested access to free psychological and 
medical services to help victims and survivors of human rights violations in the 
country. The money for such services ought to be paid by the state. A proper 
referral system should also be set up to the effect that psychological services 
would be accessible to victims in rural areas. Unfortunately, the Oputa 
Commission’s report and recommendations were not formally released by the 
government and therefore not implemented.  
This chapter contends that the Obasanjo government jettisoned the work 
of the Commission for political consideration, since the Commission 
recommended punitive measures against some powerful people in society who 
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were indicted in its report, and this is likely to vitiate the amnesty secretly granted 
to Abubakar’s regime.  
The lessons to be learnt from the Oputa Commission are wide-ranging. 
First, the fact that a government established a truth commission (TRC) does not 
necessarily mean that it would willingly implement its report, perhaps not until 
civil society groups and human rights organisations mount pressure on the 
government to release and implement such a report. However, for Kenya, due to 
the refusal of parliament to discuss the report, there has still been no public 
dissemination of the report.215 
 Second, a truth and reconciliation commission, such as the Oputa 
Commission, could be inaugurated by government and allowed to die in the 
middle of its work, for lack of political will and financial constraints. Third, a TRC 
could also be set up on political grounds, to divert attention from pressing issues 
of governance, and the Oputa Commission suffered all of these challenges in its 
quest to address human rights violations and the atrocities of military rule in 
Nigeria. Such reflects Kenya as an example of a society in transition that is focusing 
its national energy on acknowledging and amending historical injustices as a way 
of building a democracy.216 
Funding a truth commission is a significant challenge. The challenges of 
most commissions are a shortfall in funds, and this was one of the recurring 
problems faced by the Oputa Commission. Perhaps the government had no idea 
that the work of such a commission was capital intensive; even when it became 
increasingly clear that the government must commit large sums of money if it 
wanted an effective truth commission, the Nigerian government refused on the 
grounds of paucity of funds and poor economy. Thus, the rhetoric of lack of funds 
was the bottom line throughout the life of the Oputa Commission. The limited 
funds at the disposal of the Commission made it impossible to provide any 
elaborate witness protection scheme or even provide legal aid for poor victims.   
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Similarly, payment of allowance for the commissioners and others working 
for the Commission was always a problem. Actually, if it had not been for the 
lifeline provided by the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development, the Commission could not have completed its report and met its 
financial commitment and significantly, the Commission could not finance 
interpreters or any form of counselling for traumatised witnesses. 
Apart from the government starving the Commission of funds, it did not 
have committed staff or a funding strategy within and outside the country. During 
the period under study, staff and commissioners could not follow up on a pledge 
made by the German government to commit funds to a presidential fund for 
reparation, and this had a telling effect on the Commission’s finances. It also failed 
in its bid to use the initial goodwill and commitment of the international 
community and donor agencies to the benefit of the Commission.  
It is on record that this researcher once negotiated generous funding for 
some of the Commission’s activities from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which 
gave provisional approval, but the Commission could not meet with the 
Foundation to discuss and approve the proposal. Through incompetence on the 
part of the commissioners, the Commission lost substantial funding which would 
have facilitated its work. The financial neglect of the Oputa Commission by the 
administration of President Obasanjo, coupled with lack of skill and commitment 
by both the commissioners and staff in fund raising, made it difficult for the Oputa 
Commission to attract reasonable funding from donor agencies. 
This study established the fact that human rights violation in Nigeria was 
caused by military rule from 1966 to 1999, as already seen in Miners (1971)’s, The 
Nigerian Army 1956–1966,217 Elaigwu (1985)’s, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-
Statesman,218 and History of the Nigerian Army 1863–1992 (1992),219 Uwechue 
(1971)’s, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future,220 and Ojiako 
(1979)’s, 13 Years of Military Rule 1966–1979 221 in chapter one, discussed in two 
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and three. It also found that the Oputa Commission did its best within the limit of 
its mandate, considering the ethnic configuration of the Nigerian state. The TRC 
achieved its objectives based on its terms of reference by reconciling some ethnic 
groups that had petitions. The prolonged military rule in the country was due 
largely to the greed of the military elite and the support of the political class. From 
the testimonies of senior military officers and those allegedly involved in plotting 
coups and investigations, it was clear that rich and powerful civilians played critical 
supportive roles in destabilising the political process and preparing the way for 
military coups that overthrew various civilian and military regimes. 
As part of the recommendations, this chapter suggests that Nigeria could 
only develop as a nation by abandoning ethnic politics and religion. Therefore, 
religion and ethnicity should be expunged from the constitution. Military rule was 
inimical to national development; therefore, a total ban on plotting coups should 
be entrenched in the Nigerian Constitution, since it was aimed at wealth 
accumulation, corruption and human rights violations; this was reviewed from the 
writings of Oarhe and Aghedo (2010),222 Oluwaniyi (2011),223 Onuoha (2009),224 
Ogundiya (2010),225 and Bello and Odusote (2013), 226 in chapter two.  
The chapter opined that the Oputa Commission brought perpetrators of 
human rights violations to justice by facing their victims in the public domain and 
this was the greatest achievement derived by Nigerians in the exercise.  
Though the Commission may have fallen short in bringing about absolute 
or total truth and reconciliation, it succeeded in revealing the complicity of the 
State in past human rights violations, thus one can safely argue that the Oputa 
Commission was not a waste of time or a diversion of attention by the 
government;227 otherwise civil society and well-meaning individuals would not be 
calling on the government to release the report.
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LESSONS OF THE OPUTA COMMISSION FOR COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the lessons learned from the Oputa Commission 
on the transitional justice mechanism1 for Nigerians, as well as providing a possible 
framework for other nations dealing with conflicts and/or human rights violations. 
Nigeria faces a huge challenge of unity and national development which, according 
to Akenyere R.T, is due in part to the colonial rule that not only distorted the social 
system of the people but also truncated the political culture of the communities 
and their boundaries2. As Charles (2004) notes:  
Truth commissions are deemed to heal social wounds among 
former enemies or divided ethnic groups. In short, transitional justice has 
not only brought satisfaction to some victims, but also transformed world 
politics and notions of righteousness.3  
 
The lessons of TRCs worldwide cannot be overemphasised, not just as a 
working document or a legacy of reconciliation but as a pragmatic instrument for 
“how a society reckons with past human rights violations committed by 
predecessor regimes or during a conflict”.4 It is from this paradigm therefore that 
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transitional justice in its broadest sense refers to the changeover from a 
repressive, armed conflict society into a social justice system that prevent future 
human rights atrocities.5 Furthermore, a discussion of the effects of ethnic politics 
on the survival of democracy is highly desirable.6 
Recent atrocities in the modern era have resulted in a push for justice, rule 
of law and compensation for victims of human rights violations, particularly in war 
torn regions of Africa and other developing countries from around the world.7 
Thus, it is critical that countries adapt a successful transitional process that is 
based on past successes and failures.8 For instance, the Nigerian government 
conducted a comparative analysis of truth commissions from the South Africa, 
Argentina, Chile, Guatemala Liberia, Rwanda Uganda, and Ghana.910 The Nigerian 
government found that the accumulation of grievances and threats of revenge 
escalated in conflicts and human rights violations. As a best practice for their own 
truth commission, the Nigerian government ensured that the transitional justice 
process went as quickly as possible in order to avoid the colossal damage to life 
and property, as well as further human rights violations. 
This chapter analyses transitional justice, peace building and conflict 
resolution in the Nigerian context. As the Chairman of the Oputa Commission 
notes: 
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The main objective of this major undertaking is to document for 
posterity details of human rights violations in this particular significant 
period in the development of Nigeria. It is also to help to unveil the nature, 
character and dynamics of human rights violations that might have occurred 
in each of the geopolitical zones, as well as provide details about the 
involvement of key agencies of the State, such as the police, the prisons, the 
military and other security agencies, in the violations of the rights of 
Nigerians.11 
The utility of transitional justice mechanism has elicited much discussion 
among scholars,12 particularly its efficacy regarding the problems of human rights 
violations.13 The human rights violations were discussed in chapters one, two and 
three, in The Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission Report (May 
2002),14 and Shriver (1995), in An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics.15 
According to Charles (2004), “Transitional justice has captured much of the 
attention in recent thinking about human rights, partly because so many countries 
have in recent years become ‘transitional societies’ and partly because such 
societies offer unusual opportunities to capture and punish perpetrators”.16 
Consequently. Javier (2006) has argued that:  
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Transitional justice is a contested and evolving process, which 
emerged in the 1990s. It is understood as a set of practices, mechanisms 
and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or 
repression, and aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law.17  
In the same vein, Kimathi (2010) ventured that transitional justice, 
therefore, is concerned with the whole range of mechanisms and approaches 
applied by states or societies that seek to transform, heal, and transit from 
illegitimate and repressive rule or situations of conflict to national reconstruction 
and good governance.18 In its contribution on the utility of transitional justice 
mechanism, KHRC (2009) provided a menu of what a transitional justice 
mechanism can attempt to achieve. This recommendation includes legal policy 
and constitutional reforms, prosecutions, reparations, lustration measures, 
reconciliation and peace building measures, memorialisation, and truth 
commissions, among others.19  
The option of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) has been 
exploited by a number of countries with different outcomes and results. Some of 
these countries include South Africa,20 Ghana,21 Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda22 
                                                          
17     ROTH, A AND JAVIER, M (2006) Transitional Justice in the Twenty First Century.  
  Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
18       KIMATHI, L., 2010. Whose Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation? Enhancing the Legitimacy of  
  the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Among Affected Communities in Kenya.  
  Nairobi: the International Peace Support Training Centre. 
19     KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL (2010) Transitional Justice in Kenya: A Toolkit  
  For Training and Engagement. Zand Graphics: Nairobi. 
20       FARLEY, M.K. 2008. Identity in Transition: Towards A Conceptualization of the Socio- 
  Political Dynamics of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Doctoral  
  Dissertation, University of Cape Town; ROSENBERG, T. 1999 Afterword: Confronting the  
  Painful Past. in M. Meredith, Coming To Terms: South Africa’s Search For Truth, .327. Also  
  See STACEY, S. 2004. A Lockean Approach To Transitional Justice. the Review of  
  Politics, 66(01), .55-82; DUGGARD, J. 1997. “Retrospective Justice: International Law and  
  the South Africa Model”. in MCADAMS, J. ED.Transitional Justice and Rule of Law in New  
  Democracies, .270. 
21     VALJI, N., 2006. Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission: A Comparative  
  Assessment. International Center For Transitional Justice, Occasional Paper Series, New  
  York. Retrieved (Http://Www.Ictj.Org/Static/Africa/Subsahara/Ghanacommission.Pdf)   
  (Accessed 10 August 2017). 
22         COREY, A. AND JOIREMAN, S.F., 2004. Retributive Justice: the Gacaca Courts in  




and Chile,23 as previously mentioned. It was in this regard, therefore, that the 
Nigerian government decided on this mechanism to come to terms with the 
problems of human rights violation as perpetrated by the military junta from 1966 
to 1999.24 These human rights violations therefore were the reason for 
commissioning of The Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission Report 
(May 2002),25 and Shriver (1995)’s ‘An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics’26 
previously outlined in the reviewed section of literature. 
The research of this study is concerned with the followings questions: Does 
the Oputa Commission offer any lesson(s) of interest? What are the travails of 
justice as contested by Hakeem O. Yusuf?27 Was the Oputa Commission an 
unfinished job as argued by Mike Ikhariale,28 or was it a failed attempt in the 
thinking of scholars like Damilola Adeyemo29 and Elisabeth Guaker?30 (These and 
other issues will be examined in the section on perspectives and comments.)  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the lessons from the Oputa 
Commission offered and how they impacted Nigerians and the events that 
followed.31 Though the Commission was applauded for its role in bringing justice 
closer for victims of human rights violations, as well as reconciliation to warring 
communities in Nigeria, events post the Oputa Commission showed that Nigerians 
were not pleased with the outcome, since the report was not published by 
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government because it indicted highly placed military officers and former heads 
of state.32 The unpleasant side of the Nigerians can be attributed to Joseph’s 
(2014)33 observatory comments when he argued that the effects of rule by the 
military government was to accentuate the centrality of the State in the nation’s 
economic system—and thus in a circular fashion—to fuel the various features of 
prebendalism.34 Therefore, the study can attach the depreciation of the 
commission’s work to the iron hand of the military rule in Nigeria at the time. 
Specifically, this section of the chapter discusses the impact and lessons 
from the Oputa Commission. This chapter offers critical lessons to both the 
Nigerian people and nations in transition on how to resolve the problems of 
victims and perpetrators of human rights violations in an acceptable fashion.35   
In light of the previous chapter, this chapter is divided into three main 
sections and subsections. The first is the anatomy of the Oputa Commission. The 
second is findings and recommendations of the Oputa Commission. The third is 
the impact and lessons of the Oputa Commission. The final section is the 
conclusion.  
The mechanism of the Oputa Commission has attracted the attention of 
several scholars who have questioned the limited success of the Commission. A 
few even have attributed the failure of the Commission to the nature of its 
structure and composition. While others believe that the twin problems of 
mandate and composition affected the overall workings of the Oputa Commission. 
Our interest here is to understand and to explain the workings of the Commission, 
particularly the terms of reference and its mandate.36  
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Others point to views, comments, and perspectives on the Oputa 
Commission from the media, the Nigerian populace, and scholarly journals. A few 
individuals also delved into the forces and factors that worked against the 
Commission. These included the Supreme Court of Nigeria and civil liberty groups 
contesting the constitutionality of the Oputa Commission, the financial 
constraints, under staffing, and the lack of compensation and reparation, among 
others. Interestingly, though some of these challenges were, also manifest in 
Kenya’s transitional justice because notably, while President Kenyatta made a 
public apology in 2015 and announced that he would establish a victims' fund. 37  
 
5.1.1  Mechanism of the Oputa Commission  
 
This thesis maintains that the Oputa Commission had an extensive 
mandate to achieve its objective. The shortcomings of the Commission were not 
as the result of the deficiencies in its mandate, but rather it was due to the lack of 
strong legislation such as an Act of Parliament like its precursor SATRC and those 
that came later including Liberia, Ghana and Kenya. Other shortcomings included 
the paucity of funds available to the Commission and the staffing challenges. 
These factors, rather than the mandate weakened the Commission, indirectly 
affected its output. 
The work of the Oputa Commission is critical in the analysis of transitional 
justice mechanism in Nigeria and perhaps the theories and dynamics of truth 
commissions in Africa. Its import is located in the thinking and statement of the 
Chairman: “... its establishment was an attempt to lay the groundwork for an 
enduring and sustainable peace and development in the country, founded on the 
concepts and principles of human rights, equality, justice and reconciliation”.38 
It can be argued that Obasanjo’s administration did not fully comprehend 
the enormity of the work of a truth commission and its challenges before 
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embarking on the project.39 These daunting challenges included the Colonial 
powers’ entrenchment of ethnicity and tribalism through its regionalisation 
policy40 that failed to establish a pan Nigerian agenda for the nation.41 The human 
rights violations perpetrated by military dictators from 1966 to 1999 resulted in 
the establishment of the Oputa Commission in Nigeria. The Commission was well-
received by Nigerians due to the fact that Nigerians had long yearned for truth and 
justice for victims of human rights violations42, as well as the opportunity for the 
prosecution of perpetrators and their accomplices.43  
The Commission in its report noted that prior to its inauguration the 
government was anxious over the sort of accountability process the country would 
explore considering the nature of Nigeria’s composition, ethnicity, and 
domination.44 According to the Chairman of the Commission:  
The option chosen will depend on what each truth commission is 
set up to accomplish. In the case of Nigeria, the terms of reference, 
including the President’s address to the Commission, centred on 
forgiveness and reconciliation. Our quo warrant is the search for this 
reconciliation.45 
The Chairman also stressed that, “in our comparative analyses, it was only 
in Argentina that there were criminal prosecutions of members of the military 
junta and their collaborators for gross human rights abuse. In the other four cases 
(i.e. Chile, Guatemala, South Africa and Uganda), the aim was for people to know 
what happened in their respective countries during the days of military rule”.46 
According to Guaker (2009): 
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The truth commission’s primary function is investigative. The 
investigative approach was informed by the observation of Ojiako (1980).47 
Furthermore, their investigations are victim centred and their attention is 
directed towards the victims’ views and experiences, meanwhile witnesses 
and perpetrators are secondary. Truth commissions also attempt to paint 
a picture of overall abuse within a defined period.48 
The appointment of members of the Commission was also problematic due 
to the lack of consultative and transparent process. Perhaps part of the challenges 
experienced by the Commission further arose from its inability to carry out 
effective consultation among interest groups and stakeholders on the workings of 
a truth commission and its goals.  
Unfortunately, the Commission’s attempt at comparative analyses of other 
truth commissions worldwide in order to discover the ideal transitional justice 
model for Nigeria’s problems, including the question of compensation, reparation 
and punishment49, did not yield many results compared to the assurances of the 
Commission. This failure was extensively discussed by Gauker, Kukah and Yusuf 
(2007)50 as seen in chapter one and discussed in the following chapters. 
 
5.1.2  The question of terms of reference of the Oputa Commission51 
 
The powers of the Commission are contained in the Tribunals of Inquiry 
Act, Cap 447. According to Akhihiero, the law is clearly the Commission’s Magna 
Carta from where it derives its jurisdiction and powers. The terms of reference of 
the Commission are made pursuant to Section 1(2) (a) thereof. Section 5 contains 
the powers of the Commission with regard to the conduct of proceedings, while 
sections 10 to 12 provide for penalties for refusal to give evidence and contempt 
of the Commission.52 The terms included the following: First, ‘to ascertain or 
                                                          
47   Ibid.50. 
48  GUÅKER, E., 2009. A Study of the Nigerian Truth Commission and Why It Failed, Master's  
  Thesis, the University of Bergen.1-51. 
49  Oputa Commission, Synoptic Overview, Op.Cit. Vol. 6, Chapter 1, 1-3.   
50   Ibid. 
51             Ibid.  




establish the causes, nature and extent of all gross violation of human rights 
committed in Nigeria from 15th January 1966 to 28th May 1999’. Second, ‘to 
identify the person or persons, authorities, institutions or organisations which may 
be held accountable for such gross violation of human rights and determine the 
motives, the victims and circumstances thereof, and the effect on such victims and 
the society in general.  
Third, to determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of 
deliberate state policy or the policy of its organs or institutions or whether they 
arose from abuses by state officials of their office or whether they were the acts 
of any political organization, liberation movement or other groups or individuals.  
Additionally, to recommend measures which may be taken, whether 
judicial, administrative, legislative or institutional to redress past injustices and to 
prevent or forestall future violation or abuse of human rights, and finally, to make 
any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of the Judicial Commission, 
in the public interest and are necessitated by the evidence. Furthermore, to 
receive any legitimate financial or other assistance from whatever source which 
may aid and facilitate the realisation of its objectives. 
The amended terms of reference of the Commission were timely because 
it gave the Oputa Commission powers to ‘command and enforce’ the attendance 
of witnesses,53 with a view to meeting current realities and international 
standards. Lewis (1994) argued that a lacklustre democratic movement had 
weakened political institutions and, in the process, fragmented civil society. This 
resulted in tenuous foundations for the revival of democratic pressures or the 
implementation of a workable political transition.54 The powers of the commission 
were but inevitable for usage to make possible witness attendance. Nevertheless, 
more important was the view of ensuring that it acquired the status of a truth and 
reconciliation commission.55 The reason could also be located in the complexity 
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and varied nature of our society. It was also visible in the events that led to human 
rights atrocities of military rule,56 political instability, and the quest for succession. 
Therefore, specific amendments include the reference in terms of 
references (a) and (b) in the amended instrument to “gross violations of human 
rights…” as opposed to the more specific reference to “…all known or suspected 
cases of mysterious deaths and assassinations or attempted assassinations…” in 
terms of references (I) and (ii) in the original terms of reference. Same as the 
stipulation, in terms of reference (a) of the amended instrument, of the period to 
be covered by the Panel (later) Commission to be “between 15th day of January 
1966 and 28th day of May 1999,” as against the stipulation in terms of reference 
(1) in the original terms of reference to the period “since the last democratic 
dispensation in the country”. The addition of terms of reference (e) and (f), which 
were not in the original terms of reference, to the amended instrument; and finally 
the absence in the original terms of reference of the requirement, contained in 
the amended instrument for the Panel/ Commission to submit interim reports and 
its final report “not later than one year from its first Public Sitting or within such 
extended period as may be authorised by [the President] in writing.   
In the first terms of reference, the Oputa Commission was established to 
investigate human rights violations from 1983 to 1998 but was amended to cover 
“between 15th day of January 1966 and 28th day of May 1999”.57 Human rights 
groups and its affiliates including the politicians criticized the reference as not only 
restrictive but limited because it did not cover the period of the Nigerian Civil War 
and several periods of military rule such as the Gowon and Obasanjo/ Murtala 
regimes.58 The amended terms of reference was intended to give the Commission 
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the latitude to cover the entire period of military rule and perhaps expose the 
atrocities perpetrated during the era. It was also aimed at guiding against public 
assumption that the Commission targeted a particular ethnic group or 
administration.  
The Commission was initially given three months to submit its report, but 
the period was extended to twelve months because of the scope of the work. It 
eventually took the Commission twenty-eight months to submit its report.  This 
delay could be attributed to financial constraints, which directly impeded the 
Commission’s work.  
5.1.3  Interpretation of mandate59 
The question of the Commission’s mandate60 has been explained in 
Chapter Four of this study, though there was a need to highlight a few points. 
What was the nature of the Commission’s mandate? This will help us to derive 
some lessons too. Drawing from the Chairman statement as emphasised in one of 
the zonal public hearings,61 it was mainly to:   
a) pursue “a policy of openness and transparency in the conduct of 
government business”; 
b) heal “the wounds of the past, to put the ugly past behind; 
c) achieve complete reconciliation based on truth and knowledge of 
the truth; and   
d) Reconcile “the injured and seemingly injured with their 
oppressors.62 
This was further encapsulated by the Chairman, the mandate of the Panel 
/Commission was primarily a fact-finding one, namely to investigate the causes, 
nature and extent of gross violation of human rights in the country between 15th 
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January 1966 and 28th May 1999; to determine the persons, authorities and 
institutions to be held culpable of violation and their motives in doing so,63 as well 
as the effect of such violation on their victims, and to determine whether such 
violation was part of deliberate State policy or the policy of its organs.64  
Therefore, when we juxtapose the terms of reference and the mandate of 
the Commission, it was clear that the commission was purely a truth commission 
like other truth commissions that had taken place worldwide. What is the mission? 
As the Chairman cogently pointed out, “it was primarily a fact-finding one”. Relying 
on the perspectives of Guaker (2009): “Truth Commissions are non-adjudicative 
bodies and typically do not have the powers to sanction or prosecute…. Thus, 
when a Commission finishes its report further address of the violations identified 
here is at the hands of the government”.65 She also added that: “An affirmative 
government will actively pursue the implementation of a Commission’s 
recommendations. Less supportive governments on the other hand have been 
known to reject the Commission’s findings altogether and even refuse to release 
the report”.66 Extending the idea, Adeyemi (2013) noted that transitional justice 
proposes measures to redress victims of repression and massive violation of 
human rights by a state in the past, as a result of authoritarian regimes or internal 
armed conflict.67  
Therefore, the Oputa Commission was meant to set a record of fact-finding 
that would lead to the transformation of the Nigerian society. Thus, the 
Commission was expected to achieve much reconciliation but was bogged down 
by ethnic politics, hegemony, and domination. The reconciliation was presented 
in The Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission Report (May 2002),68 and 
Shriver (1995).69 
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There were also the factors of institutional decay orchestrated by 
prolonged military rule in the face of impunity and judicial crisis, coupled with the 
lack of political will on the part of Obasanjo’s government. Thus, the proposition 
of Professor Mike Ikhariale’s “Oputa Reports: An Unfinished Job”.70 It should be 
noted that assessment by some commentators of the Commission’s mandate as 
being too narrow to effectively cover human rights violations by past military 
regimes seemed very flimsy. The position of this chapter is that the Oputa 
Commission was elaborate and in the words of Guaker, the “Oputa Commission 
had [an] extensive mandate”.71 
What were the suggestions and recommendations of civil society groups 
and affiliates before and after the commencement of the Commission? If there 
were suggestions on legal issues and the need for top-notch professionals, why 
did the Commission not adhere to these suggestions? Considering the long battle 
faced by civil society groups and affiliates in the last days of Abacha’s 
administration, it was important for the civil society to ensure that the Oputa 
Commissions report was not abandoned.  
5.2  Observations of stakeholders and interest groups 
The contributions of some interest groups during the period under study 
needs to be emphasized in order to identify where the Oputa Commission erred 
in its duties. According to the Chairman: “The Commission was of the view that 
there was need to go beyond the mandate, in search of pathways along which the 
project of nation building must proceed. This is more so, because the Commission 
is uniquely the best opportunity that Nigerians have had in several years to forge 
an informed understanding of their country’s past”.72 Adeyemo (2013)73 
postulated the necessary building blocks on which a new Nigerian nation would 
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rest.74 He also added that, “after consultations with a broad spectrum of 
stakeholders, it became clear to the Commission that the nature of Nigeria’s 
volatile and fractured history75 demands that the Commission’s work should serve 
as a mirror to reflect the trials and tribulations of our country”.76 In view of the 
above, one can safely argue that the Media Rights Agenda, Civil Liberty 
Organization (CLO) and Centre for Democracy & Development (CDD) were 
stakeholders that provided support to the Commission.  
It was the CDD that planned with the International Institute for Democracy 
& Electoral Assistance in Sweden to organize a special retreat for members of the 
Oputa Commission.77 The purpose of the retreat was to initiate discussions of the 
processes and lessons learned from other truth commissions worldwide. It was 
these coalition groups that organized seminars and workshops before and during 
the Commission’s take-off. 
There was also the Seminar on the Rights to Compensation, Rehabilitation 
and Restitution for Victims of Gross Violation of Human Rights, organized jointly by 
the Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission, Centre for Democracy & 
Development and Legal Resources Consortium from July 31 to August 3, 2001. The 
seminar provided an outlet for the various perspectives on reparation for victims.  
As robust as the suggestions and recommendations appeared, the 
Commission was hamstrung by numerous factors including financial constraints,78 
so much that the Oputa Commission was unable to achieve total justice and total 
reconciliation for victims of human rights violations in Nigeria. Guäker (2009)79 
argued that the Commission was a complete failure due to the non-release of its 
report. Kukah, who was a prominent member of the Commission, had a different 
view. He concluded that beyond the legal arguments canvassed by the government 
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to justify its refusal to officially publish the report of the Commission, the Nigeria 
state missed an opportunity to come to terms with its destiny. Continually, Yusuf 
(2007)80 blamed the many setbacks suffered by the Oputa Commission on 
bureaucratic red-tapisms while Akhihiero on his own questioned the 
constitutionality and powers of the Commission. 
Similarly, the expansion of the Commission as suggested by civil society 
groups would have enabled it to strike a balance between top-notch professional 
staff and political appointees on the Commission.81 This was part of Professor 
Yadudu’s argument when he contended that appointing one Moslem was not 
enough, considering the population of Nigerian Muslims and the sensitivity of 
religion in the country.  
Civil society groups also observed their exclusion and non-representation.82 
Thus, efforts to make the Commission appear as a reasonable group by expanding 
their membership proved futile. Indeed, they argued that a robust representation 
would have helped the Commission function effectively with its expanded mandate, 
based on the SATRC,83 from which the Oputa Commission drew comparative 
knowledge, composed of seventeen commissioners, appointed through a 
competitive and consultative process which involved civil liberty organizations and 
relevant sectors of society. 84 The implication here was there was an absence of 
total truth and reconciliation for victims of human rights violations.  
                                                          
80   Ibid. 
81   ANABA, E. (2001, August 8) “Why Oputa Commission Has Been Inactive”, Op.Cit.11. 
82  YADUDU, A.H. 2001, ’What Is Wrong With Oputa Panel?’ (Part Ii) Amana Online [Online]  
  Available http://www.Amanaonline.Com/Articles/Art_13.Htm 
83  FARLEY, M.K. 2008. Identity in Transition: Towards A Conceptualization of the Socio- 
  Political Dynamics of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Doctoral  
  Dissertation, University of Cape Town; ROSENBERG, T. 1999 “Afterword: Confronting the  
  Painful Past”. in MEREDITH. M., Coming To Terms: South Africa’s Search For Truth, 327.  
  Details in DUGGARD, J. 1997. “Retrospective Justice: International Law and the South  
  Africa Model”. in A. James Mcadams ed. Transitional Justice and Rule of Law in New  
  Democracies, 270. 
84   Amnesty International. Nigeria, Time For Justice and Accountability. London, UK:  
  International Secretariat, 2000. Available  




There were requests for additional commissioners in order to function 
effectively with its expanded mandate85 after the Oputa Commission86 and civil 
society groups conducted a comparative analysis of the structure of commissions 
in South Africa, Guatemala, and Chile. Thus, the agreed political structure should 
include a chairperson and a deputy chairperson based at the Commission’s 
headquarters in Abuja, as well as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) /Chief 
Accounting Officer (CAO) with the possible provision of an executive secretary to 
the Commission.  
Additional units suggested included a Legal Department, Research and 
Investigations Unit, Media Liaison Unit, and Logistic and Human Resources Unit.87 
These were aimed at facilitating the work of the Commission and decentralizing 
responsibilities to achieve set objectives. The legal and research units would 
advise the Commission from time to time on legal issues, as was the case with the 
judiciary (Supreme Court judgment) to clear the hurdles that could impinge its 
tasks. For instance, were the legal and research units in place, debates whether 
the Oputa Commission had legal instruments88 or whether a truth commission was 
entrenched in the Nigerian Constitution89 (Constitutionality).  
The pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Nigeria90 as to the legality of 
the Commission would equally have been settled long before the Commission 
commenced. It was clear that the Oputa Commission had an elaborate mandate91 
to achieve results, but the political will on the part of government, coupled with 
the legal issue of constitutionality, and prevented the Commission from 
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accomplishing truth and reconciliation. This also affected its report from being 
published for the consumption of Nigerians, whom it was meant for.  The 
contributions of interest group and civil society groups were commendable. 
However, the reason as to why some suggestions from stakeholders were not 
implemented was less understood. Perhaps it was to depart from being tele 
guided or being perceived as incompetent, faced with the task before it.  
A more plausible explanation was due to the fact that they were hindered 
by financial constraints, professional expertise, and lack of political will. In the 
same vein, reflecting on Kenya’s transition period, their commission registered 
self-defeat from commencement since it was reported that the agenda for TJRC 
was lost following the formation of the Government of National Unity on June 30, 
2004, through which the government embraced and brought on board some of 
the KANU leaders expected to be investigated by the TJRC. From then, the struggle 
for TJRC was left to public actions through forums, litigation, protests and petitions 
to the three arms of the government.92 
The overall effect was the inability of the Commission to attend to all the 
petitioners and their requests, particularly regarding compensation, reparation, 
and punishment.  
5.3  Views and perspectives on the Oputa Commission  
Media reports, published articles, and individual comments on the Oputa 
Commission not only generated information on the part of the government, 
military dictators-cum-judiciary and the Commission, but they enhanced our 
understanding by drawing from the lessons of the Oputa Commission. The Oputa 
Commission was meant to be a solution to Nigeria’s problems, but it was hindered 
by the powers of hegemony and manipulation of the judiciary.93 Yet Panter-Brick 
(1978) argued that the debates in 1970 to 1974 produced the famous “diarchy” 
formula, which would have allowed both military and civilian collaboration and 
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participation in democratic politics.94 The Commission was ready to publish the 
report for implementation, but as previously mentioned, the Olusegun Obasanjo’s 
government quickly supressed its publication.95 
 
5.3.1  Views of the Nigerian media 
 
It would appear that the Commission enjoyed wide media coverage and 
publicity at the beginning.96 In an exclusive interview with Tell Magazine dated 
March 19, 2007, the Chairman was asked the much-awaited question: ‘After 
working so hard on the Oputa Panel, would you say the report has been properly 
implemented’? He affirmed:  
Every government has the right to decide whether to publish [the 
report including findings and recommendations] or not. In this case it was 
supposed to be a panel held in an office, but the government decided to 
make it public so that Nigerians would know what was happening. We 
carried the people along with us, and everybody followed the happenings 
on TV and radio.97 
Extending the idea, Ikhariale (2008) noted:  
What happened during the hearings of the Commission was a lesson 
to all humanity. Yes, it was a huge entertainment for a people previously 
starved of fun for so many years. There were jeers, there were boos; and 
there were emotions as there were sophistries on free display. Never, since 
the days of Alawadakerikeri itinerant theatre, did ordinary Nigerians witness 
such a mammoth circus for free.98 
Ikhariale also posited that in the end all of the good, the bad, and the ugly 
lurking in the cloakrooms of military leaders were brought into the open for public 
scrutiny. Nigerians became aware of the horrible and disgusting foibles of their 
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leaders. Who can forget the shame that former General Oladipo Diya and others 
openly heaped upon themselves in the vain hope to use the Commission to 
whitewash their tears and blood-soaked uniforms, as facilitated by the lowly 
ranked, Major El-Mustapha?99 It was also scintillating because Nigerians wanted 
to see the faces of those who terrorised Nigerian citizens without remorse. It was 
also heightened by the fact that those accused of plotting coups100 were present 
to tell Nigerians about those who implicated them as well as those that 
contributed to the annulment of the 1993 election. The Chairman of the 
Commission in an interview revealed some of the findings and recommendations 
contained in the report: 
The annulment of June 12 was not the only allegation stacked against 
General Ibrahim Babangida. He is believed to have institutionalized 
corruption in the country during his eight-year rule. Babangida allegedly 
settled his political associates with money and positions through which 
some of them siphoned government funds to private pockets. The 
commission indicted him for the murder of Dele Giwa in October 1986. Even 
when the panel provided him [with] a platform to clear his name of all the 
allegations against him brought to the panel, he refused to attend the 
hearing despite the summons. A lot of Nigerians still remember those events 
vividly and hold him with suspicion.101 
General Ibrahim Babangida refused to appear before the Oputa 
Commission and cited the following reasons, “I went to court to stop the 
implementation of the Oputa Report because the death of Dele Giwa over which 
I was summoned had been politicized”.102 If this is the main reason why Babangida 
did not face the Commission to clear his name, one can argue that his reason was 
an excuse. This is because Odusete (2014) had observed that at the time it had 
also become visible to all Nigerians that the Babangida administration was 
                                                          
99  Ibid.  
100  Tell Magazine (2006, August 28), 21. See OLADIPO, D. (1999, October 25) “in thedock”,  
  News Watch Magazine, Vol.30, No.16, 8-11. 
101  OJEWALE, O. (2005, September 5) “Hunting For the Heir Apparent”. Tell Magazine, 20-21. 




massively corrupt.103 General Babangida was economical with the truth. 
Correlatively, Masika observed that the dubious political will for commitment to 
the process, severely undermined the perceived legitimacy and overall 
effectiveness of the TJRC104. 
This was why Chief Fawehinmi Gani argued that Babangida and his co-
accusers must present themselves before the Commission, as they could not be 
adequately represented by lawyers.105 He also added that, by refusing to honour 
the summons, Babangida had committed contempt.106 
The Chairman of the Commission stated that the three former heads of 
state were indicted for various offenses brought against them.107 They 
recommended to the federal government that all the former heads of state that 
failed to honour their summons to surrender their rights to govern Nigeria and 
Nigerians at any other time in the future.108 In the second chapter it was asserted 
by Babawale (2006) said that the politics of ethnicity, region and religion 
continued as evident in the frantic search for a democratic alternative109. This was 
entirely the environment through which the former was left to be judged by time. 
Chukwudifu Oputa in an interview with TELL Magazine dated September 5, 2005, 
asserts: 
The role of President Babangida in the issue (of June 12 annulment) 
is like the role of Pontius Pilate in the Bible....So, people who wanted the 
election annulled, people in the military, people in the business world, 
politicians, all of them, were instigated by these faceless group of people 
whose only motive was vengeance against the symbol of the 1983 betrayal 
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of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo. So, Babangida, in his own situation, 
found himself in the position of the biblical Pontius Pilate.110 
The above statement goes to show that General Babangida was simply 
used as a tool to annul the 1993 Elections because of the powers of hegemony and 
ethnic politics.111 Previously in chapter one, matters pertaining ethnic politics 
were rooted in the works of Ikime (ed.) (2012),112 Falola et al. (1989),113 Crowder, 
(1966),114 and Falola et al. (1991),115 Akpofure and Crowder (1966),116 Perham 
(1960),117 and Lugard (1922).118 
The assessment of the Oputa Commission by the Church was also 
commendable. According to This Day Newspaper dated September 15, 2002, with 
the headline ‘Catholic Bishops to Obasanjo Publish Oputa Report Now,’ after the 
Bishops Conference in Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasanjo was mandated to 
publish and implement the report of the Oputa Commission that had been 
submitted to his administration.119 
What does this imply or say about the Oputa Commission? It implied that 
the Commission’s report was accepted by all Nigerians and seen to be the solution 
to the myriad of problems confronting the nation. Thus, Maiska (2004) qualified 
this by stating that post-conflict reconciliation can therefore be seen as an attempt 
by individuals and local communities, supported by the international community, 
to put the past behind them and bring erstwhile enemies or opponents together 
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in a way that would heal the wounds resulting from long years of war, atrocities 
and impunity120. 
Also, This Day Newspaper dated November 10, 2004, reported that 
Reverend Father Hassan Matthew Kukah, who was a member of the Oputa 
Commission, asked the government to release the Commission’s report to prove 
its sincerity in correcting the wrongs in the country.121Added to the clarion call was 
the voice of Father George Ehusani, who pointed out in an interview with the 
Sunday Punch Newspaper dated February 13, 2005, that the Oputa Public Sitting 
was major national dialogue that had brought some recommendations. If we take 
the Panel report seriously, we do not need to set up more dialogue, because either 
we have a full sovereign national conference or we stay with this kind of report 
and look at what it is saying.122  
The effect of these calls began to heat the Nigerian polity to the extent that 
there were growing agitation for regional government,123 national conference,124 
constitution review conference125 and opposition national conference (PRONACO) 
by Chief Anthony Enahoro and civil society groups126 so that the voice of Nigerians 
would matter. 
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In the same vein, some Nigerians who petitioned for the Human Rights 
Investigation Commission (HRVIC), popularly known as the Oputa Panel, over 
human rights violations have blamed the present spate of political violence in the 
country on the non-implementation of the Oputa Report.127 The argument here is 
that Nigerians eagerly awaited the release and implementation of the report to no 
avail. Thus, there was renewed agitation for secession and hostility128 much more 
so than in the period before the inauguration of the Oputa Commission.129  
This development prompted eminent persons in the country to approach 
the government for a national conference130 and a review of the Nigerian 
Constitution for peace to reign.131 In light of the previous developments, it was 
evident that the media not only played an active role, but also closely followed the 
proceedings and the work of the Oputa Commission that was clearly in the 
interests of the Nigerian masses and the media supported the project.  
President Obasanjo was partly responsible for the non-implementation of 
the report. In the Vanguard Newspaper dated August 30, 2004, with the headline 
‘Oputa Panel: Matters Arising.’ The editor wrote: Did President Obasanjo and his 
administration set-up the Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission 
(HRVIC) determined not to implement the reports, 132or could they not help 
themselves? This is the question many meaningful Nigerians were asking. 
Nigerians who gave their time and efforts to the success of the Commission must 
have been worried that the President kept quiet and allowed the Oputa Panel 
report to gather dust in the archives.133 
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The views of General Mohammad Buhari (rtd) were also informative. In the 
Vanguard Newspaper dated, with the headline ‘I Won’t Appear before the Oputa 
Panel – Buhari.’ The former Head of State, Major-General Mohammad Buhari (rtd) 
declared on Friday that he would not appear before the Oputa Commission unless 
the law establishing it was reviewed.134 
Arguing for the release and implementation of the report, Justice Oputa 
posited in an interview with Punch Newspaper dated March 8, 2005, with the 
headline ‘Nothing Stops Government from Releasing Report on Rights Abuse’, 
that: 
Many people did not understand the ruling of the court in respect of 
the committee’s report. There was a court case, but I don’t think our people 
took the trouble to know what the court decided. The court did not say that 
the report should not be published. It said that the recommendations 
against certain people should not be implemented. The report of the 
commission is now in the archives and anybody who wants to see it can go 
and make photocopy of it.135 
If the argument rests on the legal instrument and the court ruling that a 
part of the recommendations should not be implemented, the question is: what 
part of the report should be implemented? This had been a much-awaited answer 
from the Nigerian government and the court-cum-former Generals. In The Punch 
Newspaper dated October 17, 2002, with the headline ‘Why We Haven’t 
Implemented Government Report’: 
The Federal Government on Wednesday in Abuja said it deferred the 
implementation of the White Paper on the Human Rights Investigation and 
Violations Commission because of court cases against the release of the 
report. The decision, according to the Federal Government was taken, for 
the second time, on the advice of the Ministry of Justice and Attorney 
General of the Federation, Mr Kanu Agabi. So, this deferment has nothing to 
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do with government’s readiness to implement the recommendation. It is 
only that we are to follow due process and respect rule of law.136 
Relying on the argument of Olusegun Obasanjo’s government, time had 
proven that they were hiding under cover of the court injunction;137 the real 
argument was that the government was not ready to implement the findings and 
recommendations of the Commission. However, just as the Chairman of the 
Commission hinted, “Every government has a right to decide whether to publish 
or not”.138 
 
5.3.2  Comments of individuals 
 
Many blamed the court and the government of Olusegun Obasanjo for 
failing to implement the Oputa Report in light of the foregoing comments of 
individuals and the position of government. These are pressing issues in the 
analysis of the lessons of the Oputa Commission in Nigeria.  
The views of Professors Babajide Tunde and Ndubuisi Francis provided 
interesting insights regarding the Oputa Commission. While Babajide Tunde noted 
that the bulk of the Commission’s work rested at the President’s table, who 
established the Commission,139 Ndubuisi contended that the government cannot 
implement the report on the basis of the fact that friends of government were 
indicted in the report, and the penalty of losing their prestige and honour was at 
stake.140 Similarly, Dr. Mba Christian pointed out that the government of Olusegun 
Obasanjo should not be blamed because he knew that Nigeria’s democracy would 
be threatened if the Oputa Report were ever to be implemented. After all, it was 
the same military dictators that handed power to him.141  Finally, Professor 
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Adeleke Ademola asserted that President Olusegun Obasanjo used the Oputa 
Commission as a smokescreen, so that European powers would re-admit Nigeria 
into the comity of nations.142 
Yoruba leader Ayo Adebanjo also provided a significant view. He posited 
that the Yoruba do not want monetary compensation, as no amount of money can 
adequately compensate for their losses, but they wished for a peaceful meeting 
to solve all contentious issues in the polity so that such atrocities will not happen 
to any ethnic group whatsoever in the future.143 Others underscored the need for 
the report to be translated and published in different languages with or without 
the consent of government, to enable Nigerians to digest the report and possibly 
pass judgment.144 The views of some Nigerians indicated that the Oputa 
Commission was a step in the right direction. Nobody has indicted the Commission 
for incompetence or shoddy work and this was another lesson for Nigerians. 
However, it was important to learn from Kenya’s transition since the TJRC 
established that victims had various ways of dealing with trauma and the suffering 
they had encountered. Some were willing to forgive due to their religious beliefs, 
the lapse of time since the violations took place, helplessness, and the desire to 
move on with their lives. Some victims showed sympathy for the perpetrators, 
acknowledging that they too were victims of a bad system. This calls to question 
whether any reconciliation had been realized in these cases.145 
The fact that the Oputa Commission indicted three former heads of state, 
perceived as the untouchables in Nigerian society, was a plus in the work of the 
Commission. In some circles, these authoritarian actors were said to possess 
impunity that could not bring them to justice by any individual or court of law. 
These were some of the early misgivings of the public on the efficacy of the Oputa 
Commission to achieve justice and rule of law for victims of human rights 
violations in Nigeria. These are some of the main issues in this chapter; they are 
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not only informative but also revealing in the sense that they offer understanding 
of the lessons of the Oputa Commission for Nigerians. 
5.3.3  Views of scholars in published works 
Perhaps published articles can offer insights into the work of the 
Commission and why implementation was difficult or failed.146  Guaker (2009), in 
her informative study of “Nigerian Truth Commission and why it Failed”, 
underscored the Oputa Commission was able to fulfil the main objectives despite 
the fact that it was under-funded. Though hampered by financial constraints it 
could only attend to 250 cases out of 10,000 petitions.147  
The author added that the Oputa Commission could have done better were 
its legal powers not withdrawn148 coupled with the Supreme Court 
pronouncement. Guaker affirmed that the Nigerian military was an incredibly 
powerful force on the political scene in the country.149 Furthermore, the author 
posited that the inability of the Commission to set up important departments and 
units that would have facilitated its work hindered its operations from achieving 
total success. More importantly, from her perspective, the Oputa Commission 
lacked international funding from countries and donor agencies that would have 
improved its financial capacity.150 
Records indicate that the Commission received a generous donation from 
the Ford Foundation. In Guaker’s opinion “a truth commission with generous 
resources is more likely to achieve the objectives stated in its mandate”.151Our 
take on Guaker’s argument was that the Oputa Commission failed because it was 
hampered by financial constraints and legal crisis. Thus, it was not able to attend 
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to most of the high-profile cases brought before it and problems of staffing, 
interpreters and translators.152  
The work of Adeyemo (2013) was also revealing.153 Adeyemo focused on 
the main reasons why the Commission failed or otherwise. Some points made by 
Guaker need not be rehearsed because they were sufficiently noted. However, the 
author pointed out that the HRVIC experienced both challenges and successes. 
The Commission had limited resources to carry out independent investigations 
and received limited international support.154As previously mentioned, past 
military heads of state and members of the military ruling class failed to appear 
before the Commission. Besides, the establishment of the Commission was even 
challenged as unconstitutional155 by some past military leaders.156 
According to Adeyemo (2013), the Commission did not achieve as much as 
what was expected of it, and this stemmed from the basis of its operation. The 
legality of the Commission had not been properly settled and its mandate was too 
narrow to effectively cover areas of human rights violations by past military 
regimes.157 Writing in the same vein, the author contended that, in the midst of 
the challenges, the Commission concluded its work and submitted its report to the 
president in May 2002, which was never officially released. Initially the president 
inaugurated an implementation committee upon receiving the report in June 2002 
to begin the process of implementation, but this was later dismissed on the 
grounds that the legality of the Commission had been challenged in the courts.158
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The Supreme Court (SC) overruled the Commission’s recommendations 
because the appropriate authority did not establish the Commission.159Therefore, 
there had been contention as to the true effect of the decision of the SC, but the 
decision of the federal government to not release or implement the report based 
on this decision was quite pretentious. The report was submitted in 2002 while 
the decision of the SC was in 2003. The decision from the Supreme Court did not 
restrain the government from implementing the recommendations.160 The report 
was, however, unofficially published by civil society. Therefore, its content was 
widely known today, despite the decision of the SC against the legality of the 
Commission.161 
The work of Ikhariale (2008) was also germane in our attempt to arrive at 
the challenges and current state of knowledge on the Oputa Commission and why 
it failed. The author argued without equivocation that “the Oputa Commission was 
neither equipped to completely find the truth about what actually took place nor 
reconcile the dramatic personae or anybody. But contrary to the general 
scepticism that greeted its establishment, the Commission… has, for all intents and 
purposes proved to be of some limited success”.162 
Corroborating the views of Adeyemi (2013) and Guaker (2009), Ikhariale 
(2008) added that:  
Firstly, the instruments setting it up were less than clear, a situation 
that created considerable doubt in the minds of the citizenry who had on 
many previous occasions been deceived by similar quasi-judicial bodies 
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whose printed reports are now materials only good enough for the 
ubiquitous guguru street hawkers. Secondly, the Commission, unlike the 
South African original, was inadequately equipped and characteristically 
underfunded and understaffed.163The above statement adequately proved 
that the Oputa Commission was beset with some challenges since the 
government refused to address the myriad of problems.164 
“The anxiety of the public for the release of the report containing the 
findings and recommendations of the Commission is therefore 
understandable”.165 Since the Commission formally submitted the Reports, it was 
the government’s responsibility to make use of its contents for the public, whose 
benefit it was supposedly created for, to accept and adopt the ‘new lease of life’ 
as prescribed by the Reports.166 Thus, failure to do so as Ikhariale (2008) 
underscored would mean that we would have wasted an opportunity to make 
amends, change our evil ways and heal our past as a people.167 On the issue of 
compensation, Ikhariale offered profound insight on its indispensability. He 
emphasizes that: 
Of all the issues that must come up in the aftermath of the Reports 
is that of compensation. Signs that it [compensation] would be contentious 
were given by the honourable Chairman when he hinted that the Panel was 
not particular about the form of compensation rendered to the victims as 
long as there is a semblance of it. President Obasanjo seems to have 
prematurely bought this argument, as he was also quoted as saying that 
there would be no monetary compensation stemming from the Oputa 
Report. I think there is a fundamental misconception here. Compensation in 
this context is not a "reward’ or a "prize" for going to jail and for enduring 
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or surviving torture and humiliation, but a moral gesture of our appreciation 
of the humanity of the victims that were denied in the process.168 
His narrative coincided with that of the TJRC: reparation was key to 
reconciliation. The commission posited that reparation conditions demanded 
from perpetrators were confession and apologies, justice, compensation, and the 
demand for a meeting with the alleged perpetrators in order to understand why 
they acted the way they did169. Ikhariale also raised other contentious questions. 
Firstly, what will happen to those who unlawfully violated the rights of fellow 
citizens? Secondly, what will happen to those who suffered from their acts of 
brutality? Thirdly, what is the obligation of the government to the victims? And 
finally, would there be amnesty for those whose conduct fell below the 
expectations of the Panel? The answers to these questions must be found inside 
the voluminous Reports.170  
The author concludes that it is not right, as the Panel Chairman and the 
President have insinuated that compensation for victims of human rights 
violations will not include monetary gestures…. He must therefore not forget that 
many others left similar jailhouses for their ruined businesses, shattered homes 
and irretrievably diminished personalities. Our submission was that there must be 
real compensation because the maxim of the law ubi uius ubi remedium (for every 
wrong, the law provides a remedy) was a hallowed principle of our constitutional 
process.171.  
Contrary to Kenya’s transition, some strides had been taken towards that 
cause, though not significant. Masika for example observes that to date, there had 
not been comprehensive reparations programmed in Kenya for gross human rights 
violations. Only some limited forms of assistance to victims had been afforded, 
and this has not been accompanied by any measure of accountability. The Kenyan 
government had made some minimal payments to a minority of all people 
displaced during the post-election violence of KSh. 10,000 and KSh. 25,000 
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(approximately US $117 and US $293 respectively). These payments were to 
provide basic needs and the reconstruction of homes. They had not been framed 
(or conceived of) in terms of reparations per se; rather, they have functioned as 
mere emergency assistance, and were far from comprehensive.172 
On the issue of apology, Ikhariale suggested that after the public apology 
must have been given, ostensibly in the official Gazette and in the media, a written 
official certificate confirming the text and spirit of that apology should be issued 
through the office of the Commission to all concerned. This suggestion was more 
than a mere exercise in bureaucracy. It was also about setting precedents in 
human rights protection and respect.173  
The media reports, individual comments, and published articles were 
comprehensive on the Oputa Commission. This demonstrated the wide range of 
publicity and attention the Commission received during the period under study. 
Perhaps this was due to the fact that the Commission was perceived as a catalyst 
for the resolution of socio-political problems facing the country.174 The general 
public also saw the Commission as a timely intervention after many years of 
prolonged military rule,175 which was characterized by gross violation of human 
rights176 and endless transition politics.177  
Therefore, having examined the views and perspectives of the media, 
Nigerian people and published articles, there was a unanimous agreement that 
the Oputa Commission was fraught with numerous challenges. These included the 
problems of funding,178 staffing, constitutionality, judicial tension, and military 
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overlord. These problems have conjoined to making the Oputa Commission 
ineffective in its work. Scholars had agreed that the mandate of the Commission 
was elaborate for the task, the same as the terms of reference considering the 
scope of the Commission’s investigation. This was further expressed by the 
Chairman: 
“The Commission was of the view that there was need to go 
beyond the Mandate, in search of pathways along which the project 
of nation building must proceed. This is more so, because the 
Commission is uniquely the best opportunity that Nigerians have had 
in several years to forge an informed understanding of their 
country’s past and to put in place the necessary foundational 
building blocks on which a new Nigerian nation would rest”.179 
There was the general thinking that the Obasanjo administration lacked 
the political will to implement the Commission’s report, thus hiding under the 
Supreme Court injunction.180 
It was also speculated in some quarters that Nigerian democracy was not 
only fluid but too young to step on military dictators who have just left power in 
frustration but waiting in the wings to see whether the democratic government 
would make policy errors that would lead to their incursion into politics. The 
findings and recommendations of the Oputa Commission that caused the non-
implementation of the Oputa Report by the Obasanjo administration will be 
discussed in the following section.181 
 
5.4  Structure, findings and recommendations of the report182 
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The military class was determined to scuttle the process since they 
perceived themselves as targets of the Oputa Commission. Consequently, less 
supportive governments had been known to reject the Commission’s findings 
altogether and even refused to release the report, but an affirmative government 
will actively pursue the implementation of the commission’s recommendations.183 
Guaker (2009) added that sometimes truth commissions can include 
recommendations for prosecutions in their report and sometimes their findings 
served as a preliminary foundation for further criminal investigation, but this 
depended on the political environment of the country.184 
5.4.1  Structure of the report 
The Oputa Commission is structured in six volumes with a conclusion.185  
The first volume drew attention to the historical extent for understanding 
not only the development of constitutional provisions for human rights, but also 
the violation of those rights in the country. It provided a theoretical basis for 
understanding and appreciating the burden of our colonial legacy and its 
implications for and impact on human rights violation in the country.186 
The second volume examined at considerable length the implications of 
the internationalisation or universalization of the core moral imperatives and 
values of the evolving international law and practice of human rights for Nigeria’s 
municipal law generally and more specifically for its human rights domestic law 
and practice.  
The third volume attempted to capture this neglected aspect of the 
country’s history and politics, summarising the findings of the commissioned 
researchers.  
The fourth volume dealt with the public hearings of the Commission, while 
the fifth volume focused on reparation, restitution and compensation. The sixth 
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volume presents the Commission’s findings and recommendations.187 
The Oputa Commission investigated a wide range of human rights violation 
committed during the military regimes from 1966 to 1999. The Commission 
concluded that the issue was not simple or straightforward. It discovered from the 
evidence tendered by representatives of various interest groups and communities 
that there were accusations and counter-accusations targeting particular 
communities, institutions, or groups. On the whole, it was indisputably clear from 
the evidence that the citizens of Nigeria generally believed they have suffered 
badly at the hands of successive governments in the country since its 
independence, although this was more pronounced under military rule.188 (24) 
Specific issues investigated include: (1) murders, (2) abduction, (3) torture, 
(4) harassment and intimidation, (5) prolonged detention without trials, (6) 
employment related cases, and (7) attempted assassination.189 
Since the recommendations were wide-ranging and far-reaching, it was 
appropriate that critical points be highlighted in this chapter. At the same time, it 
was instructive to note that the public hearings and arguments surrounding its 
operations have been discussed in Chapter Four of this study. As the Chairman 
asked: Which option should Nigeria choose? The answer is clear from the 
Commission’s mandate, its terms of reference and the President’s address at the 
inauguration of the Commission which stipulate: “Forgiveness and Reconciliation. 
Reconciliation was the key word in the President’s Address. Our quo warrant is the 
search for this reconciliation”.190 These were the rules that guided the 
Commission’s work in the quest for justice for victims of human rights violations 
in Nigeria. 
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5.4.2  Findings of the report191 
The Oputa Commission found a direct link between the military rule and 
gross human rights violation that left a stain in Nigerian history. Military rule 
marked the rapid descent of the country into anarchy and destruction.192 The 
report noted that military rule created an environment conducive to gross 
violation of human rights in two respects:  
1. Firstly, military rule violated the human rights of Nigerians to live 
under constitutional or limited government.  
2. Secondly, military rule militarized the country, creating in the 
process a climate of militarized fear and thirdly, the military turned 
their instruments of coercion on ordinary citizens.193 
The Commission also noted that military rule was a fundamental violation 
of the Nigerian Constitution. During the military regime, the leaders suspended 
relevant sections of the Constitution and replaced constitutional rule by decree. 
One of these degrees was the infamous Decree No. 2.194 
The findings also revealed that the State often refused to obey judgment 
of competent courts to the detriment of citizens’ rights as a creditor in breach of 
Section 287 of the 1999 Constitution.195 
It equally discovered that the Nigerian Police Force suffers image problems 
and institutional challenges due to the following: (a) poor service conditions, (b) 
lack of working tools, (c) Poor training, (d) Low morale under the military, (f) Lack 
of internal discipline, and (g) Lack of control and monitoring of weapons among 
policemen and women.196 
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5.4.3  The case against General Mohammad Buhari 
 
It was clear from the findings of the Commission that General Mohammad 
Buhari and the Director-General of the National Security Organization (NSO) were 
accountable for violating the rights of several Nigerians who were detained 
without trial, some of them include, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Solomon Lar, Alhaji 
Rafindadi, and others. There was also evidence from AL haji Umar Dikko that he 
was “crated” by the Buhari regime for onward transmission to Nigeria. A lot of 
Nigerians would remember the diplomatic tension this incident created between 
Nigeria and Britain during the period. It would be recalled that some of the 
Nigerian security operatives who took part in the kidnapping of Umar Dikko were 
thereafter sentenced to various jail terms in Britain.  
It was also discovered that both General Mohammed Buhari and members 
of his Supreme Military Ruling Council, along with the Attorney General, were 
indicted for the death of Kenneth Owoh and three others over allegations of drug 
involvement, without due trial by a competent court, thereby offending both rule 
of law and the African Charter of Peoples’ Rights. This demonstrated the level of 
impunity exhibited by the authoritarian regime in Nigeria. There was no gain in 
saying that the Buhari administration emasculated the masses, gagged the press, 
and suppressed their opponents and politicians. 
Nigerians recalled with deep regret that the Buhari administration 
established Special Military Tribunals under Decree No. 3 of 1984, called the 
Recovery of Public Property Decree.197 The Decree provided long prison terms for 
any person found guilty of abuse of office. It was this instrument that General 
Buhari exploited during his authoritarian regime to clamp down on freedom of 
expression and rule of law in the country. The Oputa Commission’s indictment of 
the regime was highly commendable in its own right. 
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5.4.4  The case against General Badamosi Babangida 
The Oputa Commission recommended that the Dele Giwa case be re-
opened for a thorough investigation and possible prosecution of perpetrators. This 
was a welcome development to the well-meaning Nigerians and patriots. It will be 
recalled that Dele Giwa, editor-in-chief of News watch, was killed by a letter bomb 
on Sunday, October 19, 1986, in his home at Ikeja, Lagos. Prior to his death, 
General Babangida’s security chiefs had accused him of gun-running and 
subsequently invited him to their office in Ikoyi, Lagos where he met with the State 
Security Service that interrogated him. Dele Giwa, then invited his lawyer, the fiery 
Fawehinmi Gani, and pleaded with him to follow up on the case as it was clear that 
the government was after him.  
A few days later he was killed by a letter bomb and Chief Fawehinmi Gani 
accused the government of his death. He particularly accused Colonial Halilu Akilu, 
then director of military intelligence and Lt. Col AK Togun, then deputy director of 
the State Security Service (SSS), as well as Babangida.198 Fawehinmi Gani 
approached several courts for justice but was stalled by authoritarian regimes until 
the establishment of the Oputa Commission. 
Fawehinmi Gani sought two reliefs: 1) that Akilu and Togun be prosecuted 
for the murder of Giwa, and 2) that the two principal suspects together with 
Babangida should pay N2billion compensation to Giwa’s mother, wife, children, 
and other dependants and relatives of Giwa. News watch directors asked the 
Justice Chukwudifu Oputa-led Human Rights Investigation panel for “an objective 
and rewarding review” of the case. It was on the strength of this review that the 
Commission invited Babangida, Akilu, and Togun to answer the charges brought 
against them.199 Unfortunately they rejected the invitation and proceeded to 
challenge the constitutionality of the Commission in court.  
After a thorough investigation, The Oputa Commission indicted the three 
men. The Commission said in its report: “We recommend to the federal 
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government that all the former heads of state who did not honour the summons 
be considered to have surrendered their right to govern Nigeria and Nigerians at 
any time in the future”.200 
The Oputa Commission also indicted General Babangida’s administration 
for squandering the oil windfall realized by the country during the Gulf War. He 
refused to defend this accusation. His negligence led to an economic 
disequilibrium and hyperinflation in the country. It also led to lock down of 
businesses and industries. A lot of Nigerians still remember those events vividly 
and hold Babangida with suspicion.201 It was the anxiety created in the minds of 
Nigerians that led to the agitation for a commission of inquiry to investigate the 
gulf oil windfall in Nigeria. The distinguished economist Pius Okigbo chaired the 
Commission. To date the Okigbo Report has not been released, but it was available 
to the Central Bank of Nigeria and some universities across the country. 
Similarly, it was equally found in the report that implementation of certain 
public policies, like the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by the military 
regimes, contributed to human rights violation. The reaction of Nigerians to SAP 
led to what came to be known in Nigeria as the ‘SAP Riots’. These demonstrations 
took place within and outside university campuses and some students and 
workers lost their lives in the process. It will be recalled that SAP was a regulatory 
economic policy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
introduced to the Nigerian government as a means of economic recovery, self-
reliance and self-sustained growth. SAP did not benefit the Nigerian economy; in 
fact, it had the opposite effect. 
Various prominent people include the renowned Nigerian economists, 
Professor Toyo Eskor, Chief Ola shore, Managing Director of the First Bank, and 
Chief Ayagi of the defunct Continental Merchant Bank opposed the idea of a loan 
from the IMF and World Bank. Nigerian women even protested the loan and took 
their vocal opposition on the streets. At first it gladdened the hearts of Nigerians 
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that General Babangida’s administration was becoming democratic in approach. 
Indeed, it was not long before the administration succumbed to the bidding of the 
IMF and World Bank executives by taking the loan.  
Consequently, the loan sparked riots in every state in Nigeria. The effect 
was the total collapse of the Nigerian economy due to the conditions set forth by 
the IMF. The impact of this was unemployment, an increase in the price of goods 
and services, divorce, armed robbery and the emergence of scam men, popularly 
known as ‘419’. The era also marked the beginning of the export of Nigerian 
women as sex labour across Europe.202 The fact that the Oputa Commission 
discovered that certain government policies were inimical to Nigeria’s 
development was testimony to its good work. 
5.4.5  The case against the late General Sanni Abacha203 
The government of General Sanni Abacha was found to be singularly 
accountable for the most heinous human rights violations. These violations 
included the brutal murder of Pa Alfred Rewane in Lagos, perceived by the 
authoritarian regime of Abacha and his cronies as an opponent of government, 
Mrs Kudirat Abiola, Alhaja Suliat Adedeji, Admiral Olu Omotehinwa, Ken Saro-
Wiwa and his kinsmen, and others. The regime was also found to be responsible 
for the serial bomb explosions masterminded by state security operatives, and 
general brigandage of the security services against citizens.  
All these atrocities and repressive measures against the Nigerian citizens 
provoked international sanctions against Nigeria.204 This was significantly 
correlated to Akinyeye’s (2003) examination of contemporary issues of 
international relations and the place of Nigeria in the wider world. 205 
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The evidence in the case against Abacha, as recommended in the report, was that 
the federal government re-open the case of the death of General Shehu Yar’Adua, 
who died in custody in prison in mysterious circumstances on June 4th, 1996. He 
was detained simultaneously with Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in a case of coup hoax 
by the Abacha regime.  Major Al-Mustapha and Lt. Col Ibrahim Yakassai had since 
been accused and stood trial for the killing of Shehu Musa Yar’dua. They were 
charged with administering a stupefying and overpowering substance through 
lethal injection and thereby killing Shehu Musa Yar’dua in detention.206 
Consequently, the evidence in this case was inconclusive and in the opinion of the 
Commission required further investigation. 
5.4.6  The case against General Abdulsalami Abubakar 
With respect to the death of Chief Moshood Abiola, the Commission found 
that there were still more questions than answers after the testimony of General 
Abdul salami’s Chief Security Officer. It was therefore important for the State to 
re-open this case along with that of the late General Sanni Abacha in order to lay 
some misconceptions to rest.  
This chapter was in support of the view of the media, which argued that 
the death of Abiola in detention had created a political quagmire. Nigerians 
became suspicious that those who did not want Abiola as president might have 
conspired to kill him.207 For this reason, it was recommended that the case be re-
opened for further investigation.  
5.4.7 The case and findings against the Nigerian Police Force 
The Commission also indicted the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). Similar to 
military, the NPF were accused of human rights violation. While there were many 
innocent and hardworking policemen and policewomen, the NPF suffered a 
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serious image problem in the country. For example, many atrocities committed by 
the NPF were documented in the publications of the civil liberty organisation.208  
From the evidence before us, the Commission is of the opinion that there 
is an urgent need to seriously overhaul most of the security agencies and also re-
orientate their staff towards imbibing and respecting the human rights of 
Nigerians and the values of democracy. 
 
5.4.8 The case and findings against public bureaucracy and human rights 
violation 
 
The commission found from its content and tone of the petitions that 
concern was expressed about religious, ethnic, gender and regional biases in 
government appointments, promotions and retrenchment. For example, there 
were allegations to the effect that certain senior officials tended to effect changes 
in their ministries along ethnic or religious lines.... Thus, the Commission members 
held that these allegations are disturbing, and it is hoped that the setting up of the 
Federal Character Commission will deal with this issue. 
5.4.9  Findings on national dialogue 
1) ‘’We believe that there is the need for Nigerians to have platforms from 
which to articulate their fears and grievances, beyond the present political 
party arrangements. These platforms need not be primarily national. The 
discussion can start from the words and local government councils to the 
states and then finally to the national level.... Their discussion could be 
summarized and finally tabled before the State assemblies, before they are 
forwarded to the National Assembly’’, the Commission advised. 
2) ‘’Since the idea of a Sovereign National Conference has become so chaotic 
and lacking in clarity, we believe that our alternative suggestion of a 
bottom-up, broad-based series of national seminars or palavers on our 
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country’s future political and constitutional structure, would not disrupt 
the current one’’, the Commission reiterated. 
5.4.10  Findings on resource generation and allocation  
1) While the Commission members commend the Federal Government for 
the progress that has been made by the creation of the Niger-Delta 
Development Commission, they believed more could be done. For now, 
the Commission should be closely monitored in terms of project 
conception and execution, with the local communities playing a central 
role in the execution and evaluation of the projects. 
5.5  Recommendations 
The recommendations of the Oputa Commission cantered on key issues 
militating against Nigerian society. These were matters that have remained 
worrisome over time and discussed in the media as well as civil society groups. 
The fact that the Commission deliberated on these issues and offered solutions 
demonstrated the determination of the Commission to social engineering of the 
Nigerian State. Some issues include:  
5.5.1 On the civil service209 
1) They recommend that, ‘the federal and state government, effect some 
fundamental changes to enable the Civil Service become responsible to 
the challenges of democratization’.210 
5.5.2    The issue of National dialogue/ constitution211 
(1) It is recommended that, ‘the items that were to be discussed at the 
proposed palavers could include the following: human rights violations, 
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basis for representation, resource generation/control, infrastructure, 
taxation, participatory democracy, identity (religion, ethnic, communal), 
constitutional rights, policing, crime prevention, etc.)212 
(2) And that, the National Assembly ought, as a matter of top most urgency, 
harmonise, in collaboration with the State Legislatures, the findings of the 
various Constitution Review initiatives, to bring into existence an 
acceptable constitution.213 
(3) It was recommended therefore that the Report of the 1997 Kayode Eso 
Panel of Inquiry on the Judiciary should then be released immediately.214 
The Oputa Commission fulfilled its mandate and terms of reference 
creditably, in that it probed highbrow issues that had plagued the country 
for nearly half of a century. It was a credit to the Commission that other 
individuals, institutions or organizations did not manipulate the 
Commission’s original mandate. The verifiable findings and 
recommendations attested to the fact that it was overwhelmingly diligent 
in the quest for truth and justice. Similarly, amidst the challenges of 
underfunding and lack of political will on the part of government, the 
Commission was able to unearth the case of Dele Giwa and the problems 
of 1993 Elections, demanding that General Babangida be held accountable 
for abuse. Justice was delayed but not denied. Consequently, Masika 
(2004) noted that the TJRC’s reconciliation efforts in Kenya were as old as 
the country‘s independence back in 1963.  
It further asserted that the commission was under no illusion that 
it could accomplish a task that had not been accomplished in almost half a 
century. This clearly (according to Masika) indicated that reconciliation was 
thus never really realized.215The findings and recommendations against 
the brutal regime of Abacha were also laudable.  
Furthermore, the evidence surrounding the deaths of Shehu Musa 
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Yar’dua, Kudirat Abiola and Pa Alfred Rewane, and others that were 
supposedly lost under the watch of authoritarian regimes were not only 
recovered but also legally reconstructed.  
Major Al-Mustapha, Colonel Ibrahim Yakassai, and their cronies 
had legitimately faced the law and had been incarcerated for over 10 years 
since their heinous crimes. In the same vein the facts that the death of 
Chief MKO Abiola could be re-opened and Abubakar’s regime should be 
held accountable are progressive. 
The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) was equally indicted as a brutal 
institution, with few exceptions. The testimonies of Nigerians found the 
police were regularly implicated in extortion, maiming, killing, and illegal 
detention of suspects. The fact that the armed forces were not spared 
shows the depths delved by the Oputa Commission to reconstruct a new 
Nigeria.  
Additionally, the recommendations of the Commission for a 
national conference or national dialogue was impressive even without the 
release or implementation of the Commission report, the National Political 
Reforms Conference report, the Justice Eso’s report on the Judiciary, Pius 
Okigbo’s report on the Gulf War oil windfall, and neither the Ken 
Nnamani’s Constitution Review Committee report. The non-release and 
non-implementation of all these reports show that Nigeria was in a political 
dilemma, hoodwinked by the forces of hegemony, impunity and ethnic 
politics.  
5.5.3   Human rights and civil/ moral education in schools216 
(1) The Commission recommended  
‘’a teasing out of the results of the Commission’s work, including 
some of the discussions suggested above, and making them part 
and parcel of the curricula in schools. It also recommended an 
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urgent return to civic/ moral education from Nursery to Primary, 
Secondary School and at tertiary level anchored on the principle of 
oneness and indivisibility of Nigeria.’’217 
(2) It was also recommended that, ‘’beyond the recitation of the National 
Pledge and the National Anthem, there is an urgent need for Nigerians to 
come to grips with the dynamics of their history’’.218 
(3) It was clear to the Commission that,  
‘’respect for human rights is a new concept in recent African 
political and social discourse’’ …. The Commission members 
therefore recommended that human rights education becomes fully 
integrated into the curricula of the military, police and other 
security personnel in the country’’.219 
5.5.4  Expanding the political space 220 
(1) The Commission recommended that the federal government and the state 
governments place a moratorium on the further creation of more states 
and more local government, and that such exercises were known to create 
more problems than they were designed to solve.221 
5.5.5  On religion and State 222 
While the Commission members were of the view that Sharia is an integral 
part of their religion and customary law, the criminal mattered. The federal 
government was inclined to act to make Sharia conform to all the international 
legal obligations Nigeria has subscribed to, as pointed out in volumes 2 and 5 of 
this report. 
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5.5.6  On the Nigerian military223 
(1) ‘’With effect from May 29, 1999, anyone who stages a coup must be 
brought to trial, no matter for how long and regardless of any decrees or laws 
they may have passed to shield themselves from future prosecution.224(2) The 
armed forces should be pruned down to a manageable size, while they should 
also review their method of internal discipline’’. 225 
 
5.6.  Referred cases for further prosecution and adjudication226 
(1)’’The Commission forwarded the cases of Chief Alfred Rewane and Alhaja 
Kudirat Abiola to the Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of 
Justice, who, in turn forwarded the files to the High Court of Lagos, where the 
cases are being prosecuted’’. 227 
(2) ‘’The Federal Government should open up the case of Dele Giwa for proper 
investigation’’. 228 
(3) ‘’The Federal Government should open up the case of Chief Moshood 
Abiola again for proper investigation in the public interest’’. 229 
(4) ‘’The Office of the Inspector-General of Police should be made to act 
expeditiously on the cases of murder that the Commission forwarded to it for 
further investigation’’. 230 
 
5.6.1  Recommendations against the three former heads of state231 
1) On General Muhammadu Buhari, 
i. ‘’the Commission is of the view that the General has a case 
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to answer in regard to the killing of three young men 
referred to in the petition brought by the Kenneth Owoh 
Family. There was overwhelming evidence to show that the 
execution of the three young men fell well outside the time 
frame allowed by the Decree under which they were tried. 
We therefore recommend that the General tender an 
unreserved apology to the families of the deceased. We 
equally hold accountable the Supreme Military Council of 
General Muhammadu Buhari that confirmed the brutal 
execution of the three young men. We therefore hold the 
then Supreme Military Council accountable’’.232 
2) On General Ibrahim Babangida,  
i. ‘’we are of the view that there is evidence to suggest that he 
and the two security chiefs, Brigadier General Halilu Akilu 
and Col A.K.Togun are accountable for the death of Dele 
Giwa by letter bomb’’. 233 ‘’We recommend that this case be 
re-opened for further investigation in the public interest’’.234 
3) On the government of General Abdul salami Abubakar, 
i. ‘’the case against him had already been well argued by one 
of the witnesses, Col Idenhere, who testified in the case. 
Although, he was not directly mentioned in the death of 
Chief Abiola’’, 235 ‘’the inconsistency in the testimony of his 
Chief Security Officer, Lt Col Aliyu, shows that the 
government of the day knows much more about the 
circumstances leading to the death of the Chief. We 
therefore recommend that that government is 
accountable.’’236 
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4) ‘’We recommend to the Federal Government that all the former Heads of 
State [who refused to appear before the Commission] be considered to 
have surrendered their rights to govern Nigeria and Nigerians at any other 
time in the future. It is left for Nigerians to judge’’.237 
It is clear from the above discussion that the Oputa Commission 
investigated a number of critical issues during the military regimes and 
arrived at detailed findings and recommendations. The Commission’s 
holistic efforts at uncovering the impunity of the era had the consequence 
of it being targeted by the military class in Nigeria. Similarly, the invitation 
and subsequent recommendations against the three former heads of state 
showed that there was no hiding place for those who abused human rights 
in Nigeria even though they were considered ‘the untouchables’. Indeed, 
recommendations on the atrocities, and impunity of military rule from 
1966 to 1999, were heart-warming because much of the atrocities have 
been overlooked for many years amidst agitation and clamour for their 
prosecution.  
The need for moral education and national conference were 
equally timely. The fact that the Commission had the mandate and 
leverage to invite the former heads of state explains the determination of 
the Commission to uncover past human rights violations in the country, 
and therefore the majority of Nigerians affirm that the Oputa Commission 
was the best dialogue Nigerians have had.  
More importantly, the Commission’s work on the case of the killing 
of Dele Giwa by a letter bomb, the murder of Chief Abiola, and the 
extrajudicial execution of Owoh and three others were significant. The cry 
for the release and implementation of the Commission’s report by civil 
society groups, the clergy, and the populace indicated that the Oputa 
Commission was not an “unfinished job” and “it did not fail,” but suffered 
travails and predicaments in the quest for justice and truth for victims of 
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human rights violations in the country. 
5.7  Evaluation and impact of the Oputa Report 
The work of the Oputa Commission had been succinctly examined by a 
number of scholars with varying results and findings, prominent among them 
Guaker (2009)238, Adeyemo (2013),239 Ikhariale (2008),240 and Yusuf (2007).241 The 
question is, did the Oputa Commission fail? Was it an unfinished job? Was it the 
failure of the Obasanjo administration to release and implement the report for 
public consumption and make a judgment? Or was it the constitutionality of the 
Oputa Commission and the injunction of the Supreme Court against the Oputa 
Commission to release and implement the report? Could the presumed failure of 
the Commission be traced to the powerful influence of past authoritarian regimes 
and ethnicity?242 These are critical questions that will guide our assessment of the 
Oputa Commission. This section evaluates the Oputa Commission and its impact 
on Nigerians and the nation in general. 
As a building block, it is appropriate that this chapter takes a position on 
the work of the Oputa Commission and its impact on the public and the nation in 
general. The Oputa Commission itself was not a failure; rather, the Obasanjo 
administration failed to issue a contestable legal mandate that worked against the 
release and implementation of the report. A combination of factors worked 
against the Oputa Commission in its attempt to achieve truth and reconciliation. 
The portrait of failure painted by some scholars against the Oputa 
Commission was not only elementary, but it was unjustified. This was because 
they over emphasized the mandate and terms of reference of the Commission 
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without a holistic understanding of the systemic and institutional failure of 
decades’ long military rule243 and autocratic impunity in Nigeria.244 Yusuf (2007), 
in “Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria,”245 
discussed about such impunity in chapter one. The authors also avoided the all-
important theory that change was not only difficult but challenging.’ Those are 
used to wielding power are more likely to resist change and progress at all costs 
and progress, even if that resistance would mean taking the entire society down. 
This is the predicament and travails246 of the Oputa Commission.  
More worrisome are the views of some scholars who jostled between 
failure and adequacy of the mandate. For instance, Guaker noted that the Nigerian 
Commission received an extensive mandate, which asked the Commission to 
investigate and report on the nature and causes of all gross human rights violation 
committed between 15th of January and 28th of May 1999.247 At the same time, 
the author added that in theory a mandate of this nature was in Nwagwu’s words 
“frightening”, particularly because it opened up to the plausibility of retributive 
justice.248 
What was the situation in Nigeria before the establishment of the Oputa 
Commission? Prior to its establishment, the Nigerian State was struggling with the 
challenges of ethnic politics and prolonged military rule, characterized by human 
rights violations, domination and authoritarian impunity.249 As Meredith (2011) 
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argued, “Thus forty years after independence, Nigeria presented a sorry spectacle. 
Wole Soyinka described his own country as the open sore of a continent”.250  
If it was assumed in some quarters that the Oputa Commission failed 
because of its weak mandate, the question was how weak the mandate? 
Moreover, some scholars attributed the non-release and non-implementation of 
the report to the mandate and explained it within the purview of underfunding, 
the time frame, and the legal powers. These are peripheral arguments and not the 
main issues. “The Powers of the Commission are contained in Tribunals of Inquiry 
Act Cap 447 which is its enabling Law. That law is clearly the Panel’s Magna 
Carta”.251  
It was also constituted by Statutory Instrument No.8 of 1999 as amended 
by the Statutory Instrument of No. 13 of 1999 in the exercise of all powers 
conferred upon him by Section 1 of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, 1990 ‘and all other 
powers enabling him on that behalf’”.252 This meant that “the president 
constituted the Oputa Panel in exercise of the powers conferred on him not only 
by Section 1 of the Act, but also in the exercise of all other powers conferred upon 
him enabling him on that behalf. The latter include the executive powers vested 
on the President by virtue of Section 5 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1999.253 
Therefore, one can conclude that the Commission’s mandate had vested 
powers and was complete and robust. The failure to release and implement the 
report showed that the authoritarian regime still maintained a lot of influence on 
the political scene, and they were perceived to be the target of inquiry; in this case 
they ganged up against the Oputa Commission using the court’s narrow 
interpretation of the mandate.254 This chapter will attempt to establish the facts. 
Firstly, it was the failure of political power on the part of Obasanjo’s 
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administration to release and implement the report that limited the Commission’s 
effectiveness. Secondly, the autocratic influence of past authoritarian regimes and 
their collaborators was still potent in the new democratic era. Thus, the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria acted as Pontius Pilate to nail down the Oputa Commission. It was 
a written script that the Supreme Court rehearsed, because of persistent 
institutional failure in silencing the Oputa Commission by declaring it 
unconstitutional and lacking in mandate.255 The Oputa Commission was an 
episode in the annals of Nigerian history, similar to colonialism256 that was seen in 
Obaro Ikime’s (2012)257 edited work in chapter two and the Nigerian Civil War, 
that both attempted to bring about political and social change in society. These 
agencies of transformation were significant and historic in nature because they 
helped to shape social and political questions in relation to Nigeria and Nigerians. 
Thus, these agencies were never overlooked in any major discourse on Nigeria’s 
political and social transformation and this was the position the Oputa 
Commission occupies in modern Nigeria. 
The report of the Oputa Commission was in the archives258 but it continued 
to inform public hearings, national debate, and reconciliation of past human rights 
violations. What was the general assessment of the Commission’s report and how 
had that assessment informed the people and the nation in general? According to 
Charles Oputa, son of Chukwudifu Oputa, “The Oputa Commission opened our 
eyes to all the atrocities of the past. It got people talking which was a good 
thing”.259 In The Sun Newspaper ‘Editorial’ dated May 11, 2014, with the headline 
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“Chukwudifu Akunne Oputa: Exit of a Legal Icon,” the editor wrote: 
The investigation of the Oputa Commission brought into the 
open some of the sordid deeds of past military dictators in the 
country, especially their abuse of power. The work of the panel also 
helped to achieve some measure of the reconciliation among 
aggrieved Nigerians. One useful lesson the Oputa investigative 
panel taught Nigerians is that the actions of our political leaders in 
office can still be questioned, even several years after leaving 
office.260 
These assessments were profound because they illuminated the general 
overview of the work of the Commission. It also assisted the public in 
understanding the lessons from the Commission’s findings and recommendations. 
Beginning with the first question, did the Oputa Commission fail?261 The answer 
was in the negative because it adhered to its mandate and terms of reference. 
These were the fulcrums upon which truth commissions revolved. Any attempt to 
exceed the mandate was perceived as arrogating powers of prosecution to itself; 
in that case it becomes the jury and prosecutor. The Oputa Commission did not 
tow this line but rather referred its findings and recommendations to government 
for further prosecution. While the designers of the Kenyan TJRC, and those who 
implemented its mandate, clearly learned from that mistake. There was also no 
question that the Kenyan Commission did not provide a strong counter example 
of how addressing violations of socioeconomic rights improves the ability of a 
society to move forward after a history of historical injustices and gross violations 
of human rights.262The Oputa Commission covered a lot of ground based on its 
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mandate, contrary to public assumption. This is corroborated in the Chairman’s 
comment:  
“The Commission was of the view that there was need to go 
beyond the mandate, in search of pathways along which the project 
of nation building must proceed. This is more so, because the 
Commission is uniquely the best opportunity that Nigerians have had 
in several years to forge an informed understanding of their 
country’s past and to put in place the necessary foundational 
building blocks on which a new Nigerian nation would rest”.263 
The main issues that impinged on the Commission’s report rested on the 
fact that past authoritarian regimes were still powerful and influential in Nigeria’s 
political space. They still occupied commanding heights and were consulted on 
critical issues of national importance by the new democratic regime. This gave 
them unlimited access to circulate and confer with the government of the day. For 
instance, Generals Buhari, Babangida, and Abdulsalami Abubakar were all indicted 
by the Commission’s report, but in the election of 2007 General Buhari contested 
and lost, but in 2015 he contested the national election for presidency and won. 
Were Nigeria to have been a nation of conscious, with strong institutions, he 
would not have been cleared to contest the election because he had an issue with 
the State, including Abdul salami Abubakar, who acted as umpire and go-between 
in the election that returned Buhari to power as a democratic president in 2015.  
On the other hand, it showed that Obasanjo’s administration had no political 
power to actualise the implementation of the report and this was why it has been 
consigned to the archives.264As a consequence of this development, there was 
renewed agitation and clamour for a national conference,265 political reform 
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review266, and regional government267 since the government refused to 
implement the Oputa Commission.  
Thus, the Nigerian State became engulfed in more trouble than the period 
before the Oputa Commission. Violence, clamouring for succession,268 impunity, 
and extrajudicial killing by law enforcement agencies brought further insecurity.  
Thus, This Day Newspaper dated March 5, 2003, with the headline 
“Disregard of Oputa Panel Report, Cause of Political Violence” noted that some 
Nigerians who petitioned the Human Rights Investigation Commission (popularly 
known as the Oputa Panel) over human rights violations had blamed the present 
state of political violence on the non-implementation of the Oputa Report.269 
Reasons that were cited already in chapter one, indicated refusal by government 
to publish the report as reported by Kukah, a commission member, Yusuf (2007) 
blame of red tape.270  
The impact of this development on the victims of human rights violations 
in the country was the total absence of justice, truth, and reconciliation. To date, 
the victims still clamour for compensation and reparation. The question therefore 
was how did the government respond to these agitations, since they were 
hamstrung by the court’s decision?  
On February 21, 2005 the Obasanjo administration began indirectly 
implementing the recommendations of the Oputa Commission by inaugurating 
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391 members of the National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) in Abuja.271 The 
members feared that the report of the Oputa Commission would not be released, 
so they extracted assurances from government that the report would not be 
jettisoned into the archives272 without implementation.273 
Deep misgivings about the government’s intention led to the inauguration 
of the Pro-National Conference (PRONACO) by opposition groups, which was led 
by Chief Anthony Enahoro.274 Unfortunately, the government undermined the 
process by appointing some of their members in the NPRC at the last minute. The 
NPRC was chaired by Justice Niki Tobi, a Supreme Court judge, and members 
included Justice Chukwudifu Oputa, Sunday Adewusi, a former Inspector of Police, 
Joseph Wayas, Professor Idachaba and John Wash Pam, to mention a few.275  
Because of the fate suffered by the Oputa Commission, the Adviser to the 
President on Political Affairs, Professor Jerry Gana, “gave the assurance that the 
recommendations of the conference would be fully implemented”.276 Yet, the 
NPRC produced its report and a new draft constitution to the government but 
could not assuage insurgency, ethnic agitations, and political lop-sidedness. The 
Punch Newspaper dated May 26, 2014 aptly corroborates this.  
Some Nigerians are too angry at the country and would rather 
destroy it. What exactly is making them angry? Is [it] something we 
can assuage or redress? However, young Nigerians are trying to 
break out of this mould but when the harsh realities of the Nigerian 
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life confront them, they recoil to their shells. Essentially, the core 
issues we need to address include the structure and form of 
government, wealth creation and revenue sharing, devolution of 
powers, citizenship, residency rights, land use, policing, the role of 
religion in politics, and others.277 
It was for this and other reasons that President Good Luck Ebele Jonathan 
in 2014 inaugurated another set of 400 members for a national conference in 
Abuja. It can be said of the NPRC, headed by Justice Niki Tobi that it also part of 
the recommendations of the Oputa Commission’s report.  
Other committee reports yet to be implemented include: the 1999 
Constitution Review Committee chaired by Senator Ken. Nnamani; the Justice Eso 
Judicial Panel of Inquiry, recommended for implementation by the Oputa 
Commission; and the Pius Okigbo Report on the $12.5 billion Gulf Oil windfall 
under President Badamosi Babangida’s regime.278 It is for this reason that Ibim 
Semenitari called these reports ‘A Conference of Hidden Agendas.’279 This was due 
to the effect of ethnic politics, hegemony and the struggle for resource control.  
The success of the Oputa Commission can be located in its findings and 
recommendations. The report indicted the Babangida administration for some of 
his human rights violation and over alleged squandering of the oil windfall realized 
by the country during the Gulf War.  
The panel also blamed his government for the murder of Dele Giwa in 1986 
through a letter bomb. A lot of Nigerians still remember those events vividly and 
hold him with suspicion.280 Other issues trumped-up by the Oputa Commission 
that have been addressed include the five drivers of the economy, namely sector 
reform, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, security and job creation.281 
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5.8  Lessons of the Oputa Commission 
The lessons of the Oputa Commission cannot be ignored in a detailed study 
of this nature. This was because of the manner in which the Nigerian public 
embraced the idea of a truth commission to resolve the myriad of issues on human 
rights violations and bring the perpetrators to justice. Nigerian people followed 
the programme on national television and other media outlets.282 This chapter 
demonstrates that the Oputa Commission not only contributed to the political and 
social history of Nigeria but offered lessons on the existence and social integration 
of Nigeria.  
The Oputa Commission first and foremost can be viewed as an episode in 
Nigeria’s political and constitutional engineering. It can also be viewed from the 
prism of historical deep-rooted contradictions generated by conflict and 
cooperation among various peoples and social movements in the country, dating 
back to pre-colonial times.283 Fundamental to this study on that period were the 
works of Falola et al. (1989),284 Crowder, (1966),285 and Falola et al. (1991),286 
Akpofure and Crowder (1966),287 Perham (1960),288 and Lugard (1922),289 as 
observed in chapter one and the following discussion on pre-colonial and post-
colonial periods. The setting up of the Commission was an attempt to lay the 
groundwork for enduring and sustainable peace and development in the country, 
founded on the concepts and principles of human rights, equality, justice and 
reconciliation.290  
What was the Oputa Commission set up to do? Inaugurated on 14th June 
1999 by President Olusegun Obasanjo, the Commission was primarily established 
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to investigate the causes, nature, and extent of gross violation of human rights in 
the country from 15th January 1966 to 28th May 1999. To determine the persons, 
authorities and institutions to be held culpable and their motives, as well as the 
effect of such gross violation on their victims, and to determine whether such 
violation was part of State policy, or the policy of its organs.291As an extension of 
the above, the mandate and terms of reference also capture the address of the 
President, which says to pursue a policy of openness and transparency in the 
conduct of government business. To “heal the wounds of the past...to put the ugly 
past behind [us], and to achieve complete reconciliation based on truth and 
knowledge of the truth in our land,” and to “reconcile the injured and seemingly 
injured with their oppressor or seeming oppressors”.292 
Where did the Oputa Commission go wrong in its work?  It is important to 
state, as has been pointed out elsewhere in this study, that the Oputa Commission 
fulfilled its terms of reference in its judgement.293 In trying to protect past 
authoritarian actions, the SC emphasised the individual rights of witnesses 
summoned, finding that the Commission infringed upon these rights,294 
particularly in its attempt to compel witnesses to appear.295 It was gratifying to 
know that the Oputa Commission did its work meticulously and objectively by 
arriving at surprising decisions that informed its findings and recommendations.  
This was also corroborated by Yusuf (2007): “The failure of the process 
derived not from the any major deficiency in the work of the Commission but 
largely from external factors, chiefly amongst which was a lack of sincerity on the 
part of the initiating regime”.296 Drawing on Guaker (2009), it was obvious that an 
affirmative government would actively pursue the implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations, while less supportive governments on the other 
hand have been known to reject the Commission’s finds altogether and even 
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refuse to release the report.297 The staggering revelations in the report, especially 
that of Dele Giwa, Chief MKO Abiola, Kudirat Abiola, wife of Chief MKO Abiola, 
who was murdered on the street of Lagos, including the extrajudicial killing of 
Shehu Yar’dua, Mr Owoh and three others, showed the Commission laboured to 
uncover the atrocities of past autocratic regimes in Nigeria.298  Other 
recommendations revolved around the annulment of the June 12, 1993 elections 
by the Babangida administration, the vexed issues of nation conference, 
constitution review and pruning of the military, which gave Nigerians the 
confidence to demand the release of the report of the Oputa Commission.299 
The public hearings did not cover enough ground; out of about 10,000 
petitions, it only attended to 250 petitions.300 This figure in itself was minimal 
because many victims of human rights violations were excluded from the 
Commission. It was an enduring lesson for Nigerians and perhaps nations in 
transition. This went to support the evidence that the Commission was grossly 
understaffed, as pointed out by some scholars, stakeholders, and civil society 
groups. It was also established that the Oputa Commission was not well equipped 
to extract truth from either the victims or perpetrators of human rights 
violations.301 Yusuf’s view is corroborated by the Commission, as follows:  
“This is not to deny that public hearings are inherently 
problematic. For example, during our public hearings in Abuja, Lagos 
and Port Harcourt, alleged perpetrators of human rights violations 
blatantly denied the human rights violations and violations alleged 
against them by their victims and families. To this extent, it was not 
possible or easy to extract from some alleged perpetrators the 
measure of remorse and plea for forgiveness so vital for forgiveness 
and reconciliation to take place”.302 
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The Chairman also stressed that all was not lost, because public hearings 
still had their redemption. Thus, denials made no difference to the facts. When so 
many witnesses from different ethnic and geographical backgrounds allege 
unlawful arrest, illegal detention, and torture against the same set of persons or 
security agencies, such witnesses cannot be all be lying, and the alleged 
perpetrators cannot all be witnesses of truth. In such situations, the Commission 
had to read between the lines.303 This is a lesson of morality and ethical restraint 
in the operations of Nigerian security agencies and those who abuse human rights. 
The public hearings were compounded by a lack of interpreters and 
secretaries who could have efficiently transcribed witnesses’ statements for the 
Commission. The challenges of office space and integration of the Oputa 
Commission into the Civil Service Commission brought to the fore the problems of 
public service, inadequate space for operations, and dedication to duty. It equally 
led to the issue of limited membership of the Commission because there were no 
top-notch officers.304 These challenges impinged on the Oputa Commission to 
achieve reconciliation, truth and justice. In all, the greatest challenge faced by the 
Oputa Commission was underfunding305 and lack of political will on the part of 
government.  
The lesson of underfunding was palpable during the period, though most 
truth commissions had experienced financial constraints in the course of their 
work. For instance, the truth commissions of Uganda, Rwanda, Chile, Ghana and 
South Africa were no exception and perhaps this arose from the fact that 
transitional justice was expensive in nature, or that the governments that 
established them really had no interest in properly funding them. The Oputa 
Commission was therefore no exception, as it was known to have experienced 
shortage of monetary resources that would have effectively assisted its 
operations. The situation became worrisome when it was published in the media 
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that the Commission was unable to pay the salaries of workers and travel expenses 
and the printing of draft reports.306 
The lessons of the Oputa Commission for Nigerians cannot be ignored, 
particularly those who followed the proceedings on national television and 
radio.307 The revelations and confessions of victims on how their loved ones died 
at the hands of security operatives, including those left to die of bullet wounds 
including journalists, 308brought tears to the eyes of observers, panel members, 
and the audience.309 Also revealing was how victims of human rights violations 
confronted their abusers in the public domain, leaving them with smiles of 
contempt. Here they reminded them of their actions and heinous crimes against 
other victims who were with them in the same detention camp.310 Others had the 
privilege of knowing how their loved ones had died in the hands of their 
oppressors.  
The lessons and impact of the Oputa Commission were also visible in the 
settlement and reconciliation of warring communities such as the Maroko 
evictees,311 the Modakeke and Ife’s long-standing feud, as well as Arewa and 
Ohaneze disagreements.312 More importantly was the invitation and summons of 
the three former heads of state, though they declined to appear. Nevertheless, 
the recommendations against them were still in the archives of history. This 
singular act, that the Oputa Commission had touched the untouchables, 
gladdened the hearts of Nigerians. It was this action that compelled the three 
former heads of state and their collaborators to seek judgment in court.313 
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If the report of the Oputa Commission was not a ‘living document’ and had 
no lessons, why did President Olusegun Obasanjo submit a copy to members of 
the Political Constitution Review and request they made it a part of the ‘working 
papers’ for the conference?314 Why did the cleric request the president to release 
the recommendations of the Commission?315 And why was the Oputa Commission 
seen as the best national dialogue ever had in Nigeria?316 Nevertheless, these were 
impressive contributions by the Oputa Commission, and its quest for pan Nigerian 
agenda, reconciliation and justice for victims of human rights violations in Nigeria. 
At the national level, what did the Oputa Commission trump up, or how did it 
affect the Nigerian political space? 
Would it have been possible for the Oputa Commission ensure justice 
through the provision of compensation and reparation? The answer laid in the 
affirmative because it would have alleviated the pain of victims, even though some 
victims claim it could not have done anything. The Afenifere socio-political-cultural 
group and Chief Ayo Adebanjo, claimed that the Yoruba did not want any 
monetary compensation, but they requested a friendly meeting to solve all 
contentious issues in the polity, so they would not happen to any ethnic group 
whatsoever in the future.317 Nevertheless, this chapter demonstrated that the 
position of the Oputa Commission, in relation to material and monetary 
compensation, was a huge lesson to be learnt because it watered down the zeal 
of victims.  
The fact that the Commission rendered compensation and punishment, a 
neglected theme of its mandate,318 made the Commission lose aspects of its 
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credibility, as compensation was paid elsewhere in South Africa, Guatemala, Chile, 
and Rwanda, where they drew their comparative analysis.  
Ethnic sentiment made payment of compensation and punishment 
impossible because it was feared in some quarters that victims of the 1966 
Nigerian Civil War,319 predominantly Igbo and Hausa, would present themselves 
for compensation for what they suffered. As such the Commission’s lean budget 
would be depleted in the face of complaints by victims of human rights violations, 
and in the face of the cry of government for money to execute its immediate 
projects. According to TELL Magazine dated July18, 2005:  
By 1999 when the democratic government of Olusegun Obasanjo 
took over, the nation’s debt figures were an estimated $27.09 billion. 
Despite loan repayments the debt continued to mount up to $30 billion 
before the Paris Club reprieve. Much of this money, says Okonjo-Iweala, 
the then Minister of Finance, comes from penalties and interest. And all 
that the country has been paying off in real terms has been the interest, 
with the principal still intact. 320 
Records indicated that the majority of the petitioners who submitted 
petitions before the Oputa Commission and those that actually testified at the 
public hearings were emphatic on reparation for the abuse they suffered.321 Most 
of the victims suffered untold hardship during unlawful detention,322 torture as 
well as other unjustified human rights violation by the State Security Services 
(SSS).323At the same time, victims lost their economic base and other sources of 
livelihood while in prison custody. Others suffered dementia and divorce.324 For 
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instance, Chief Abiola was one of the richest Nigerians; he was involved in the 
media as the owner of the Concord Newspaper, Abiola Bookshop, Abiola Farms, 
Berec West Africa Ltd, producers of Berec Batteries and other businesses. 
5.9  Truth – reconciliation and compensation 
The Oputa Commission was primarily set up to pursue reconciliation and 
justice in Nigeria after many years of authoritarian regimes. One of the hardest 
things in conflict resolution and peace building, even in traditional society, was 
total reconciliation. Thus, the culture and spirit of wrestling bouts, festivals, 
solemn oaths, trade and marriages were employed between and among 
communities emerging from feuds as a guarantee of total peace during the period. 
If the Oputa Commission had the objectives and mandate to pursue a 
policy of openness and transparency in the conduct of government business, heal 
the wounds of the past, achieve complete reconciliation and reconcile those 
seemingly injured with their oppressors325, how far did it progress in achieving 
these goals? 
Achieving total reconciliation, truth and justice in a divided country was a 
herculean task. Especially when some groups believed that the country belonged 
to them and further, compounded by deceit and intrigue. The Oputa Commission 
aptly captured this:  
Yet Petition No.1648 submitted to the Commission by Oha-
na-eze Ndigbo and the responses to it by the Arewa Consultative 
Forum, the Joint Action Committee on the Middle Belt, the Afenifere, 
the South-South and the Government of Rivers State, Ogbakor-
Ikwere Convention provide telling illustration of how divided we are 
as a country and of how suspicious and afraid we are of one another. 
What is clear from this is that the various ethno-communal groups in 
the country, including the major ones, complain of marginalization 
in the scheme of things.326   
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This cogently explained the predicament of Nigeria and the travails of 
leadership in an emerging democratic society. What do we make out of a situation 
where information generated through official conferences and panels on how the 
country can live in peace was gathering dust in the archives and shelves of various 
universities without its findings and recommendations being implemented? How 
then can we confidently articulate the work of the Oputa Commission and further 
explain its pursuit of total reconciliation?  
According to some Maroko residents, genuine reconciliation was not 
possible in an atmosphere of lies, remorseless, and unrepentant attitudes towards 
those who suffer human rights violations.327 They contended that people's rights 
had been blatantly violated and concluded that genuine reconciliation must 
involve some form of restitution, "justice", and "adequate" compensation.328 On 
the other hand, the Afenifere group questioned how much compensation would 
be needed to address injustice and manipulation against the Yoruba ethnic group 
in Nigeria. Thus, records indicated that they never asked for compensation but 
instead truth and justice.329 
Nevertheless, the Oputa Commission did its best within the scope of its 
mandate and terms of reference to pursue reconciliation. Some major 
achievements include reconciling the quarrelling communities of Maroko Village 
and Lagos State, the warring Ife and Modakeke communities in Osun State, where 
the people had to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and a Joint Declaration 
to live in peace and harmony, and to adopt a peaceful means of pursuing their 
respective rights and entitlements. 
In the same vein, the Oputa Commission succeeded in brokering a Peace 
Accord among the warring factions and groups in Ogoni land, Rivers State. In 
particular, the Commission managed to unite and amalgamate the Ogoni Four and 
the Ogoni Nine into the Ogoni Thirteen. This was corroborated by the New 
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Nigerian Newspaper ‘Editorial’ dated February 16, 2001. “The Peace Accord signed 
by the warring factions in Ogoni land…will go down in the socio-political 
development of this country as one of the landmark achievements of the Human 
Rights Violation Investigation Commission”.330 
Another great achievement was the reconciliation of the embattled 
Umuleri and Aguleri communities in Anambra State. This was an age-long feud in 
which not less than ten thousand inhabitants and strangers had been killed. The 
state and federal governments in conjunction with the Boundary Commission had 
tried repeatedly to solve the problems but to no avail, due to the government’s 
insincerity, until the Oputa Commission came on board.  Therefore, was peace 
achieved and was the reconciliation effort of the Oputa Commission sustained 
thereafter? The answer was in the affirmative, but the Oputa Commission could 
not possibly attend to all petitions of other warring factions in Nigeria.  
It was clear from the above discussion that the Oputa Commission 
achieved some element of reconciliation among warring communities in Nigeria. 
This success has made a lot of scholars acquiesce to the fact that the Commission 
would have achieved me if it had received adequate support from the 
government. 
On the issue of compensation, some Nigerians thought that reconciliation 
could not be complete without compensation. Thus, victims of human rights 
violations and others had great expectations about how the Commission could 
help them financially, psychologically, and medically to overcome trauma.331  
In view of emerging reports and pressure for reparation and compensation 
for victims, the Commission clearly stated that it had no powers to pay them 
compensation directly, only to make recommendations. The Chairman reiterated:  
“During the public hearings, it was observed that almost all 
petitioners wanted some form of compensation and/or reparation”.332 
What is more, he added, “we need to underscore the fact that no matter 
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how we may try, there can be no adequate compensation for life, but there 
is consolation when those in power or the perpetrators at least 
acknowledge the truth of the loss and sufferings of victims and their 
families”.333  
The Chairman added: 
“This attitude will facilitate both the process of national 
reconciliation and ensure the guarantee and protection of 
individual and communal rights of citizens. Following this, we 
recommend that all the presidents between 1966 and 1999 should 
apologise for all human rights violation that took place during their 
tenures. Failing this, the president should apologise on behalf of his 
fellow former heads of state”.334 
The Commission indicted some past authoritarian heads of state, and 
perhaps their pride and identity would not give them the space to apologize, and 
so perhaps the president could do that for them. After all, he was complicit in the 
authoritarian regime that caused human rights violations in Nigeria. Records 
showed that payment of compensation was a mark of outright judgment and 
prosecution, thus the report stated that reparation and compensation are largely 
a consequence of the establishment of guilt and responsibility.335 The 
Commission’s public hearings, according to the draft report, were not victim 
hearings, as such. Thus, the issue of reparation and compensation became 
problematic. For example, there were ethical-philosophical questions, which we 
also needed to pose.336 What really constitutes compensation and how do you 
compute it? Was compensation such an important component in reconciliation? 
How much compensation is enough compensation? Who determines whether 
compensation meets the standards? Who sets the standards?337 How do you 
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compensate for life or injury (whether physical, psychological or structural)? How 
can you even quantify it?338 
These questions, according to the Chairman of the Commission, “might on 
the surface sound escapist or abstract, but they are important if we are to take 
these concepts with the seriousness they deserve”.339 This volume of the draft 
report was important, even if it underscored the fact that in the final analysis, in 
determining arbitration and arriving at the knowledge of the truth, attribution of 
guilt, and admission of guilt are part and parcel of the compensation. Many sought 
and expected from a Commission of this nature.340  
The above discussion had shown that compensation, reparation, and 
punishment were often drivers of the transitional justice mechanism. The absence 
of these factors made any truth commission an absurd gathering. The challenges 
faced by the Commission no doubt stand as a lesson to Nigerians in many ways.  
First, the Oputa Commission encountered budgetary and infrastructural 
needs that affected its operations.341 This was because it was underfunded by the 
government that established it, consequently it was unable to meet its obligations 
and staffing needs, particularly in administrative areas, personnel requirements, 
and organisational structure which greatly hampered its efficiency.  
Second, there were misgivings about the efficacy of the Commission due 
to the absence of compensation, reparation, and punishment for victims and 
perpetrators.342 These factors prevented many people from attending the 
proceedings, which invariably affected the audience watching on national 
television and other media. The effect of this development was the criticism of the 
Commission as a government’s model of truth to divert peoples’ attention away 
from reality.  
Additionally, the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Nigeria on the 
illegality of the Oputa Commission watered down the interests of the majority of 
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Nigerians and the SC supported its case on the grounds that the Nigerian 
Constitution had to make provision for a truth commission. This declaration of the 
court and attendant reactions of legal luminaries and civil liberty organisations 
dashed the hopes of Nigerians.  
The questions Nigerians were asking included:  what legal instrument(s) 
established the Commission and where was the Supreme Court of Nigeria to 
advise correctly on these important matters before the Commission was 
established? This showed how deep-seated Nigerian problems were, and how 
politically, socially and morally divisive the nation has been and still remains today. 
It was also indicative of the fact that the Oputa Commission was not the right 
model and no single theory of what a truth commission is meant to be can solve 
the nation’s problems. Nevertheless, the Oputa Commission filled a very 
important gap in the transitional justice mechanism in Nigeria.  
This chapter discovered that material and monetary assistance are not only 
prospective ideas but also a necessity, because they go a long way in alleviating 
the problems of victims of human rights violations.  Many victims as well as 
survivors were in dire need of financial assistance to make ends meet, or even seek 
medical treatment for injuries sustained in custody. 
Indeed, a few questions will illuminate our understanding here. Firstly, 
what lessons can nations emerging from conflicts and human rights violations 
learn from the Oputa Commission as a transitional justice mechanism? How can 
human rights violations be redressed when the Commission’s report remains 
unpublished, despite agitations from the civil society and its affiliates?343 The 
clarion call, perhaps, was to avail Nigerians of the opportunity to digest the report, 
draw conclusions and move the nation forward.344 Secondly, does the nation, 
desirous of a model, have similar experiences with Nigeria in terms of 
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composition, ethnicity and prebendal politics? This is important because they 
contributed largely to the factors and forces that prevented the nation from 
achieving total reconciliation and truth.345 
Thirdly, were the nation’s problems rooted in a colonial strategy of divide 
and rule and did it suffer from transitional politics of the military and its coup 
culture? Additionally, to what extent was hegemony and interregional struggle for 
federal resources346 the bedrock of the nation’s corruption and under 
development?347 These issues are critical to any nation trying to replicate the 
Oputa Commission, because it functioned along this paradigm, which helped stall 
the results and effects of the Commission’s findings. 
Symbolic reparation is one of the theories of the transitional justice 
mechanism. It has been exploited by a number of nations with varying outcomes. 
It is a veritable tool in not only assuaging victims, but in making their families 
eschew bitterness of revenge and further conflicts. It makes aggrieved parties 
believe that their efforts were not in vain, particularly when their names are 
engraved on monuments, their birthdays celebrated, or important streets and 
highways are named after them. Since the Oputa Commission suffered from 
paucity of funds to pay compensation and reparation, as pointed out by the 
Commission,348 it would have been ideal for the Commission to name important 
places, parks, public buildings, colleges and libraries after victims of human rights 
violations in remembrance of their collective suffering. 
Symbolic reparation could take the form of celebrating and remembering 
victims’ birthdays or deaths, as well as acknowledging those who died in the 
struggle.349 The need for government to recognize the sufferings of victims of past 
human rights violations is paramount because some of them paid the ultimate 
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price with their lives. To mark their suffering, a national holiday could be declared. 
The naming of monuments (buildings) such as stadiums, halls350, hospitals, 
schools, bridges, and streets and road junctions is another appropriate form of 
remembrance. Unfortunately, the Oputa Commission overlooked this alternative 
means of peace building and transitional justice settlement.  
It is therefore instructive that nations in transition should consider 
reparation, whether it is material, symbolic or monetary compensation. This 
would go a long way in alleviating the plight of victims of human rights violations. 
It is also imperative that outside help and assistance should be sought before, 
during and after a truth commission, since this wealth of experience would make 
a great difference in the Commission’s quest for justice and reconciliation.  
5.10  Oputa Commission and truth recovery 
In every truth commission the questions of truth, recovery and total justice 
are never ending. This can be compounded by denial and lack of scientific evidence 
to arrive at the absolute truth and lies. However, the fact that total truth and 
justice cannot easily be extracted from victims and perpetrators does not mean 
that the work of a truth commission should be rendered useless, ignored or 
jettisoned.  Distinguished scholars, such as Professors Ayodeji Olukoju and 
Akinyele Taiwo, are of the view that truth commissions are mere gatherings and 
the necessary instruments to recover truth are vital.351 But when viewed from 
another perspective, according to them, truth is only one element, and not the 
entire work covered, so the overall efficacy of truth commissions is still intact.352  
The Oputa Commission equally agreed that public hearings are inherently 
problematic. For example, in Abuja, Lagos and Port Harcourt, the perpetrators 
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blatantly denied human rights abuse and violations alleged against them by 
victims and families. To this extent, the Commission admitted that it was not 
possible or easy to extract a measure of remorse or plea for forgiveness from 
alleged perpetrators so that reconciliation could take place. The Commission, 
however, reasoned that it believed the overwhelming evidence of many witnesses 
alleging violations of their human rights by the same set of persons or security 
agencies. In the words of the Commission “such witnesses cannot all be lying, and 
the alleged perpetrators cannot all be witnesses of truth. In such situations, the 
Commission had to read between the lines”.353   
Therefore, depending on one’s position in this matter, the question of 
absolute truth cannot be too problematic. Truth was evident in the refusal of the 
three former heads of state to appear before the Oputa Commission. Rather than 
honouring the invitation to defend the cases against them, they headed for the 
courts. Before the Oputa Commission, Nigerians knew that Dele Giwa was killed 
by General Babangida’s administration. Nigerians also knew that Chief MKO Abiola 
did not die a natural death and so the quest for the case to be reopened is in order, 
and General Abdulsalami Abubakar and his administration must answer for it. 
Thus, ‘a general truth that is known to everyone is the absolute truth.’ 
 
5.11  Conclusion 
The Oputa Commission was a stepping-stone in the attempt to settle the 
challenges of nation building in Nigeria. The Commission did a holistic job and 
revealed a mass of information hitherto unknown to Nigerians, though beset by 
institutional failure and the ambush of the Supreme Court judgment, which 
affected its implementation. Nevertheless, the Oputa Commission achieved a 
certain level of success, which benefited many Nigerians. Indeed, evidence 
showed that the new democratic government of Nigeria wanted to extricate itself 
from the odious records of military regimes, and thus had no time to investigate 
the workings of a truth commission and how it would impact on the victims of 
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human rights violations without grievances. This development was probably due 
to the fact that the ‘democratic born-again administration’ was busy chasing 
recognition, internationalization, and geopolitics of the advanced countries that 
needed an ally in the pursuit of their goals in Africa. But more importantly, 
Obasanjo’s administration wanted the whole world to know that the military had 
undergone probes and been brought to justice, and perhaps the load of sanctions 
would then be lifted. 
The early stage of the Commission was fraught with teething problems, 
such as the resignation of some members for personal reasons, and the request 
for amendment to the terms of reference and mandate in order to give the 
Commission the necessary latitude and powers to operate.354 This indicated that 
the Oputa Commission was established in a hurry, and this partly hindered its 
success in achieving total justice and reconciliation. Nevertheless, it was clear from 
the lessons of the Oputa Commission that accountability for past human rights 
violations was difficult, especially embarking on the quest for truth and justice.  
The lessons of the Oputa Commission are important in two ways. First, the 
effect of the Commission’s work on the Nigerian people, and second, lessons 
learned for countries in transition or emerging from human rights violations.  In 
the first instance, the investigation brought into the open some of the sordid 
deeds of past military dictators in the country, especially their abuse of power and 
impunity. The report confirmed already known facts about the deaths of Dele 
Giwa, MKO Abiola and Shehu Yar’dua, including the murder of Mr Owoh, and the 
three men executed by General Mohammed Buhari’s administration. 
Apart from the measure of reconciliation achieved among some warring 
communities, the Oputa Commission taught Nigerians that the actions of our 
political leaders in office could still be questioned even after the leaders have left 
office.355 It also shows that government can hide behind a court ruling, obtained 
by those who were indicted, not to release and implement the work of a truth 
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commission. Additionally, the fear that government might not release and 
implement the official report of a Panel or Commission, as happened in the case 
of the Oputa Commission, can discourage individuals from participating as 
members of a Panel or Commission.356  
In sum, the report of the Oputa Commission was not officially released but 
some of the findings and recommendations were subsequently implemented. 
These include: the National Political Review Conference 2005, chaired by Justice 
Niki Tobi; President Good luck Jonathan National Conference of 2014; the 
Constitution Review Committee headed by Senator Ken Nnamani; job creation 
masterminded by the Nigerian Economic Summit; and pruning the armed forces. 
The lessons of the Oputa Commission to nations in transition is also 
rewarding. It was noted that no one model is sacrosanct in view of the complexity 
of issues and the fact that local circumstances may be different and sometimes 
compounded by the history of the nation, its ethnic composition and political 
culture. These factors may defy attempts to subject the issues to a universally 
accepted set of rules. However, it is important and beneficial for a nation to exploit 
mixed models, or a combination of transitional justice mechanisms based on 
peculiar political and social problems. It is also pertinent that nations in transition 
should examine all aspects of the legal mandate to ensure it does not fall within 
the powers of the President of the country or the constitution of a nation, which 
affected the Oputa Commission. 
This chapter noted that the Commission met all standards and criteria of a 
truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). It invited those who were high and low 
in status in society to take part. This singular act was commendable and a lesson 
to the Nigerian people and indeed nations emerging from conflict and human 
rights violations.  
The work of the Commission is beneficial, even though it did not heal all 
the wounds of the past, because there was no reparation or compensation for 
victims of human rights violations, as happened in other countries. It achieved 
                                                          




some reconciliation among warring communities in Nigeria, such as the Maroko357 
and Modakeke/ Ife conflicts and others. 
This chapter therefore establishes the fact that a TRC must have 
compensatory benefits for victims of human rights to cushion their losses and 
some form of amnesty as an incentive for perpetrators to have confidence to 
reveal all that happened, including their partners in crime. This was what the 
Oputa Commission lacked in healing all wounds. This is a lesson to all nations in 
transition, that is, never repeat such a costly mistake in your quest for truth and 
justice. 
The goal of restoring harmony was also a tall order as Nigerians still 
struggle for power, hegemony and resource control. The struggle for domination 
between northern and southern Nigeria has been aggravated since democratic 
rule was achieved in 1999. This is because of the absence of total truth and total 
reconciliation.  
In modern times, the Igbo have been speedily calling for a declaration of 
independence for Biafra. It should be recalled that they seceded in 1966 leading 
to the Nigerian Civil War. All these events point to the fact that the Oputa 
Commission did not restore harmony to Nigerians and the Nigerian State.  
In light of the above discussion, the Oputa Commission did its best within 
the prescribed mandate and objectives, but it was affected by the lack of political 
will on the part of government coupled with the Supreme Court injunction. 
Nevertheless, its goals in achieving unity and healing past abuse could not be 
totally successful. The Commission was not the right model for the inherent 
problems in Nigeria caused by hegemony, ethnic politics and authoritarian legacy. 
The country had long been under military rule and things were done with impunity 
and recklessness. Nations in transition that intend to draw analyses from Nigeria’s 
truth commission must, as a matter of fact, examine their history, politics and 
ethnicity. 
The Oputa Commission suffered many challenges, which should also serve 
as a lesson to countries in transition. These include paucity of funds, staffing 
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issues, compensation, and assistance from donor agencies and international 
organizations, to mention a few. This chapter establishes that blame should lie 
with Olusegun Obasanjo’s government for its indifference to the Commission that 
ironically, he established.  
The Commission was partly to blame for its inability to carry out a detailed 
background check on the workings of other truth commissions before it embarked 
on the project in Nigeria. The resultant effect was the absence of compensation 
for victims and punishment for perpetrators of human rights violations and the 
battle of the judiciary. 
It also contributed to the absence of total truth and reconciliation in the 









6.1  Introduction  
This study examined wide ranging political and human rights problems that 
have confronted Nigeria from colonial times and were exacerbated after the 
military incursion into governance in 1966. The research revealed that the period 
of military rule in Nigeria witnessed untold repression and gross violation of basic 
human rights of Nigerians.1The most reprehensible acts that occurred during the 
period under study were killings that indicated either direct involvement of or 
complicity by the State and its security agencies.2 Therefore, the rule of the junta 
was categorised by subjugation of political opposition, civil society groups and the 
media. The military government and its security agents did not respect rule of law 
and due process but acted with impunity. The media were inundated with reports 
of people being harassed, detained without trial, tortured, extra-judicially 
murdered and sometimes forcibly displaced from their homes.3  
The chapters of the thesis integrate the theoretical literature in the field of 
transitional justice to evaluate the available choices for countries emanating from a 
period of conflict or gross human rights violations. Particularly relevant in evaluating 
the work of the Oputa Commission were the analysis by Adeyemo (2013),4 Guaker 
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(2009),5 Ikhariale (2008),6 Yusuf (2007),7 Akhihiero (2001/2002)8 and Kukah (2011).9  
The analysis provided clear insights on how these writers perceived the work of the 
Oputa Commission.  
The research established how the violations by the military were aimed at 
perpetuating them in power. Ihonvbere posited that years of military rule, and a 
tradition of toying around with the political class without repercussions, have 
convinced many that there are really only two 'parties' in Nigeria: the military and 
the people. Because the soldiers command the bombs, tanks, guns, and bullets, at 
least legally and in larger quantities, they regard themselves as belonging to the 
superior party.10 
The military endless transition politics reached its climax and unravelled 
under the regime of General Sani Abacha. The anti-democratic tendencies o his 
regime as well as gross violations of human rights provoked the demand for a ‘truth’ 
commission to investigate human rights violations under various military regimes. 
The need to deal with these series of events ultimately led to the establishment of 
the Oputa Commission. This thus is qualified by the statement on the role of military 
in the transition of Nigeria which goes, ‘’ It is part of the tragedy of Nigeria that when 
the military decided to intervene finally, it did not do so on the side of the electorate. 
Instead, it sided with those who voided the June 12, 1993 verdict. It sided with the 
anti-democratic cabal who had been holding the nation hostage for more than three 
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decades’’11The study discussed in detail issues relating to human rights violation in 
Nigeria from colonial times, which was then exacerbated from 1966 to 1999 when 
the military was in power. The research focused on the issues of transition politics 
of various military regimes in Nigeria, and how they used corruption, suppression of 
dissenting voices and other forms of human rights violation to perpetuate 
themselves in power. The use of ethnic politics and religion to maintain hegemony 
of the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy over other ethnic nationalities was a major setback for 
Nigeria and has prevented the country from reaching its full potential. Therefore, 
this study, posits that Nigeria's ethno-nationalities, with the Ogoni and others in the 
oil-rich Niger Delta region taking the lead, are increasingly becoming critical sites of 
manifest and latent democratic struggle.12  
The Oputa Commission was therefore established as a transitional justice 
mechanism to holistically look at human rights and political problems confronting 
Nigeria. The Commission’s mandate was to heal the wounds of the past and set a 
road map for the beginning of a new Nigeria founded by the principles of respect for 
human rights and rule of law. An analysis of the work of the Commission revealed 
that despite its shortcomings the Commission was a laudable initiative and has 
paved the way for Nigeria to achieve the dreams of its founding father and reclaim 
its rightful place in the comity of nations. The study finally looked at the lessons of 
the Oputa Commission as a transitional justice mechanism13 to Nigerians, and 
perhaps nations emerging from conflict and human rights violations. This is 
remarkable considering the challenges of unity and national development that has 
continued to confront the Nigerian state.    
The conclusion to the thesis outlined the main issues discussed in the work. 
It discusses the problems found with the process leading to the establishment of the 
Oputa Commission and how these deficiencies hampered the work of the 
Commission.14 It also contains recommendations that will foster the unity of the 
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Nigerian State, as well as the contribution to knowledge. It established the fact that 
the military, more than any other institution in the country, contributed to the decay 
of the Nigerian State.15 The military, it must be noted, found ready allies in political 
elites who collaborated with them at all times to truncate the Nigerian democracy. 
16 This is evident in the manner in which one regime after another sought politicians 
to work with them in government as ministers or political advisers.  
Historically, the Oputa Commission was set up to investigate human rights 
violation in Nigeria from July 6, 1966 to May 28, 199917. The Commission was simply 
an attempt to resolve the crisis committed by authoritarian regimes in Nigeria whose 
rule were characterised by gross violation of human rights, transition politics, 
impunity and domination. The Nigerian masses became disillusioned and helpless in 
their quest for democratic rule, justice and rule of law until civil liberty groups and 
affiliates decided to chase the military out of governance. The resistant of the people 
against the military elites was also backed by the European nations, which imposed 
sanctions on the country as a pressure to end military and human rights violations. 
As a consequence of these actions Nigeria became a pariah state, isolated in the 
comity of nations and the Nigerian economy tumbled into recession. Consequently, 
the insecurity that pervaded Nigerian society assumed a worrisome dimension, 
leading to the call for secession, war and regional autonomy. The Oputa 
Commission, in its findings, affirmed that General Abacha and his administration 
were accountable for the atrocities and human rights violations that took place 
during his tenure.18 
On June 8, 1998 General Sani Abacha died in mysterious circumstances and 
the government of Nigeria was taken over by General Abdul salami Abubakar. The 
pressure from human rights and prodemocracy organisations, institutions and 
European nations forced the new regime to acquiesce to political transition and 
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further pledged to hand over power on May 29, 1999. It was during this period that 
eminent personalities worldwide converged in Abuja to work out the new political 
process and unconditional release of Chief MKO Abiola. His sudden death created 
ethnic problems, which led to the suggestion that a truth commission be instituted, 
similar to that of South Africa, Ghana, Rwanda, and Chile. This eventually culminated 
in the establishment of the Oputa Commission. 
The thesis establishes the fact that the problems of the Nigerian State began 
with Arthur Richards’ Constitution of 1947, which introduced regionalism, ethnic 
politics and hegemony19. Attempts by the nationalists to address this anomaly 
proved abortive because Nigeria was a colonial state under the British government. 
The politicians therefore resolved that the problems of Pax Britannica would be 
addressed after self-determination.20 Unfortunately, the undemocratic attitude of 
politicians led to the emergence of military rule and the atrocities of authoritarian 
regimes. This situation subsequently brought the country to a standstill. The 
annulment of June 12, 1993 elections by the Ibrahim Babangida led administration, 
and the eventual takeover of Sani Abacha and his reign of terror made the situation 
even more complex.21  
The Nigerian State was a victim and child of circumstance. It was not 
envisaged that Nigeria would exist as a federation. Thus, the people and the nation 
lost a pan Nigerian vision, or what Professor Akinyemi has called “Pax Nigeriana”22, 
capable of taking the country to enviable heights with a sustainable political culture. 
Pre-colonial culture endowed the regions with a sustainable political and socio-
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economic way of life entirely different from one another, but adequate for social 
and economic integration.  
It was further discovered that rather than achieve constitutional 
development, this led to ethnic agitation and hegemony that further introduced 
division, resource control and domination. The challenges of empire and 
exploitation made British crusaders ignore the suggestions of nationalists to balance 
the nation equitably to avoid conflicts and human rights violations. Unfortunately, 
constitutional problems dragged on till independence when politicians believe the 
crisis would be resolved at a round table, but that was not to be; rather it culminated 
in the population census and election crises of 1964.23 
As outlined in Chapter Two, the interplay of ethnic politics and religion had 
wide-ranging and far-reaching implications for Nigeria’s political transition and 
emergent democracy. Without a balance of power between north and south, Nigeria 
as a nation was in for more trouble in future. It is therefore suggested that a sincere 
and holistic national dialogue to examine the political complexities of Nigeria and 
balance of power would be a way forward.  
The chapter established the fact that various components of the Nigerian 
State would thrive better as a confederation or loose federation, as was the case in 
some advanced countries, since it was the attempt to rid the country of corruption, 
ethnic sentiment and power imbalance that led to military political incursion in 
196624. The effect of the change from democratic rule to military administration 
meant stagnation of development for the nation. This stagnation was also 
accompanied by human rights violation and various atrocities, which eventually led 
to the Oputa Commission.  
As outlined in Chapter Four the process that led to the establishment of the 
Oputa Commission was faulty.25 The Obasanjo regime did not engage Nigerians in 
the transitional justice process.26 There were serious issues with the law establishing 
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the Commission, its appointment and funding. Despite these shortcomings the 
Commission worked to produce a report with laudable recommendations. 
The Oputa Commission was a landmark in the history of Nigeria because it 
afforded victims of human rights violation the opportunity to confront their 
opponents in the public arena. And to some extent this brought home reconciliation 
and unity to warring communities in the country but attempts at reparation and 
compensation for victims of human rights violations proved abortive and this was 
part of the Commission’s undoing.  
The chapter observed that despite the daunting challenges of budgetary 
constraints and poor staffing, the Commission rose to the occasion and produced a 
report, which no doubt delivered a holistic review of the ugly legacies of military 
rule, responsible for gross violation of human rights. 
Questions have been asked as to how much truth and reconciliation the 
Oputa Commission achieved. This debate in the quest for Nigeria’s unity and 
development remains an ongoing dialogue; the Commission was an experiment in 
the right direction, but it left behind a legacy of information. The Oputa Commission 
affirmed that Nigeria’s problems of nationhood could be traced to remote and 
immediate factors, which finally led to copious findings and recommendations to 
help victims of human rights violations in the country, but this was ignored by the 
government of Olusegun Obasanjo.27 
The Commission suggested symbolic reparation. This means there is a need 
for government to acknowledge the suffering of victims of past human rights 
violations, because some paid the supreme price with their lives. To recognise their 
worth and suffering, their birthdays or the day they died could be remembered as 
national holidays. Also, national monuments to immortalise them could be erected. 
Unfortunately, the Obasanjo’s government jettisoned these ideas on the grounds 
that there was no money. This was due to the fact that with the number of retired 
military officers and their cronies still in political positions, Obasanjo felt that 
executing the recommendations would amount to threading on a risky pathway that 
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could tilt his young regime to nose-dive into the abyss of history. Thus, to maintain 
his grip on power, even at the cost of subverting justice for the vast majority, he 
looked the other way, while his benefactors utilized their access to political decision-
making machinery to circumvent the implementation of the Commission’s 
recommendations.28 The study contended that the Obasanjo government jettisoned 
the work of the Commission for political reasons, since the Commission 
recommended punitive measures against powerful people in society, whom it 
indicted in its report and this is likely to vitiate the theory of amnesty and retributive 
justice granted to Abubakar’s regime.  
 
6.2  Findings  
 
First, the study established that ethnic politics, hegemony and prolonged 
military rule were responsible for Nigeria going backwards.29 Testimonies of senior 
military officers and those allegedly involved in coups shows that rich and powerful 
civilians were behind the military in destabilising the political transition process30. 
Second, this thesis demonstrates that the nature and impact of human 
rights violations during the extended period of authoritarian regimes were 
heinous, thus much was expected of civil society groups and affiliates to persuade 
the government to officially release the report and implement the 
recommendations of the Oputa Commission. 
Third, the experience of Oputa Commission shows that government may 
set up a truth commission, but it does not necessarily follow that government 
would implement its recommendations. This is because political considerations far 
outweigh national interests. This means that an unfavourable report would not be 
implemented if politicians could not influence its contents. 
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Fourth, past authoritarian regimes are still powerful and influential in 
Nigeria’s political space because of their ill- acquired wealth which gives them 
tremendous power and authority. 
Fifth, the Oputa Commission suffered a lot of challenges, which also serve 
as a lesson to countries in transition. These include paucity of funding, staffing, 
absence of a reparation programme the underfunding of the Commission by 
government impacted its efforts, so much so that the Commission was not able to 
carry out some of its functions.31 
Sixth, though the Commission did not bring about absolute or total truth 
and reconciliation, it succeeded in revealing the complicity of the Nigerian State in 
past human rights violations; thus, it is safe to argue that the Oputa Commission 
was not a waste of time or a diversion by the government,32 otherwise civil society 
groups and well-meaning individuals would not be calling for the release the 
report. 
Seventh, a truth and reconciliation commission must have compensatory 
benefits for victims of human rights to cushion their losses and some form of 
incentive for perpetrators to have confidence to reveal all that happened, including 
their partners in crime. This was what the Oputa Commission lacked, and this 
affected how much truth it was able to uncover.33 
Eighth, the study demonstrates that the Commission achieved an element 
of success in its mandate, particularly the cases of the Ohaneze and Arewa groups, 
Maroko and Lagos State, and Ife and Modakeke.34 These were groups and 
communities that had long been on the path of conflict and efforts by past 
governments to reconcile them proved abortive until the coming of the Oputa 
Commission.  
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Ninth, the Obasanjo’s administration, which inaugurated the Commission, 
should be blamed for the limited success achieved by the Oputa Commission. At 
the same time, the Commission was partly to blame for its inability to carry out 
detailed background discourse and adhere to the workings of other truth 
commissions before embarking on the project. This contributed to the absence of 
total truth and reconciliation in the work of the Oputa Commission. 
Tenth, the Obasanjo government jettisoned the work of the Oputa 
Commission for political reasons, since the Commission recommended punitive 
measures against powerful people in society, whom it indicted in its report.  
 
6.3  Recommendations 
 
First, Nigeria should abandon ethnic politics and religion as a prelude to its 
development. It should expunge the provisions on religion and ethnicity from the 
Constitution. This is in line with what Kasfir argues when he stresses that, ‘the most 
serious theoretical problem for most proponents of cultural pluralism and 
‘consociationalism’ is their insistence that ethnic categories be treated as self-
contained communities. Any useful concept of ethnicity must embody the 
possibility that situations evoking ethnic identity may stabilize over a period of time 
and may give birth to reinforcing institution.35 
Second, military rule and human rights violations stagnated national 
development; therefore, a total ban on coup plotting should be entrenched in the 
Nigerian Constitution, as recommended by the Oputa Commission, since coups 
were aimed at wealth accumulation, corruption and human rights violations. The 
sole reason for such recommendation is because traditionally, the problem of the 
coup d’état has been viewed as a problem of political instability. Instability, 
whether manifested in institutional gridlock or mass protests, invites members of 
the ruling elite or military to supplant the government and take the reins of power 
in their own hands.36 
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Third, the Oputa Commission as a transitional justice mechanism shows 
that nations in transition should adopt a transitional justice mechanism peculiar to 
its situation as no one model is sacrosanct for a nation in transition or conflict, 
rather a mixture of models should be exploited, as Shaw suggests too.37 
Fourth, civil society should mobilise national support to persuade the 
government to officially release the report and implement the recommendations 
of the Oputa Commission.  
Fifth, Nigeria needs a sincere and holistic national conference to resolve the 
imbalance in political and socio-economic systems. 
Sixth, the government should seriously consider conducting further 
investigations with respect to the Commissions far reaching findings. This is critical 
in cases where security agencies were implicated in unlawful deaths of Nigerians. 
6.4 Contributions to knowledge 
First, transitional justice methodologies can be used to uncover the 
atrocities and human rights violations of past authoritarian regimes.  
Second, the efficacy of truth commissions in the resolution of conflicts and 
human rights violations is an important reconciliation mechanism; if there is 
political will on the part of government.  
Third, nations in transition must first examine the dynamics of their history, 
and political and social culture before embarking on any form of transitional 
justice. This will enable them to achieve truth and reconciliation because truth 
commissions are a challenging task, often compounded by denial, total justice, 
compensation, and amnesty. 
Fourth, the Nigerian military brought about corruption and human rights 
violation in the country; there is therefore the need to strengthen all institutions 
to enable the country to move forward without the ambush of the courts. 
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Fifth, a sincere national conference is needed more than ever before in 
Nigeria to address ethnic politics, hegemony and resource control.  
 
6.5  Lessons learnt 
 
Lessons learnt from the Oputa Commission are many.  
First, the fact that a government can establish a truth commission does not 
necessarily mean it will implement the findings and recommendations, unless civil 
society groups and human rights organisations mount pressure on the government 
to release and implement such a report.  
Second, a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC), such as the Oputa 
Commission, could be inaugurated by government but allowed to die in the middle 
of its work for lack of political will and financial constraints.  
Third, a TRC could also be set up on political grounds, to divert attention 
from pressing issues of governance. The Oputa Commission suffered these 
challenges in its quest to address human rights violations and atrocities of military 
rule in Nigeria. 
Fourth, funding a TRC is one of the most important factors in achieving 
success. The challenges of most commissions lie in shortage of funds, and this was 
one of the recurring problems faced by the Oputa Commission. Perhaps the 
government did not have any idea that the work of such a Commission was capital 
intensive, and even when it became clear that the government must commit large 
sums of money if it wanted an effective truth commission, the Nigerian 
Government refused on the grounds of paucity of funds and poor economy. Thus, 
the rhetoric of lack of funds became a recurring issue throughout the life of the 
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